Toward a New Employer-Worker Compact
By
Gary Chartier
Abstract
Employers and workers alike could benefit if the legal
and regulatory regime that currently governs their relationships were
significantly transformed. Each group would bear significant costs,
but the result could be a net improvement in American economic life.
On the model I elaborate here, unions would perform
a much narrower range of functions than they do at present. An array
of other, more specialized, entities would take over responsibility
for these functions—including negotiating and interpreting contracts
and participating in corporate governance—from unions. Unions
would be limited to the tasks of building community among workers, fostering
cross-firm links, and serving as public advocates for workers. Employers
would gain the freedom to negotiate about a variety of issues currently
resolved by law and regulation, seeking flexible, tailored solutions
to their problems, provided they negotiated with workers as a group.
Employers would enhance performance and reduce conflict with workers
by accepting participatory management and ownership schemes. Workers
would give up some means of fostering job security in return for guarantees
of fairness and due process. Corporations and unions alike would stop
spending money on election campaigns, and would accept limits on their
ability to spend stockholders’ and members’ money on lobbying
efforts, and corruption-reducing “clean money” campaigns
would become the norm. And corporations and unions alike would take
less responsibility for traditional benefits, accepting the cost reductions
effected by the sharing of responsibility for benefits as compensation
for the loss of influence attendant on the loss of control over these
benefits.
I label this model a “compact” because it is intended to
emerge from a genuine bargain between owners and workers. Workers and
employers could effect some terms of this bargain simply by agreeing
to particular contract terms or agreeing to negotiate in particular
ways. Much of the compact, however, could be brought into being only
through national legislation. Existing laws related to labor relations,
corporate governance, and campaign finance would need to be changed
so to make some of the compact’s provisions legal. In addition,
legal changes would be needed to establish uniform standards and a level
playing field; even when some changes might be made voluntarily by some
unions or employers, others might not be prepared to go along.
In Part II of the Article, I explain why collective bargaining is appropriate
and necessary, but why it does not need to be conducted by unions and
why it might make sense to separate the collective bargaining function
from the other functions unions perform. Then, I outline an alternative,
non-union collective bargaining mechanism, a workforce negotiating team.
In Part III, I outline and defend a set of arrangements designed to
foster greater participation by workers in firm decision-making: enterprise
committees, work teams, open-book management techniques, and worker
stock ownership and board membership. In Part IV, I indicate why, given
the operation of negotiating teams and other mechanisms for worker participation,
some protections currently afforded by legislation could be determined
in a more market-friendly manner. In Part VI, I suggest that capital
and labor opt for new rules regarding termination, and consider abandoning
strict work rules and seniority norms, which would be less necessary
under the compact. In Part VI, I focus on an area of particular concern
to many critics of unions and corporations—their roles in elections.
I suggest that union and corporate donations to campaigns be banned
in their entirety, that unions be permitted to promote policy and electoral
outcomes only using completely voluntary dues (under the compact, there
would be no compulsory union dues, of course), but that, in return,
both sides ought to agree to support public funding of federal and state
election campaigns. In Part VII, I argue that corporations should leave
the health-care business and that unions and corporations alike should
leave the pension business. In Part VIII, I examine the trade-offs I
have proposed and argue for the compact as a package with the potential
to offer a bargain of value to both sides.