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Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal
Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payment to Named Plaintiffs in Emloyment Discrimination Class Actions Abstract By Employment Discrimination class actions (EDCA) are
complex creatures for many reasons. One complexity involves the resolution
of EDCAs, which typically includes a provision for an incentive award
or "bonus" for name plaintiffs. This Article describes five
models under which courts struggle with awarding incentive awards to
named plaintiffs in EDCAs. It examines how (under which model) and why
(upon what justification) courts award or refuse to award incentive
payments. This examination illustrates that courts have failed to differentiate
between incentive payments that further Title VII's statutory goal of
workplace fairness and other litigation matters, such as securities
litigation or consumer credit actions. In short, courts too ofter restrict
incentives in EDCAs based on rationales better suited to less public-minded
consumer or other class actions. By conflating the different models,
instead of recognizing the difference between distinct and varied areas
of substantive law, courts have severely limited the incentive for plaintiffs
to bring meritorious and worthwhil discrimination claims on a class
basis. This article aims to refocus the inquiry of Title VII incentive
payments back on the statutory goals of the civil rights initiative
and argues that courts must stop applying rationales from other lcass
claims to EDCAs.
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