Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, HALL, [FN*] Senior Circuit Judge, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.
 

FN* Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Manuel Julio Cardales ("Cardales"), Robinson Rafael Hernandez ("Hernandez"), and Arkel Hawkins Peterson ("Peterson") appeal their convictions for aiding and abetting each other in the possession with intent to distribute marijuana on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced Cardales to 120 months in prison, Hernandez to 78 months in prison, and Peterson to 121 months in prison. Peterson appeals his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.

[2] To satisfy due process, our application of the MDLEA must not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49; see also Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056. In determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by principles of international law. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n. 2. Under the "territorial principle" of international law, a "state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the extent provided by international agreement with the other state." United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988). In Robinson, we decided that the United States had jurisdiction over a Panamanian vessel stopped over 500 miles off shore because the Panamanian government authorized the United States to apply U.S. law to the persons on board the vessel. See id. (recognizing informal authorization as valid agreement for purposes of territorial principle, and affirming conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 955a, statutory precursor to MDLEA). In this case, the Venezuelan government authorized the United States to apply United States law to the persons on board the CORSICA. Therefore, jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the territorial principle of international law.
[3] In addition, under the "protective principle" of international law, a nation is permitted "to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security." Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3; see United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.) (characterizing protective principle as applying only to conduct generally recognized among nations as a crime), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2306, 20 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1968). Consistent with this principle, Congress specifically found in the MDLEA that "trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is universally condemned [, and] ... presents a specific threat to the security ... of the United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902. Therefore, application of the MDLEA to the defendants is consistent with the protective principle of international law because Congress has determined that all drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens our nation's security. See Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056 ("Inasmuch as trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is 'fundamentally unfair' for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas."); cf. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804) ("[A nation's] power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.").
We therefore hold that when individuals engage in drug trafficking aboard a vessel, due process is satisfied when the foreign nation in which the vessel is registered authorizes the application of United States law to the persons on board the vessel. When the foreign flag nation consents to the application of United States law, jurisdiction attaches under the statutory requirements of the MDLEA without violation of due process or the principles of international law because the flag nation's consent eliminates any concern that the application of United States law may be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. [FN2]
 

FN2. In Martinez-Hidalgo, the Third Circuit stated that the MDLEA "expresses the necessary congressional intent to override international law to the extent that international law might require a nexus to the United

States." 993 F.2d at 1056. The question of whether Congress intended to override international law is not presented here. To the extent that international law requires a nexus to the United States, that nexus requirement is not overridden by the MDLEA, but instead is satisfied by the foreign flag nation's authorization to apply U.S. law to the defendants and by the congressional finding that drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens the security of the United States.

First, the government introduced evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the United States had jurisdiction over the defendants. The government introduced testimony that the Venezuelan government authorized the Coast Guard crew to board and search the CORSICA. In addition, the Venezuelan government authorized the United States to apply United States law to the CORSICA's crew. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(C).
Second, the government introduced evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the crew of the CORSICA had possessed the bales of marijuana found floating in the ocean. The government introduced evidence that (1) there were impressions in the CORSICA's carpet that matched the shape of the marijuana bales; (2) there was yellow dye on the CORSICA's carpet that matched yellow dye found in the bricks of marijuana; (3) there were cardboard pieces and packing tape on board the CORSICA that matched the materials used to package the marijuana; (4) the pieces of plastic removed from the CORSICA's carpet matched the thickness and type of plastic used to package the bales; (5) there was a piece of what appeared to be a marijuana stem on the CORSICA that tested positive for THC; and (6) a narcotics dog aboard the CORSICA alerted Coast Guard officers to *555

(Cite as: 168 F.3d 548, *555)

the presence of drugs. In addition, the government introduced testimony that traced the bales found floating in the water to the location of the CORSICA at the time the bales were allegedly thrown overboard.
In addition, the government introduced sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer that the defendants knowingly possessed the marijuana. The government demonstrated that the defendants evaded the Coast Guard helicopter for over two hours, turning off their navigation lights when it got dark, failing to respond to radio contact even though their radio was working, and refusing to allow the Coast Guard crew to board when finally stopped. See United States v. Leuro-Rosas, 952 F.2d 616, 622 (1stCir.1991); United States v. Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 985 (1st Cir.1990). The government demonstrated that the CORSICA was riding low in the water, suggesting that the CORSICA was laden with illegal cargo. See Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d at 131. The government demonstrated that the defendants tried to mask the presence of the marijuana by pouring gasoline on the CORSICA's deck. See United States v. Romero, 32 F.3d 641, 645 (1st Cir.1994). The government demonstrated that the CORSICA was carrying a large amount of marijuana relative to its size. See Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d at 131; United States v. Cuevas-Esquivel, 905 F.2d 510, 515 (1st Cir.1990). The government demonstrated that the defendants had traveled a great distance to reach the location where they were spotted. See Piedrahita-Santiago, 931 F.2d at 131; United States v. Corpus, 882 F.2d 546, 550 (1st Cir.1989). The government demonstrated that the defendants shared close relationships with each other because the three of them were on board a boat that was only forty-two feet long, they were all Colombians, and they worked closely together to operate the CORSICA. See Cuevas, 905 F.2d at 515. Finally, the government demonstrated that the marijuana recovered had a street value of up to $8 million. [FN5] See Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d at 985.

FN5. Although Peterson claimed in an issue heading in his brief that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the marijuana's street value, Peterson failed to develop this argument in his brief, and therefore waived review of this argument. See Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 61 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir.1995).

Third, the government introduced evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer that the defendants intended to distribute the marijuana. The government demonstrated that lookouts aboard the GROVES spotted over twenty bales floating in the water. The crew of the GROVES recovered seventeen of the bales, which contained over 1080 pounds of marijuana. The jury reasonably could infer from the quantity of marijuana recovered that the defendants intended to distribute the marijuana. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 344; United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.1993).

[16] Second, Peterson contends that the district court erred by preventing his trial counsel from refreshing the recollection of one of the government's witnesses. However, the district court merely prevented Peterson's counsel from repeatedly and improperly asking, "Has your recollection been refreshed?" to impeach the government's witness when the witness had never indicated that he did not recall his previous statements. The district court did not otherwise prevent Peterson's counsel from legitimately refreshing the recollection of this witness.
[17] Third, Peterson contends that the district court erred by permitting the government to refresh the recollection of one of its witnesses during redirect examination. The district court did not abuse its discretion when, after Officer Epps testified that his report did not mention a field test on a marijuana stem, it allowed the government to refresh Epps' recollection by showing Epps his report indicating that he had field tested a marijuana stem. Cf. United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.) (refreshing recollection by reading reports of interviews given to FBI agents), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1258, 117 S.Ct. 2424, 138 L.Ed.2d 187 (1997).
[18] Fourth, Peterson contends that the district court erred by not permitting Peterson to refresh the recollection of one of the government's witnesses during cross examination. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Peterson's request to refresh Officer Langevin's recollection with log books Langevin did not prepare when Langevin could not recall whether Epps had field tested a piece of cardboard or some other material. See United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir.1979); cf. NLRB v. Federal Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 489 n. 3 (1stCir.1962) (forbidding misuse of written aids).
[19] Fifth, Peterson contends that the district court erred by allowing one of the government's witnesses to testify about corroborating evidence of the defendant's guilt. The district court did not err by permitting Officer Taravela to testify about the corroborating evidence because Cardales' counsel asked Taravela about the cause for the defendants' arrests, thereby opening the door for the government to explore on redirect the grounds for the arrests. Cf. *558

(Cite as: 168 F.3d 548, *558)

United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1226 (1st Cir.1979).
Because we find that the district court did not err in any of the evidentiary rulings challenged on appeal, Peterson's cumulative error argument necessarily fails.

Peterson's argument that the district court enhanced his sentence merely for being convicted after testifying in his defense is without merit. The district court specifically stated that it was not enhancing Peterson's sentence on that improper basis, and engaged in a detailed discussion of the perjurious nature of Peterson's testimony.