Seventh Circuit Review

For more than a decade, the federal judiciary has struggled to reconcile the conflict between the territorial restrictions of International Shoe's framework for personal jurisdiction and cybersquatting claims filed pursuant to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). The International Shoe framework conditions the exercise of personal jurisdiction on a geographic nexus between a nonresident defendant and the forum state. Logically, this rubric is at odds with cybersquatting--a form of trademark infringement entirely within the virtual confines of the Internet.

In uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation accused of cybersquatting by bending the International Shoe framework beyond its breaking point. Although this opinion will surely become the darling of future plaintiffs in cybersquatting suits, the divergent analyses used by the court majority and concurrence demonstrate why cybersquatting has outgrown the limitations of International Shoe.

This Note will argue that the proper means of resolving the disjunction between International Shoe and cybersquatting lies with Congress, rather than the federal courts. Thus, namely, a congressional amendment to the ACPA that provides for nationwide service of process will allow the federal judiciary to continue reaching the equitable decision seen in GoDaddy--without setting dangerous precedent that eviscerates the jurisdictional framework of International Shoe.

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In Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, a statute that mandates a daily "brief period of silence" for reflection and prayer in Illinois public schools. Though the statute fails to define the meaning of a "brief period" and provides no mechanism for enforcement, the court found that the statute possessed sufficient certainty to pass constitutional muster. The void for vagueness doctrine states that a statute with vague language is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it is generally accepted that a vague statute fails to provide notice and can lead to arbitrary enforcement, the courts have not settled on a uniform definition for the doctrine. As a result, a danger exists that courts will use the void for vagueness doctrine as a tool of reaching judicially predetermined outcomes by selecting their own interpretation of it. In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit used an interpretation of the doctrine that favored a finding of constitutionality and gave little explanation behind its rationale. This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit misapplied the void for vagueness doctrine in finding that the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act was constitutional.

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More than ever, domestic courts are asked to resolve international disputes, often requiring domestic courts to analyze and apply foreign law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 sets the basic parameters for raising and determining foreign law issues in federal courts. In Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., the Seventh Circuit debated the propriety of relying on foreign law experts to aid the court in determining foreign law, even though Rule 44.1 specifically authorizes that practice. Two of the appellate judges argued that published materials such as treatises and foreign law translations were more reliable than expert testimony. This Note analyzes whether that methodology allows American judges to make accurate determinations of foreign laws, which are often written in a foreign language, conceived in a different political system, and established as part of another cultural tradition.

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In its recent decision in United States v. Carlisle, the Seventh Circuit made clear that challenging the constitutionality of a search is no easy task. Although the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government intrusion, defendants seeking to suppress evidence must first prove a reasonable expectation of privacy. This Note will use Carlisle as a basis of exploring the law of Fourth Amendment standing. This Note will argue that the Seventh Circuit applied a flawed test in evaluating a defendant's subjective expectation of privacy, but nevertheless arrived at a result supported by existing precedent. Finally, this Note will examine the policy concerns surrounding Fourth Amendment standing.

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