Mullen v. Hawkins
40 N.E. 797 (1895)
[Mullen wished to take out a loan on land that he owned. The lenders were worried that Hawkins might have a claim to the land, and hence that Mullen's title was not clear. Mullen asked Hawkins to sign a quit-claim deed to the land. The court notes that Hawkins told Mullen that Hawkins "had no interest in said land; that he had theretofore conveyed it to one of [Mullen's] remote grantors, but, the [Mullen] continued to insist on the deed, and offered him $50 if [Hawkins] and his wife would go to Marion--about seven miles--and execute the deed, he accepted the offer, went with his wife to Marion, and executed the quitclaim deed, for which appellant executed to him [a promissory note for $50]." Mullen later refused to pay off the note, and Hawkins sued for the money.]
It is sufficient to say that “it is well settled that, in the absence of covenants of warranty or for title or proof of fraud, a failure of title is no defense to an action for the purchase money of real estate” Stratton v. Kennard, 74 Ind. 302 . . . If such failure of title is no defense, then it does not amount to a failure of consideration for the note executed to procure the conveyance.
The “failure of title” refers to the fact that Hawkins had no valid claim on the land; he did not even have an argument that he had such a claim; in fact, he insisted he did not. It follows that when Hawkins signed the quit claim deed and hence promised to forego any claim against the land, he was not really giving up any claim, or even any arguable claim, to the land.
The court insists that, even so, there was no failure of consideration.
Where a party voluntarily and without fraud or deception enters into a contract, and receives all he contracted for, he cannot be relieved on the ground of inadequacy or want of consideration. . . . Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39. . . .
What Mullen wanted was a quitclaim deed to convince the bank that he held absolutely clear title.
(a) Mullen did not get what he wanted.
(B) Mullen got what he wanted.
The evidence on behalf of the appellee was sufficient to warrant the trial court in finding that there was a sufficient consideration to support the note . . . , even though appellee had no interest in the real estate quitclaimed. . . . We think . . . that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial. Judgment affirmed.