Seventh Circuit Review

In EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, the Seventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court precedent of the last decade that has increasingly narrowed the determination of what constitutes a disabled individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act in an attempt to restore the ADA to its original purpose and the original vision of the ADA's drafters and supporters. Whether these amendments will produce dramatic changes in the way the administrative agencies and courts apply the ADA remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the only way the ADA or its amendments will successfully protect against disability discrimination is if the concept of disability in America changes along with the laws. To help break down the myths, stereotypes, and fears surrounding the concept of disability that continues today, this article suggests that instead of the dichotomous nature of determining disability, we instead consider everyone to be on a continuum of disability. By locating every individual on the disability spectrum, not only do we change the concept of disability, but we also make it easier for people to fall under the protections of the ADA so that a determination of discrimination claims can be based on the merits of the case, not merely on a narrow rendering of the definition of disability.

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The Seventh Circuit in Tate v. Executive Management Services, Inc. faced the issue of whether an employee who rebuffs his supervisor's sexual advances engaged in the kind of opposition to an unlawful employment practice protected by Title VII's retaliation provision. The retaliation provision requires that an employee oppose any unlawful employment practice but does not define "oppose." The Eighth Circuit has held that an employee engages "the most basic form of protected activity" by rebuffing a supervisor's sexual advances. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has found that an express rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances does not qualify as opposition activity. The Seventh Circuit in Tate acknowledged the circuit split, declined to decide the issue, and decided the case on other grounds.

The result of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Tate, however, is that an employee who was given an ultimatum by his supervisor to choose between sex and his job, and was fired when he refused to sleep with his supervisor, was not protected under Title VII's retaliation clause. This Comment explores this issue by examining the language of Title VII's retaliation provision, the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the meaning of "oppose" in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., the purposes behind the retaliation clause, and the practical implications of this issue. This Comment concludes that in most circumstances, an employee who rebuffs a supervisor's sexual advances has opposed an unlawful employment practice and that by disregarding these concerns, the court's result in Tate was incorrect.

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With over one million fatalities occurring every year on the world's roadways, the safety of motorists, passengers, and pedestrians is a major public policy concern. In an effort to address this policy concern and prevent roadway fatalities and accidents, communities across the county have implemented automated enforcement technology systems, such as red light cameras. Proponents of red light camera legislation believe the laws are constitutional and effective, but critics claim that such laws fail to pass the rational-basis test required of all legislation. In Idris v. City of Chicago, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether a red light camera ordinance meets the requirements of the rational-basis test under both equal protection and due process. In a very brief analysis, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the red light camera ordinance passes the rational-basis test; however, this Note argues that the court's application of the test was insufficient. Further, this Note expands upon the Seventh Circuit's reasoning by considering additional arguments raised by red light camera critics and discusses the implications of the court's decision for automated enforcement technology systems.

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Counterterrorism experts agree that, because money is the lifeblood of terrorists, one of the most effective means of combating terrorism is eradicating vital sources of funding. Recognizing this, Congress passed legislation throughout the 1990s that holds individuals criminally liable for providing financial or other material support to terrorists or terrorist organizations. Additionally, Congress created a civil remedy for victims who are injured or killed by reason of an act of international terrorism. In the first case to utilize the 18 U.S.C. § 2333 civil cause of action, the parents of David Boim, a Jewish-American teenager killed in Israel by alleged Hamas terrorists, filed suit in 2000 against several individuals and nonprofit organizations that allegedly funneled money to Hamas through charitable "fronts" for Hamas. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has addressed Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development on three occasions: on an interlocutory appeal in Boim I, on appeal from a $156 million jury verdict in Boim II, and, most recently, on rehearing en banc in Boim III, in which the Seventh Circuit held that defendants who donate or provide other material support to terrorist or terrorist-linked organizations are liable under § 2333 as long as they knew that the donee organization engages in terrorism. This Note discusses the Boim III majority opinion written by Judge Posner, as well as a dissenting opinion written by Judge Rovner. By analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of both judges' frameworks, this Note concludes that neither framework provides the ideal basis for liability. Accordingly, this Note proposes an alternative structure for § 2333 liability that can guide other courts in applying this vitally important statute to complicated situations like that in Boim.

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Following a federal jury trial, losing litigants may seek a new trial by challenging, or impeaching, the validity of the jury's verdict. It is well recognized that, unlike fine wine, steaks, and cheese, lawsuits do not improve with age because as time passes, memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is often lost. Accordingly, society has as interest verdict finality, but few would deny a litigant, especially a criminal defendant, a new trial if the jury's verdict was tainted by something external to the protections of the courtroom. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict; hence, it protects the individual jurors from, inter alia, harassment by losing litigants and it protects society's interest in verdict finality. However, an outright prohibition of juror testimony may destroy the only evidence that shows a tainted or mistaken verdict, thus Rule 606(b) has carved out three exceptions under which a juror may testify. One exception permits juror testimony concerning "extraneous prejudicial information." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently addressed this little-known rule in Arreola v. Choudry. While the court correctly addressed the merits in this case, it provided little guidance to the district courts for future application of "extraneous prejudicial information" under Rule 606(b). This article will attempt to clarify how to determine extraneous prejudicial information and how courts should proceed when such information was present during deliberations.

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In 2007, the collapse of the housing market and the developing trend of state court filings of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act culminated into a new type of securities litigation: state court filings of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities in general and mortgage-backed securities in particular. Thus, it became important for defendants to remove these claims to federal court. Permitting removal of such claims appears to conflict with the Securities Act, which broadly prohibits removal of claims arising under the Securities Act. But prohibiting removal is in tension with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which generally permits removal of class actions. This article considers whether the Securities Act bars removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. Part I of this article provides a background on the issue and explains the general framework of removal and the conflicting provisions of the Securities Act and the Class Action Fairness Act. Next, Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit's holding in Luther v. Countrywide that the Securities Act bars removal of a class action alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to mortgage-backed securities. Part III analyzes the Seventh Circuit's decision in Katz v. Gerardi, in which the court disagreed with Luther and held that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions that allege violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. Finally, Part IV analyzes and expands on the reasoning of the Luther and Katz courts, concluding that the Seventh Circuit decided correctly that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities.

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