Moreover, to the extent that prior case law such as Dorfman and Richter held that a mail fraud or a wire fraud charge can be based on the deprivation of intangible rights so long as a fiduciary relationship exists between the victim and the defendant, those cases are no longer good law. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that such a charge can be based on the deprivation of an intangible right -- fiduciary relationship or not -- in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 97 L. Ed. 2d 292, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320, 98 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1987). The McNally Court ruled that a mail fraud charge must be based on the deprivation of property. Id. However, the property which forms the basis for a wire fraud or mail fraud charge can be "intangible" property. See Bateman v. United States, 875 F.2d 1304, 1306 & n. 2 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 922, 110 S. Ct. 1956, 109 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1990). This distinction between intangible property and intangible rights has somewhat muddled the ruling in McNally. Id.