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Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal
By Edward A. Marshall Abstract This article endeavors to reveal the flaws with the courts'
current construction of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, under
which employees resorting to internal complaint mechanisms receive only
the most austere protection from retaliation under the opposition clause.
Perhaps the most obvious victims of this diluted protection are the
employees, torn between avoiding the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
by reporting discriminatory treatment as soon as it becomes evident,
or avoiding actionable retaliation when their grievances are filed before
the discrimination could "reasonably" be perceived as unlawful.
Employees, however, are by no means the only victims of these weak retaliatory
safeguards. Limiting employee retaliation protection in the context
of internal grievance mechanisms to the opposition clause also works
an equally undesirable result upon employers, who are virtually powerless
to prevent the current epidemic of underutilization of these prophylactic
internal procedures. Instead, employers must endure massive legal expenditures
to combat discrimination litigation, as well as the decreased productivity
and increased employee absenteeism and turnover that commonly result
from workplace discrimination, all in exchange for a retaliatory "right"
that is essentially worthless after the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Ellerth, Faragher and Kolstad. Despite this mutually detrimental
impact, the current regime of austere protection cannot be said to effectively
preserve any significant incentive for employer's to establish internal
grievance procedures-and even the benefits produced by the marginal
incentive that remains are largely illusory, as the incentive is preserved
only at the expense of utilization. |
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