Incorrect.  Here is the crucial part of the court's reasoning. 

The court asserts:  (1) "Suppose the plaintiffs had another shaft in their possession put up or putting up at the time, and that they only wished to send back their broken shaft to the engineer who made it; it is clear that this would be quite consistent with the above circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the delivery would have no effect upon the intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again, suppose that, at the time of the delivery to the carrier, the machinery of the mill had been in other respects defective, then , also, the same results would follow."

From (1), they conclude: (2) It is obvious that, in the great multitude of cases millers sending off broken shafts to third parties by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these special circumstances were here never communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It follow, therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract.

The problem is that (1) notes that certain things are possible.  (2) however asserts that those same things are the things normally true.  This does not follow.  It is possible that you will be run over by a car when you cross the street, but his normally does not happen. 

Is there a better justification for the decision in Hadley?  The next question raises the same issue in the context of another case.

Continue