Supreme Court of the United States
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v.
ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC., et al.
Maria Del Rosario Ortega, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Star-Kist Foods, Inc.
___ U.S. ___
125 S.Ct. 2611
Nos. 04-70, 04-79.
Argued March 1, 2005.
Decided June 23, 2005.
No. 04-70, 333
F.3d 1248, affirmed; and No. 04-79, 370
F.3d 124, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, O'CONNOR, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases present the question
whether a federal court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum
amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the claims are part of the same
case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient
amount in controversy. Our decision
turns on the correct interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1367. The question has divided the
Courts of Appeals, and we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 543
U.S. ----, 125 S.Ct. 314, 160 L.Ed.2d 221 (2004).
We hold that, where the other elements of
jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action
satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does
authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III
case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional
amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in No. 04-70, and we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in No. 04- 79.
I
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a
class-action suit against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida.
The dealers alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by Exxon under
which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon. The plaintiffs invoked the District Court's § 1332(a)
diversity jurisdiction. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocutory review,
asking whether it had properly exercised § 1367
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members who did not meet the
jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy.
*2616 The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court's extension of supplemental
jurisdiction to these class members. Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
333 F.3d 1248 (2003). "[W]e find," the court held,
"that § 1367 clearly
and unambiguously provides district courts with the authority in diversity
class actions to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims of class members who do not meet the minimum
amount in controversy as long as the district court has original jurisdiction
over the claims of at least one of the class representatives." Id.,
at 1256.
This decision accords with the views of the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See
Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc.,
263 F.3d 110 (C.A.4 2001); Olden
v. LaFarge Corp.,
383 F.3d 495 (C.A.6 2004); Stromberg
Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,
77 F.3d 928 (C.A.7 1996); In
re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation,
123 F.3d 599 (C.A.7 1997). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, adopting a similar analysis of the statute, have held that in a
diversity class action the unnamed class members need not meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the named class members do. These decisions, however, are unclear on
whether all the named plaintiffs must satisfy this requirement. In
re Abbott Labs.,
51 F.3d 524 (C.A.5 1995); Gibson
v. Chrysler Corp.,
261 F.3d 927 (C.A.9 2001).
In the other case now before us the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit took a different position on the meaning of § 1367(a). 370
F.3d 124 (2004).
In that case, a 9-year-old girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking
damages for unusually severe injuries she received when she sliced her finger
on a tuna can. Her family joined in the
suit, seeking damages for emotional distress
and certain medical expenses. The
District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist, finding that none of the
plaintiffs met the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
however, ruled that the injured girl, but not her family members, had made
allegations of damages in the requisite amount.
The Court of Appeals then addressed whether,
in light of the fact that one plaintiff met the requirements for original
jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining plaintiffs' claims
was proper under § 1367. The court
held that § 1367 authorizes
supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original
jurisdiction over the action, and that in a diversity case original
jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement.
Although the Court of Appeals claimed to "express no view" on
whether the result would be the same in a class action, id.,
at 143, n. 19, its analysis is inconsistent with
that of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
view of § 1367 is,
however, shared by the Courts of Appeal for the Third, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, and the latter two Courts of Appeals have expressly applied this rule
to class actions. See
Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
166 F.3d 214 (C.A.3 1999); Trimble
v. Asarco, Inc.,
232 F.3d 946 (C.A.8 2000); Leonhardt
v. Western Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631 (C.A.10 1998).
A
[1] The district courts of the United States, as we have said
many times, are "courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute," *2617Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128
L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). In order to provide a federal forum for
plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the
district courts original jurisdiction in federal-question cases--civil actions
that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 1331. In order to provide a neutral
forum for what have come to be known as diversity cases, Congress also has
granted district courts original jurisdiction in civil actions between citizens
of different States, between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens, or by foreign
states against U.S. citizens. § 1332. To ensure that diversity jurisdiction does
not flood the federal courts with minor disputes, § 1332(a)
requires that the matter in controversy in a diversity case exceed a specified
amount, currently $75,000. § 1332(a).
Although the district courts may not exercise
jurisdiction absent a statutory basis, it is well established--in certain
classes of cases--that, once a court has original jurisdiction over some claims
in the action, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims
that are part of the same case or
controversy. The leading modern case for
this principle is Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). In Gibbs, the plaintiff alleged the defendant's conduct violated
both federal and state law. The District Court, Gibbs held, had original jurisdiction over the action based on
the federal claims. Gibbs confirmed that the District Court had the additional power
(though not the obligation) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
state claims that arose from the same Article III case or controversy. Id.,
at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ("The federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
court ... .[A]ssuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power
in federal courts to hear the whole").
As we later noted, the decision allowing
jurisdiction over pendent state claims in Gibbs did not mention, let alone come to grips with, the text of
the jurisdictional statutes and the bedrock principle that federal courts have
no jurisdiction without statutory authorization. Finley
v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 548, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). In Finley, we nonetheless reaffirmed and rationalized Gibbs and its progeny by inferring from it the interpretive
principle that, in cases involving supplemental jurisdiction over additional
claims between parties properly in federal court, the jurisdictional statutes
should be read broadly, on the assumption that in this context Congress
intended to authorize courts to exercise their full Article III power to dispose of an "
'entire action before the court [which] comprises but one constitutional
"case." ' " 490
U.S., at 549, 109 S.Ct. 2003 (quoting Gibbs,
supra,
at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130).
We have not, however, applied Gibbs' expansive interpretive approach to other aspects of the
jurisdictional statutes. For instance,
we have consistently interpreted § 1332 as
requiring complete diversity: In a case
with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of
a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the
district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action. Strawbridge
v. Curtiss,
3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 375, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). The complete
diversity requirement is not mandated by the Constitution, State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 530- 531, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967), or by the plain text of § 1332(a). The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the
complete diversity *2618 rule in light of the purpose of the diversity
requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where
state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants. The presence of parties from
the same State on both sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a
principal reason for conferring § 1332
jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action. See Wisconsin
Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 389, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998); Newman-Green,
Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U.S. 826, 829, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989). The specific
purpose of the complete diversity rule explains both why we have not adopted Gibbs ' expansive interpretive approach to this aspect of the
jurisdictional statute and why Gibbs does not undermine the complete diversity rule. In order for a federal court to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, it must first have original jurisdiction over at least one
claim in the action. Incomplete
diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, so there
is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction can adhere.
In contrast to the diversity requirement, most
of the other statutory prerequisites for federal jurisdiction, including the
federal-question and amount-in-controversy requirements, can be analyzed claim
by claim. True, it does not follow by
necessity from this that a district court has authority to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over all claims provided there is original
jurisdiction over just one. Before the
enactment of § 1367, the Court
declined in contexts other than the pendent-claim instance to follow Gibbs' expansive approach to interpretation of the
jurisdictional statutes. The Court took
a more restrictive view of the proper interpretation of these statutes in
so-called pendent-party cases involving supplemental jurisdiction over claims
involving additional parties--plaintiffs or defendants--where the district courts would lack original jurisdiction over
claims by each of the parties standing alone.
Thus, with respect to plaintiff-specific
jurisdictional requirements, the Court held in Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001 (1939),
that every plaintiff must separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement. Though Clark was a federal-question case, at that time federal-question
jurisdiction had an amount-in-controversy requirement analogous to the
amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases. "Proper
practice," Clark held, "requires that where each of several plaintiffs
is bound to establish the jurisdictional amount with respect to his own claim,
the suit should be dismissed as to those who fail to show that the requisite
amount is involved." Id.,
at 590, 59 S.Ct. 744. The Court reaffirmed this rule, in the
context of a class action brought invoking § 1332(a)
diversity jurisdiction, in Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973). It follows "inescapably" from Clark, the Court held in Zahn, that "any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount
must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally
sufficient claims." 414
U.S., at 300, 94 S.Ct. 505.
The Court took a similar approach with respect
to supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants that
fall outside the district courts' original jurisdiction. In Aldinger
v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413,
49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976), the plaintiff brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against county officials in district court pursuant to the
statutory grant of jurisdiction in 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976 ed.). The plaintiff
further alleged the court had supplemental jurisdiction over her related
state-law claims against *2619 the county, even though the county was
not suable under § 1983 and so was
not subject to § 1343(3)'s
original jurisdiction. The Court held
that supplemental jurisdiction could not be exercised because Congress, in
enacting § 1343(3), had
declined (albeit implicitly) to extend federal jurisdiction over any party who
could not be sued under the federal civil rights statutes. 427
U.S., at 16-19, 96 S.Ct. 2413. "Before it can be concluded that
[supplemental] jurisdiction [over additional parties] exists," Aldinger held, "a federal court must satisfy itself not only
that Art[icle] III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring
jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its
existence." Id.,
at 18, 96 S.Ct. 2413.
In Finley
v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593
(1989), we confronted a similar issue in a
different statutory context. The
plaintiff in Finley brought a Federal Tort Claims Act negligence suit against
the Federal Aviation Administration in District Court, which had original
jurisdiction under § 1346(b). The plaintiff tried to add related claims
against other defendants, invoking the District Court's supplemental jurisdiction over so-called pendent
parties. We held that the District Court
lacked a sufficient statutory basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over these claims. Relying primarily on Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger, we held in Finley that "a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving
particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims
by or against different parties." 490
U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. While Finley did not "limit or impair" Gibbs' liberal approach to interpreting the jurisdictional
statutes in the context of supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims
involving the same parties, 490
U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003, Finley nevertheless declined to extend that interpretive
assumption to claims involving additional parties. Finley held that in the context of parties, in contrast to
claims, "we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been
congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes
broadly." Id.,
at 549, 109 S.Ct. 2003.
As the jurisdictional statutes existed in
1989, then, here is how matters stood:
First, the diversity requirement in § 1332(a)
required complete diversity; absent
complete diversity, the district court lacked original jurisdiction over all of
the claims in the action. Strawbridge,
3 Cranch, at 267-268, 2 L.Ed. 435; Kroger,
437 U.S., at 373-374, 98 S.Ct. 2396. Second, if the district court had original
jurisdiction over at least one claim, the jurisdictional statutes implicitly
authorized supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims between the same parties arising out of the same Article III
case or controversy. Gibbs,
383 U.S., at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130. Third, even when the district court had
original jurisdiction over one or more claims between particular parties, the
jurisdictional statutes did not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over
additional claims involving other parties.
Clark,
supra,
at 590, 59 S.Ct. 744; Zahn,
supra,
at 300-301, 94 S.Ct. 505; Finley,
supra,
at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003.
B
In Finley we emphasized that "[w]hatever we say regarding the
scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular statute can of course be
changed by Congress." 490
U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. In 1990, Congress accepted the
invitation. It passed the Judicial
Improvements Act, 104 Stat. 5089, which enacted § 1367, the
provision which controls these cases.
Section
1367 provides, in relevant part:
"(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or
as expressly provided otherwise *2620 by Federal statute, in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
"(b) In any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded solely on section
1332 of this title, the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule
24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section
1332."
All parties to this litigation and all courts
to consider the question agree that § 1367 overturned
the result in Finley. There is no
warrant, however, for assuming that § 1367 did no
more than to overrule Finley and otherwise to codify the existing state of the law of
supplemental jurisdiction. We must not
give jurisdictional statutes a more expansive interpretation than their text
warrants, 490
U.S., at 549, 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003; but it is just as important not to adopt an
artificial construction that is narrower than what the text provides. No sound canon of interpretation requires
Congress to speak with extraordinary clarity in order to modify the rules of
federal jurisdiction within appropriate constitutional bounds. Ordinary
principles of statutory construction apply.
In order to determine the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction authorized by § 1367, then, we
must examine the statute's text in light of context, structure, and related
statutory provisions.
[2] Section
1367(a) is a broad grant of supplemental
jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as
the action is one in which the district courts would have original
jurisdiction. The last sentence of § 1367(a) makes
it clear that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction extends to claims involving
joinder or intervention of additional parties.
The single question before us, therefore, is whether a diversity case in
which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement, but the claims of others plaintiffs do not, presents a "civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction." If the answer is yes, § 1367(a) confers
supplemental jurisdiction over all claims, including those that do not
independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, if the claims are
part of the same Article III case or controversy. If the answer is no, § 1367(a) is
inapplicable and, in light of our holdings in Clark and Zahn, the district court has no statutory basis for exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the additional claims.
We now conclude the answer must be yes. When the well-pleaded complaint contains at
least one claim that satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, and there
are no other relevant jurisdictional defects, the district court, beyond all question, has
original jurisdiction over that claim.
The presence of other claims in the complaint, over which the district
court may lack original jurisdiction, is of no moment. If the court has original jurisdiction over a
single claim in the complaint, it has original jurisdiction over a "civil
action" *2621 within the meaning of § 1367(a), even
if the civil action over which it has jurisdiction comprises fewer claims than
were included in the complaint. Once the
court determines it has original jurisdiction over the civil action, it can
turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims in the action.
Section
1367(a) commences with the direction that §
§ 1367(b) and (c), or other
relevant statutes, may provide specific exceptions, but otherwise § 1367(a) is a
broad jurisdictional grant, with no distinction drawn between pendent-claim and
pendent-party cases. In fact, the last
sentence of § 1367(a) makes
clear that the provision grants supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving
joinder or intervention of additional parties.
The terms of § 1367 do not
acknowledge any distinction between pendent jurisdiction and the doctrine of
so-called ancillary jurisdiction. Though the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction developed separately as a historical matter, the Court has
recognized that the doctrines are "two species of the same generic
problem," Kroger,
437 U.S., at 370, 98 S.Ct. 2396. Nothing in § 1367 indicates
a congressional intent to recognize, preserve, or create some meaningful,
substantive distinction between the jurisdictional categories we have
historically labeled pendent and ancillary.
If § 1367(a) were
the sum total of the relevant statutory language, our holding would rest on
that language alone. The statute, of
course, instructs us to examine § 1367(b) to
determine if any of its exceptions apply, so we proceed to that section. While § 1367(b)
qualifies the broad rule of § 1367(a), it
does not withdraw supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the additional
parties at issue here. The specific
exceptions to § 1367(a)
contained in § 1367(b),
moreover, provide additional support for our conclusion that § 1367(a) confers
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.
Section
1367(b), which applies only to diversity cases,
withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs proposed to
be joined as indispensable parties under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19, or who seek to
intervene pursuant to Rule
24.
Nothing in the text of § 1367(b),
however, withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs
permissively joined under Rule
20 (like the additional plaintiffs in No. 04- 79)
or certified as class-action members pursuant to Rule 23 (like the additional
plaintiffs in No. 04-70). The natural,
indeed the necessary, inference is that § 1367 confers
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by Rule
20 and Rule
23 plaintiffs.
This inference, at least with respect to
Rule
20 plaintiffs, is strengthened by the fact that § 1367(b)
explicitly excludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against defendants
joined under Rule
20.
We cannot accept the view, urged by some of
the parties, commentators, and Courts of Appeals, that a district court lacks
original jurisdiction over a civil action unless the court has original
jurisdiction over every claim in the complaint.
As we understand this position, it requires assuming either that all
claims in the complaint must stand or fall as a single, indivisible "civil
action" as a matter of definitional necessity--what we will refer to as
the "indivisibility theory"--or else that the inclusion of a claim or
party falling outside the district court's original jurisdiction somehow
contaminates every other claim in the complaint, depriving the court of original
jurisdiction over any of these claims--what we will refer to as the
"contamination theory."
The indivisibility theory is easily dismissed,
as it is inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction. If a *2622 district court must have original
jurisdiction over every claim in the complaint in order to have "original
jurisdiction" over a "civil action," then in Gibbs there was no civil action of which the district court
could assume original jurisdiction under § 1331, and so no
basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over any of the claims. The indivisibility theory is further belied
by our practice--in both federal-question and diversity cases--of allowing federal courts to cure jurisdictional
defects by dismissing the offending parties rather than dismissing the entire
action. Clark, for example, makes clear that claims that are
jurisdictionally defective as to amount in controversy do not destroy original
jurisdiction over other claims. 306
U.S., at 590, 59 S.Ct. 744 (dismissing parties
who failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement but retaining
jurisdiction over the remaining party).
If the presence of jurisdictionally problematic claims in the complaint
meant the district court was without original jurisdiction over the single,
indivisible civil action before it, then the district court would have to
dismiss the whole action rather than particular parties.
We also find it unconvincing to say that the
definitional indivisibility theory applies in the context of diversity cases
but not in the context of federal-question cases. The broad and general language of the statute
does not permit this result. The
contention is premised on the notion that the phrase "original jurisdiction
of all civil actions" means different things in § 1331 and § 1332. It is implausible, however, to say that the
identical phrase means one thing (original jurisdiction in all actions where at
least one claim in the complaint meets the following requirements) in § 1331 and
something else (original jurisdiction in all actions where every claim in the
complaint meets the following requirements) in § 1332.
The contamination theory, as we have noted,
can make some sense in the special context
of the complete diversity requirement because the presence of nondiverse
parties on both sides of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for providing a
federal forum. The theory, however,
makes little sense with respect to the amount-in-controversy requirement, which
is meant to ensure that a dispute is sufficiently important to warrant
federal-court attention. The presence of
a single nondiverse party may eliminate the fear of bias with respect to all
claims, but the presence of a claim that falls short of the minimum amount in
controversy does nothing to reduce the importance of the claims that do meet this
requirement.
It is fallacious to suppose, simply from the
proposition that § 1332 imposes
both the diversity requirement and the amount-in-controversy requirement, that
the contamination theory germane to the former is also relevant to the
latter. There is no inherent logical
connection between the amount-in-controversy requirement and § 1332 diversity
jurisdiction. After all,
federal-question jurisdiction once had an amount-in-controversy requirement as
well. If such a requirement were revived
under § 1331, it is
clear beyond peradventure that § 1367(a)
provides supplemental jurisdiction over federal-question cases where some, but
not all, of the federal-law claims involve a sufficient amount in
controversy. In other words, § 1367(a)
unambiguously overrules the holding and the result in Clark. If that is so,
however, it would be quite extraordinary to say that § 1367 did not
also overrule Zahn, a case that was premised in substantial part on the
holding in Clark.
In addition to the theoretical difficulties
with the argument that a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil
action only if it has original jurisdiction over each *2623 individual
claim in the complaint, we have already considered and rejected a virtually
identical argument in the closely analogous context of removal
jurisdiction. In Chicago
v. International College of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997),
the plaintiff brought federal- and state-law claims in state court. The defendant removed to federal court. The plaintiff objected to removal, citing the
text of the removal statute, §
1441(a). That statutory
provision, which bears a striking similarity to the relevant portion of § 1367,
authorizes removal of "any civil action ... of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction ... ." The College
of Surgeons plaintiff urged that, because its
state-law claims were not within the District Court's original jurisdiction,
§ 1441(a) did not authorize removal. We
disagreed. The federal law claims, we
held, "suffice to make the actions 'civil actions' within the 'original
jurisdiction' of the district courts .... Nothing in the jurisdictional
statutes suggests that the presence of related state law claims somehow alters
the fact that [the plaintiff's] complaints, by virtue of their federal claims,
were 'civil actions' within the federal courts'
'original jurisdiction.' " Id.,
at 166, 118 S.Ct. 523. Once the case was removed, the District Court
had original jurisdiction over the federal law claims and supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(a) over
the state-law claims. Id.,
at 165, 118 S.Ct. 523.
The dissent in College
of Surgeons argued that because the plaintiff
sought on-the-record review of a local administrative agency decision, the
review it sought was outside the scope of the District Court's
jurisdiction. Id.,
at 177, 118 S.Ct. 523 (opinion of GINSBURG,
J.). We rejected both the suggestion
that state-law claims involving administrative appeals are beyond the scope of § 1367
supplemental jurisdiction, id.,
at 168-172, 118 S.Ct. 523 (opinion of the Court),
and the claim that the administrative review posture of the case deprived the
District Court of original jurisdiction over the federal-law claims in the
case, id.,
at 163-168, 118 S.Ct. 523. More importantly for present purposes, College
of Surgeons stressed that a district court
has original jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of § 1441(a) as long as it has original
jurisdiction over a subset of the claims constituting the action. Even the College
of Surgeons dissent, which took issue with
the Court's interpretation of § 1367, did not
appear to contest this view of §
1441(a).
Although College
of Surgeons involved additional claims
between the same parties, its interpretation of § 1441(a) applies equally to cases involving
additional parties whose claims fall short of the jurisdictional amount. If we were
to adopt the contrary view that the presence of additional parties means there
is no "civil action ... of which the district courts ... have original
jurisdiction," those cases simply would not be removable. To our knowledge, no court has issued a
reasoned opinion adopting this view of the removal statute. It is settled, of
course, that absent complete diversity a case is not removable because the
district court would lack original jurisdiction. Caterpillar
Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. 61, 73, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). This, however, is
altogether consistent with our view of §
1441(a). A failure of complete
diversity, unlike the failure of some claims to meet the requisite amount in
controversy, contaminates every claim in the action.
We also reject the argument, similar to the
attempted distinction of College
of Surgeons discussed above, that while the
presence of additional claims over which the district court lacks jurisdiction
does not mean the civil action is outside the purview of § 1367(a), the
presence of additional *2624 parties does. The basis for this distinction is not
altogether clear, and it is in considerable tension with statutory text. Section
1367(a) applies by its terms to any civil action
of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, and the last sentence
of § 1367(a)
expressly contemplates that the court may have supplemental jurisdiction over
additional parties. So it cannot be the
case that the presence of those parties destroys the court's original
jurisdiction, within the meaning of § 1367(a), over a
civil action otherwise properly before it. Also, § 1367(b)
expressly withholds supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases over claims by
plaintiffs joined as indispensable parties under Rule
19. If joinder
of such parties were sufficient to deprive the district court of original
jurisdiction over the civil action within the meaning of § 1367(a), this
specific limitation on supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(b) would
be superfluous. The argument that the
presence of additional parties removes the civil action from the scope of § 1367(a) also
would mean that § 1367 left the Finley result undisturbed.
Finley, after all, involved a Federal Tort Claims Act suit against
a federal defendant and state-law claims against additional defendants not
otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction.
Yet all concede that one purpose of § 1367 was to
change the result reached in Finley.
Finally, it is suggested that our
interpretation of § 1367(a) creates
an anomaly regarding the exceptions listed in § 1367(b): It is not immediately obvious why Congress
would withhold supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs joined as parties
"needed for just adjudication" under Rule
19 but would allow supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiffs permissively joined under Rule
20. The
omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs from the list of exceptions in § 1367(b) may
have been an "unintentional drafting gap," Meritcare,
166 F.3d, at 221 and n. 6. If that is the case,
it is up to Congress rather than the courts
to fix it. The omission may seem odd,
but it is not absurd. An alternative explanation for the different treatment of
Rule
19 and Rule
20 is that Congress was concerned that extending
supplemental jurisdiction to Rule
19 plaintiffs would allow circumvention of the
complete diversity rule: A nondiverse
plaintiff might be omitted intentionally from the original action, but joined
later under Rule
19 as a necessary party. See Stromberg
Metal Works,
77 F.3d, at 932.
The contamination theory described above, if applicable, means this ruse
would fail, but Congress may have wanted to make assurance double sure. More generally, Congress may have concluded
that federal jurisdiction is only appropriate if the district court would have
original jurisdiction over the claims of all those plaintiffs who are so
essential to the action that they could be joined under Rule
19.
To the extent that the omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs from the list of § 1367(b)
exceptions is anomalous, moreover, it is no more anomalous than the inclusion
of Rule
19 plaintiffs in that list would be if the
alternative view of § 1367(a) were to
prevail. If the district court lacks
original jurisdiction over a civil diversity action where any plaintiff's
claims fail to comply with all the requirements of § 1332, there is
no need for a special § 1367(b)
exception for Rule
19 plaintiffs who do not meet these
requirements. Though the omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs from § 1367(b)
presents something of a puzzle on our view of the statute, the inclusion of Rule
19 plaintiffs in this section is at least as
difficult to explain under the alternative view.
And so we circle back to the original
question. When the well-pleaded
complaint in district court includes multiple claims, all part of the same case
or controversy, and some, but not all, of the claims *2625 are within
the court's original jurisdiction, does the court have before it "any
civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction"? It does. Under § 1367, the court
has original jurisdiction over the civil action comprising the claims for which
there is no jurisdictional defect. No
other reading of § 1367 is
plausible in light of the text and structure of the jurisdictional
statute. Though the special nature and
purpose of the diversity requirement mean that a single nondiverse party can
contaminate every other claim in the lawsuit, the contamination does not occur
with respect to jurisdictional defects that go only to the substantive
importance of individual claims.
It follows from this conclusion that the
threshold requirement of § 1367(a) is
satisfied in cases, like those now before us, where some, but not all, of the
plaintiffs in a diversity action allege a sufficient amount in
controversy. We hold that § 1367 by its
plain text overruled Clark and Zahn and authorized supplemental jurisdiction over all claims
by diverse parties arising out of the same Article III case or controversy,
subject only to enumerated exceptions not applicable in the cases now before
us.
The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist
that the statute is at least ambiguous and that we should look to other
interpretive tools, including the legislative history of § 1367, which
supposedly demonstrate Congress did not intend § 1367 to
overrule Zahn. We can reject this argument at the very outset simply
because § 1367 is not
ambiguous. For the reasons elaborated
above, interpreting § 1367 to
foreclose supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs in diversity cases who do
not meet the minimum amount in controversy is inconsistent with the text, read
in light of other statutory provisions and our established jurisprudence. Even if we were to stipulate, however, that
the reading these proponents urge upon us is textually plausible, the
legislative history cited to support it would not alter our view as to the best
interpretation of § 1367.
Those who urge that the legislative history
refutes our interpretation rely primarily on the House Judiciary Committee
Report on the Judicial Improvements Act. H.R.Rep.
No. 101-734 (1990) (House Report or Report). This Report explained that § 1367 would
"authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction." House Report, at 28. The Report stated that § 1367(a)
"generally authorizes the district court to exercise jurisdiction over a
supplemental claim whenever it forms part of
the same constitutional case or controversy as the claim or claims that provide
the basis of the district court's original jurisdiction," and in so doing
codifies Gibbs and fills the statutory gap recognized in Finley. House Report, at
28-29, and n. 15. The Report then
remarked that § 1367(b)
"is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of [§ 1332] in
diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley," citing, without further elaboration, Zahn and
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921). House Report, at 29, and n. 17. The Report noted that the "net
effect" of § 1367(b) was to
implement the "principal rationale" of Kroger, House Report, at 29, and n. 16, effecting only "one
small change" in pre-Finley practice with respect to diversity actions: § 1367(b) would
exclude "Rule
23(a) plaintiff-intervenors to the same extent as
those sought to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19."
House Report, at 29. (It is
evident that *2626 the report here meant to refer to Rule
24, not Rule
23.)
As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative
statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other
extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation
only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature's
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.
Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings,
however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious
criticisms. First, legislative history
is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. Judicial investigation of legislative history
has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal's memorable phrase, an
exercise in " 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.'
" See Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term,
68 Iowa L.Rev. 195, 214 (1983). Second, judicial reliance on legislative
materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the
requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members--or,
worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists--both the power and the incentive
to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results
they were unable to achieve through the statutory text. We need not comment here on whether these problems
are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable
in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this Court have
disagreed. It is clear, however, that in
this instance both criticisms are right on the mark.
First of all, the legislative history of § 1367 is far
murkier than selective quotation from the House Report would suggest. The text of § 1367 is based
substantially on a draft proposal contained in a Federal Court Study Committee
working paper, which was drafted by a Subcommittee chaired by Judge
Posner. Report of the Subcommittee on
the Role of the Federal Courts and Their Relationship
to the States 567-568 (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in Judicial Conference of the
United States, 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and
Subcommittee Reports (July 1, 1990). See
also Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee 47-48 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Study Committee Report) (echoing, in
brief summary form, the Subcommittee Working Paper proposal and noting that the
Subcommittee Working Paper "contains additional material on this
subject"); House Report, at 27
("[Section
1367] implements a recommendation of the Federal
Courts Study Committee found on pages 47 and 48 of its report"). While the Subcommittee explained, in language
echoed by the House Report, that its proposal "basically restores the law
as it existed prior to Finley," Subcommittee Working Paper, at 561, it observed in a
footnote that its proposal would overrule Zahn and that this would be a good idea, Subcommittee Working
Paper, at 561, n. 33. Although the Federal Courts Study Committee did not
expressly adopt the Subcommittee's specific reference to Zahn, it neither explicitly disagreed with the Subcommittee's
conclusion that this was the best reading of the proposed text nor
substantially modified the proposal to avoid this result. Study Committee
Report, at 47-48. Therefore, even if the
House Report could fairly be read to reflect an understanding that the text of § 1367 did not
overrule Zahn, the Subcommittee Working Paper on which § 1367 was based
reflected the opposite understanding.
The House Report is no more authoritative
than the Subcommittee Working Paper. The
utility of either can extend no further than the light it sheds *2627 on
how the enacting Legislature understood the statutory text. Trying to figure out how to square the
Subcommittee Working Paper's understanding with the House Report's
understanding, or which is more reflective of the understanding of the enacting
legislators, is a hopeless task.
Second, the worst fears of critics who argue
legislative history will be used to circumvent the Article I process were
realized in this case. The telltale
evidence is the statement, by three law professors who participated in drafting
§ 1367, see House
Report, at 27, n. 13, that § 1367 "on
its face" permits "supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class
members that do not satisfy section
1332's jurisdictional amount requirement, which
would overrule [Zahn]. [There is] a disclaimer of intent to accomplish this
result in the legislative history .... It would have been better had the
statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an
attempt to correct the oversight."
Rowe, Burbank, & Mengler, Compounding
or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J.
943, 960, n. 90 (1991). The professors were frank to concede that if
one refuses to consider the legislative history, one has no choice but to
"conclude that section
1367 has wiped Zahn off the books."
Ibid. So there exists an acknowledgment, by parties who have
detailed, specific knowledge of the statute
and the drafting process, both that the plain text of § 1367 overruled Zahn and that language to the contrary in the House Report was
a post hoc attempt to alter that result.
One need not subscribe to the wholesale condemnation of legislative
history to refuse to give any effect to such a deliberate effort to amend a
statute through a committee report.
In sum, even if we believed resort to
legislative history were appropriate in these cases--a point we do not
concede--we would not give significant weight to the House Report. The distinguished jurists who drafted the
Subcommittee Working Paper, along with three of the participants in the
drafting of § 1367, agree
that this provision, on its face, overrules Zahn. This accords with the best reading of the statute's text,
and nothing in the legislative history indicates directly and explicitly that
Congress understood the phrase "civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction" to exclude cases in which some but not all of
the diversity plaintiffs meet the amount in controversy requirement.
No credence, moreover, can be given to the
claim that, if Congress understood § 1367 to
overrule Zahn, the proposal would have been more controversial. We have little sense whether any Member of
Congress would have been particularly upset by this result. This is not a case where one can plausibly
say that concerned legislators might not have realized the possible effect of
the text they were adopting. Certainly,
any competent legislative aide who studied
the matter would have flagged this issue if it were a matter of importance to
his or her boss, especially in light of the Subcommittee Working Paper. There are any number of reasons why
legislators did not spend more time arguing over § 1367, none of
which are relevant to our interpretation of what the words of the statute mean.
D
Finally, we note that the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub.L.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4, enacted this year, has no
bearing on our analysis of these cases. Subject to certain limitations, the
CAFA confers federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions where the
aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. It abrogates the *2628 rule against
aggregating claims, a rule this Court recognized in Ben-Hur and reaffirmed in Zahn. The CAFA, however, is not retroactive, and the views of
the 2005 Congress are not relevant to our interpretation of a text enacted by
Congress in 1990. The CAFA, moreover,
does not moot the significance of our interpretation of § 1367, as many
proposed exercises of supplemental jurisdiction, even in the class-action
context, might not fall within the CAFA's ambit. The CAFA, then, has no impact, one way or the
other, on our interpretation of § 1367.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is affirmed. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BREYER joins, dissenting.
Justice GINSBURG's carefully reasoned opinion,
post, at 2631 (dissenting opinion), demonstrates the error in the
Court's rather ambitious reading of this opaque jurisdictional statute. She also has demonstrated that
"ambiguity" is a term that may have different meanings for different
judges, for the Court has made the remarkable declaration that its reading of
the statute is so obviously correct--and Justice GINSBURG's so obviously
wrong--that the text does not even qualify as "ambiguous." See ante, at 2625. Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of
the beholder, I remain convinced that it is unwise to treat the ambiguity vel
non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative history is
consulted. Indeed, I believe that we as
judges are more, rather than less, constrained when we make ourselves
accountable to all reliable evidence of legislative intent. See Koons
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh,
543 U.S. ----, ----, 125 S.Ct. 460, 463 and n. 1, 160 L.Ed.2d 389 (2004) (STEVENS, J., concurring).
The legislative history of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 provides powerful confirmation of Justice GINSBURG's interpretation of
that statute. It is helpful to consider in full the relevant portion of the
House Report, which was also adopted by the Senate:
"This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case
like Finley
[v. United
States,
490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989)], as well as essentially restore the pre-Finley
understandings of the authorization for and
limits on other forms of supplemental jurisdiction. In federal question cases, it broadly
authorizes the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
additional claims, including claims involving the joinder of additional
parties. In diversity cases, the
district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, except when doing so
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the diversity
statute.
. . . . .
"Subsection 114(b) [§ 1367(b)]
prohibits a district court in a case over which it has jurisdiction founded
solely on the general diversity provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, from exercising supplemental jurisdiction in specified
circumstances. [Footnote 16: 'The net effect of subsection (b) is to
implement the principal rationale of Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978)'.] In diversity-only actions the district courts
may not hear plaintiffs' supplemental claims when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs to evade *2629 the jurisdictional requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming initially only those defendants whose
joinder satisfies section
1332's requirements and later adding claims not
within original federal jurisdiction against other defendants who have
intervened or been joined on a supplemental basis. In accord with case law, the subsection also
prohibits the joinder or intervention of persons a plaintiffs if adding them is
inconsistent with section
1332's requirements. The section is not intended to affect the
jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted
prior to Finley. [Footnote 17: 'See Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921); Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973)'.]
"Subsection (b) makes one small change in pre-Finley practice. Anomalously, under current practice, the same
party might intervene as of right under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and take advantage
of supplemental jurisdiction, but not come within supplemental jurisdiction if
parties already in the action sought to effect the joinder under Rule
19. Subsection (b) would eliminate this anomaly,
excluding Rule
23(a) plaintiff-intervenors to the same extent as
those sought to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19." H.R.Rep.
No. 101-734, pp. 28-29 (1990) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter House Report or Report). [FN1]
FN1. The last quoted
paragraph was intended to refer to Rule
24, not Rule
23. See ante,
at 2626.
Not only does the House Report specifically
say that § 1367 was not
intended to upset Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973),
but its entire explanation of the statute demonstrates that Congress had in
mind a very specific and relatively modest task--undoing this Court's 5-to-4
decision in Finley
v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). In addition to overturning that
unfortunate and much-criticized decision, [FN2] the statute,
according to the Report, codifies and preserves the "the pre-Finley
understandings of the authorization for and
limits on other forms of supplemental jurisdiction," House Report, at 28,
with the exception of making "one small change in pre-Finley practice," id., at 29, which is not relevant
here.
FN2. As I pointed out
in my dissent in Finley, the majority's decision was "not faithful to our
precedents," 490
U.S., at 558, 109 S.Ct. 2003, and casually
dismissed the accumulated wisdom of judges such as Henry Friendly, who had "special learning
and expertise in matters of federal jurisdiction," id.,
at 565, 109 S.Ct. 2003.
The sweeping purpose that the Court's decision
imputes to Congress bears no resemblance to the House Report's description of
the statute. But this does not seem to
trouble the Court, for its decision today treats statutory interpretation as a
pedantic exercise, divorced from any serious attempt at ascertaining
congressional intent. Of course, there
are situations in which we do not honor Congress' apparent intent unless that
intent is made "clear" in the text of a statute--in this way, we can
be certain that Congress considered the issue and intended a disfavored
outcome, see, e.g., Landgraf
v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (requiring clear statement for retroactive civil legislation). But that principle provides no basis for
discounting the House Report, given that our cases have never recognized a
presumption in favor of expansive diversity jurisdiction.
*2630 The Court's reasons for ignoring
this virtual billboard of congressional intent are unpersuasive. That a subcommittee of the Federal Courts
Study Committee believed that an earlier, substantially similar version of the
statute overruled Zahn, see ante, at 2627, only highlights the fact that the statute is ambiguous. What is determinative is that the House
Report explicitly rejected that broad reading of the statutory text. Such a report has special significance as an
indicator of legislative intent. In
Congress, committee reports are normally considered the authoritative
explication of a statute's text and purposes, and busy legislators and their
assistants rely on that explication in casting their votes. Cf. Garcia
v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) ("In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly
stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying
proposed legislation' " (quoting Zuber
v. Allen,
396 U.S. 168, 186, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)) (brackets in original)).
The Court's second reason--its comment on the
three law professors who participated in drafting § 1367, see ante,
at 2627--is similarly off the mark. In
the law review article that the Court refers to, the professors were merely
saying that the text of the statute was susceptible to an overly broad (and
simplistic) reading, and that clarification in the House Report was therefore
appropriate. See Rowe, Burbank, &
Mengler, Compounding
or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer,
40 Emory L.J. 943, 960, n. 90 (1991). [FN3] Significantly, the
reference to Zahn
in the House Report does not at all appear to
be tacked-on or out of place; indeed, it
is wholly consistent with the Report's broader explanation of Congress' goal of
overruling Finley
and preserving pre-Finley
law.
To suggest that these professors participated in a "deliberate
effort to amend a statute through a committee report," ante, at
2627, reveals an unrealistic view of the legislative process, not to mention
disrespect for three law professors who acted in the role of public servants.
To be sure, legislative history can be manipulated. But, in the situation before us, there is
little reason to fear that an unholy conspiracy of "unrepresentative
committee members," ante, at 2626, law professors, and
"unelected staffers and lobbyists," ibid., endeavored to
torpedo Congress' attempt to overrule (without discussion) two longstanding
features of this Court's diversity jurisprudence.
FN3. The professors' account
of the challenges they faced in drafting § 1367 gives some
sense, I think, of why that statute has proved difficult to interpret: "More broadly, codifying a complex area
like supplemental jurisdiction--as Professor Freer's discussion illustrates--is
itself complex business. A danger is
that that result of the effort to deal with
all the foreseeables will be a statute too prolix and baroque for everyday use
and application by practitioners and judges. Section
1367 reflects an effort to provide sufficient
detail without overdoing it. The statute
is concededly not perfect. What it
accomplishes, however, is to change the direction taken by the Supreme Court in
Finley, to provide basic guidance (in particular the legislative
history's general approval of pre-Finley case law, which has treated some specific issues Professor
Freer raises), and then to trust the federal courts under the changed direction
to interpret the statute sensibly...."
40
Emory L. J., at 961.
After nearly 20 pages of complicated analysis,
which explores subtle doctrinal nuances and coins various neologisms, the Court
announces that § 1367 could not
reasonably be read another way. See *2631
ante, at 2625. That conclusion is difficult to accept. Given Justice GINSBURG's persuasive account
of the statutory text and its jurisprudential backdrop, and given the
uncommonly clear legislative history, I am confident that the majority's
interpretation of § 1367 is
mistaken. I respectfully dissent.
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice O'CONNOR, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.
These cases present the question whether
Congress, by enacting 28
U.S.C. § 1367, overruled this Court's decisions in Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 589, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001 (1939) (reaffirming the holding of Troy
Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co.,
222 U.S. 39, 40, 32 S.Ct. 9, 56 L.Ed. 81 (1911)),
and Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973). Clark held that, when federal-court jurisdiction is predicated
on a specified amount in controversy, each plaintiff joined in the litigation
must independently meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn confirmed that in class actions governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), "[e]ach
[class member] ... must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any [class
member] who does not must be dismissed from the case." 414
U.S., at 301, 94 S.Ct. 505.
Section
1367, all agree, was designed to overturn this
Court's decision in Finley
v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). Finley concerned not diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction (28
U.S.C. § 1332), but original federal-court jurisdiction in cases arising
under federal law (28
U.S.C. § 1331). The plaintiff in Finley sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b), to recover for the death of her husband and children in
an airplane crash. She alleged that the Federal Aviation
Administration's negligence contributed to the fatal accident. She later amended her complaint to add
state-law tort claims against two other defendants, a municipality and a
utility company. 490
U.S., at 546-547, 109 S.Ct. 2003. No independent basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction existed over the state-law claims. The plaintiff could not have brought her
entire action in state court, because federal jurisdiction in FTCA actions is
exclusive. § 1346(b). Hence, absent federal jurisdiction embracing
the state-law claims, she would be obliged to pursue two discrete actions, one
in federal court, the other in state court.
This Court held, nevertheless, that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over the "pendent-party" state-law claims. Id.,
at 555-556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. In so holding, the Court stressed that
Congress held the control rein. Id.,
at 547-549, 109 S.Ct. 2003. Congress could reverse the result in Finley, and permit pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims
against additional defendants, if it so chose.
Id.,
at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. Congress did so in § 1367.
What more § 1367 wrought is
an issue on which courts of appeals have sharply divided. Compare Stromberg
Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,
77 F.3d 928, 930 (C.A.7 1996) (§ 1367
"supersedes Clark
and allows pendent-party jurisdiction when
the additional parties have claims worth less than
[the jurisdictional minimum]"), and In
re Abbott Labs.,
51 F.3d 524, 529 (C.A.5 1995) ("[U]nder § 1367 a district
court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although
they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, as did the class
representatives."), with Meritcare
Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
166 F.3d 214, 222 (C.A.3 1999) (§ 1367
"preserves the prohibition against aggregation outlined in [Zahn and Clark]"), and *2632Leonhardt
v. Western Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631, 641 (C.A.10 1998) (§ 1367 does not
alter "the historical rules prohibiting aggregation of claims, including Zahn's prohibition of such aggregation in diversity class actions"). The Court today holds that § 1367, although
prompted by Finley, a case in which original access to federal court was
predicated on a federal question, notably enlarges federal diversity
jurisdiction. The Court reads § 1367 to
overrule Clark and Zahn, thereby allowing access to federal court by co-plaintiffs
or class members who do not meet the now in excess of $75,000
amount-in-controversy requirement, so long as at least one co-plaintiff, or the
named class representative, has a jurisdictionally sufficient claim. Ante, at 2615.
The Court adopts a plausibly broad reading of § 1367, a measure
that is hardly a model of the careful drafter's art. There is another plausible reading, however,
one less disruptive of our jurisprudence regarding supplemental jurisdiction. If one reads § 1367(a) to
instruct, as the statute's text suggests, that the district court must first
have "original jurisdiction" over a "civil action" before
supplemental jurisdiction can attach, then Clark and Zahn are preserved, and supplemental jurisdiction does not open
the way for joinder of plaintiffs, or inclusion of class members, who do not
independently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that
this narrower construction is the better reading of § 1367.
I
A
Section
1367, captioned "Supplemental
jurisdiction," codifies court-recognized doctrines formerly labeled
"pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. Pendent
jurisdiction involved the enlargement of federal-question litigation to include
related state-law claims. Ancillary
jurisdiction evolved primarily to protect defending parties, or others whose
rights might be adversely affected if they could not air their claims in an
ongoing federal-court action. Given
jurisdiction over the principal action, federal courts entertained certain
matters deemed ancillary regardless of the citizenship of the parties or the amount
in controversy.
Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966),
the leading pendent jurisdiction case,
involved a claim against a union for wrongfully inducing the plaintiff's
discharge. The plaintiff stated a
federal claim under the Taft-Hartley Act, and an allied state-law claim of
unlawful conspiracy to interfere with his employment contract. This Court upheld the joinder of federal and
state claims. "[T]here is power
in federal courts to hear the whole," the Court said, when the state and
federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and
are so linked that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding." Id.,
at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130.
Gibbs
involved the linkage of federal and state
claims against the same defendant. In Finley
v. United States,
490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593,
the Court contained Gibbs. Without
congressional authorization, the Court admonished, the pendent jurisdiction
umbrella could not be stretched to cover the joinder of additional
parties. Gibbs
had departed from earlier decisions
recognizing that "jurisdiction [must] be explicitly conferred," the
Court said. 490
U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. Aldinger
v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976),
the Court observed, although resting "on a much narrower basis," R.
Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 925 (5th ed.2003) (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler), had
already signaled that "the Gibbs
*2633
approach would not be extended to the pendent-party field," Finley,
490 U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. While the Finley Court did not "limit or impair" Gibbs
itself, 490
U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003, for further
development of pendent jurisdiction, the Court made it plain, the initiative
would lie in Congress' domain. Id.,
at 555-556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. [FN1]
FN1. "[B]oth the
Finley result and its implications" sparked "considerable
criticism." Hart & Wechsler
926; see also 13B C. Wright, A. Miller,
E. Cooper, & R. Freer, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3567.2, p. 91 (2d ed. Supp.2005)
(hereinafter Wright & Miller) (characterizing the Finley decision as "surprising").
Ancillary jurisdiction, which evolved as a
more sprawling doctrine than pendent jurisdiction, was originally rooted in
"the notion that [when] federal jurisdiction in [a] principal suit
effectively controls the property or fund under dispute, other claimants
thereto should be allowed to intervene in order to protect their interests,
without regard to jurisdiction." Aldinger,
427 U.S., at 11, 96 S.Ct. 2413; see, e.g., Freeman
v. Howe,
24 How. 450, 16 L.Ed. 749 (1861). In Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 98
S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978), the Court
addressed the permissible scope of the doctrine in relation to the liberal
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for joinder of parties and
claims.
Kroger commenced as a suit between a citizen of Iowa and a
Nebraska corporation. When the Nebraska
defendant impleaded an Iowa corporation as a third-party defendant under Rule
14(a), the plaintiff asserted state-law claims
against the impleaded party. No
independent basis of federal jurisdiction existed over the newly asserted
claims, for both plaintiff and impleaded defendant were citizens of Iowa. 437
U.S., at 370.
The Court held that the plaintiff could not draw in a co-citizen
defendant in this manner. Id.,
at
377, 98 S.Ct. 2396. Federal courts, by the time of Kroger, were routinely exercising ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims, impleader claims, cross-claims among defendants, and
claims of parties who intervened "of right." See id.,
at 375, n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (collecting
cases). In Kroger, however,
"the nonfederal claim ... was asserted by the
plaintiff, who voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law claim in a
federal court. By contrast, ancillary
jurisdiction typically involve[d] claims by a defending party haled into court
against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost
unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court." Id.,
at 376, 98 S.Ct. 2396.
Having "chosen the federal rather than
the state forum," the Court said, the plaintiff had to "accept its
limitations." Ibid.
In sum, in federal-question cases before § 1367's
enactment, the Court recognized pendent-claim jurisdiction, Gibbs,
383 U.S., at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, but not
pendent-party jurisdiction, Finley,
490 U.S., at 555-556, 109 S.Ct. 2003. As to ancillary jurisdiction, the Court
adhered to the limitation that in diversity cases, throughout the litigation,
all plaintiffs must remain diverse from all defendants. See Kroger,
437 U.S., at 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396.
Although pendent jurisdiction and ancillary
jurisdiction evolved discretely, [FN2] the Court has recognized that they are "two species
of the same generic problem: Under *2634
what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim
arising between citizens of the same State?" Id.,
at 370, 98 S.Ct. 2396. Finley regarded that question as one properly addressed to
Congress. See 490
U.S., at 549, 556, 109 S.Ct. 2003; 13 Wright & Miller § 3523, p. 127 (2d
ed. Supp.2005); Hart & Wechsler
924-926.
FN2. See generally 13B
Wright & Miller § § 3567, 3567.1, 3567.2
(2d ed.1984) (discussing pendent
jurisdiction); 13 id., § 3523 (discussing ancillary
jurisdiction); Hart & Wechsler
922-926 (discussing pendent
jurisdiction); id., at 1488-1490
(discussing ancillary jurisdiction).
B
Shortly before the Court decided Finley,
Congress had established the Federal Courts
Study Committee to take up issues relating to "the federal courts'
congestion, delay, expense, and expansion." Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 3 (Apr. 2, 1990) (hereinafter
Committee Report). The Committee's
charge was to conduct a study addressing the "crisis" in federal
courts caused by the "rapidly growing" caseload. Id., at 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Among recommendations, the Committee urged
Congress to "authorize federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction over
parties without an independent federal jurisdictional base." Id., at 47. If adopted, this recommendation would
overrule Finley. Earlier, a
subcommittee had recommended that Congress overrule both Finley
and Zahn. Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts
and Their Relationship to the States 547, 561, n. 33 (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted
in 1 Judicial Conference of the United States, Federal Courts Study Committee,
Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports (July 1, 1990) (hereinafter
Subcommittee Report). In the
subcommittee's view, "[f]rom a policy
standpoint," Zahn
"ma[de] little sense." Subcommittee Report 561, n. 33. [FN3] The full Committee,
however, urged only the overruling of Finley
and did not adopt the recommendation to
overrule Zahn. Committee Report 47-48.
FN3. Anomalously, in
holding that each class member "must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount," Zahn
v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973), the Zahn
Court did not refer to Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 366, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921), which established that in a class action, the citizenship of the named
plaintiff is controlling. But see Zahn,
414 U.S., at 309-310, 94 S.Ct. 505 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (urging Zahn's inconsistency with Ben-Hur).
As a separate matter, a substantial majority
of the Committee "strongly recommend[ed]" the elimination of
diversity jurisdiction, save for "complex multi-state litigation,
interpleader, and suits involving aliens."
Id., at 38-39; accord
Subcommittee Report 454-458. "[N]o
other step," the Committee's Report maintained, "will do anywhere
nearly as much to reduce federal caseload pressures and contain the growth of
the federal judiciary." Committee
Report 39.
Congress responded by adopting, as part of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089, [FN4]
recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee ranked by the House
Committee on the Judiciary as "modest" and
"noncontroversial". H.R.Rep.
No. 101-734, pp. 15-16 (1990) (hereinafter H.R.
Rep.); see also 136 Cong. Rec. 36288
(1990). Congress did not take up the
Study Committee's immodest proposal to curtail diversity jurisdiction. It did, however, enact a supplemental
jurisdiction statute, codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
FN4. The omnibus Act
encompassed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (Title I), the creation of new
judgeships (Title II), the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of
1990 (Title III), and the establishment of the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal (Title IV).
*2635 II
A
Section
1367, by its terms, operates only in civil
actions "of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction." The "original
jurisdiction" relevant here is
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, conferred by § 1332. The character of that jurisdiction is the
essential backdrop for comprehension of § 1367.
The Constitution broadly provides for
federal-court jurisdiction in controversies "between Citizens of different
States." Art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. This Court has read that provision to demand no more than
"minimal diversity," i.e., so long as one party on the
plaintiffs' side and one party on the defendants' side are of diverse
citizenship, Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise diversity
jurisdiction. See State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 530-531, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967). Further, the Constitution includes no
amount-in-controversy limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. But from the start, Congress, as its measures
have been construed by this Court, has limited federal court exercise of
diversity jurisdiction in two principal ways.
First, unless Congress specifies otherwise, diversity must be
"complete," i.e., all parties on plaintiffs' side must be
diverse from all parties on defendants' side. Strawbridge
v. Curtiss,
3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); see 13B
Wright, Miller & Cooper § 3605 (2d
ed.1984).
Second, each plaintiff's stake must independently meet the
amount-in-controversy specification:
"When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands,
unite for convenience and economy in a
single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount." Troy
Bank,
222 U.S., at 40, 32 S.Ct. 9.
The statute today governing federal court
exercise of diversity jurisdiction in the generality of cases, § 1332, like all
its predecessors, incorporates both a diverse-citizenship requirement and an
amount-in-controversy specification. [FN5] As to the latter, the statute reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction [in diversity-of-citizenship cases] where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum ... of $75,000." § 1332(a). This Court has long held that, in determining
whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied, a single
plaintiff may aggregate two or more claims against a single defendant, even if
the claims are unrelated. See, e.g., *2636Edwards
v. Bates County,
163 U.S. 269, 273, 16 S.Ct. 967, 41 L.Ed.
155 (1896). But in multiparty cases, including class
actions, we have unyieldingly adhered to the nonaggregation rule stated in Troy
Bank. See Clark,
306 U.S., at 589, 59 S.Ct. 744 (reaffirming the
"familiar rule that when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct
demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy must
be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court,
and that those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional
requirements"); Snyder
v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 339-340, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d
319 (1969) (abandonment of the nonaggregation
rule in class actions would undercut the congressional "purpose ... to
check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts").
FN5. Endeavoring to
preserve the "complete diversity" rule first stated in Strawbridge
v. Curtiss,
3 Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806), the Court's
opinion drives a wedge between the two components of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, treating the diversity-of-citizenship requirement as essential, the
amount-in-controversy requirement as more readily disposable. See ante, at 2618, 2622. Section
1332 itself, however, does not rank order the two
requirements. What "[o]rdinary
principl[e] of statutory construction" or "sound canon of
interpretation," ante, at 2620, allows the Court to slice up § 1332 this
way? In partial explanation, the Court
asserts that amount in controversy can be analyzed claim-by-claim, but the
diversity requirement cannot. See ante,
at 2618. It is not altogether clear why that should be so. The cure for improper joinder of a nondiverse
party is the same as the cure for improper joinder of a plaintiff who does not
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. In
both cases, original jurisdiction can be preserved by dismissing the
nonqualifying party. See Caterpillar
Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. 61, 64, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437
(1996) (diversity); Newman-Green,
Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U.S. 826, 836-838, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989) (same); Zahn,
414 U.S., at 295, 300, 94 S.Ct. 505 (amount in
controversy); Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 590, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001 (1939) (same).
This Court most recently addressed "[t]he
meaning of [§ 1332's] 'matter
in controversy' language" in Zahn,
414 U.S., at 298, 94 S.Ct. 505. Zahn, like Snyder decided four years earlier, was a class action. In Snyder, no class member had a claim large enough to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount. But in Zahn, the named plaintiffs had such claims. 414
U.S., at 292, 94 S.Ct. 505. Nevertheless, the Court declined to depart
from its "longstanding construction of the 'matter in controversy'
requirement of § 1332." Id.,
at 301, 94 S.Ct. 505. The Zahn
Court stated:
"Snyder invoked the well-established rule that each of several
plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims must satisfy the
jurisdictional-amount requirement if his claim is to survive a motion to
dismiss. This rule plainly mandates not
only that there may be no aggregation and that the entire case must be
dismissed where none of the plaintiffs claims [meets the amount-in-controversy
requirement] but also requires that any plaintiff without the jurisdictional
amount must be dismissed from the case, even
though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims." Id.,
at 300, 94 S.Ct. 505.
The rule that each plaintiff must
independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, unless Congress
ex-pressly orders otherwise, was thus the solidly established reading of § 1332 when
Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which added § 1367 to Title 28.
B
These cases present the question whether
Congress abrogated the nonaggregation rule long tied to § 1332 when it
enacted § 1367. In answering that question, "context
[should provide] a crucial guide." Rosario
Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F.3d 124, 135 (2004). The Court should assume, as it ordinarily
does, that Congress legislated against a background of law already in place and
the historical development of that law.
See
National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish,
541 U.S. 157, 169, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). Here, that
background is the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction, the amount-in-controversy
condition that Congress, from the start, has tied to the grant, and the
nonaggregation rule this Court has long applied to the determination of the
"matter in controversy."
Section
1367(a) provides:
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as
expressly provided otherwise by Federal
statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution. *2637 Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties."
The Court is unanimous in reading § 1367(a) to
permit pendent-party jurisdiction in federal-question cases, and thus, to
overrule Finley. The basic
jurisdictional grant, § 1331, provides
that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Since 1980, § 1331 has
contained no amount-in-controversy requirement.
See 94 Stat. 2369 (eliminating § 1331's
amount-in-controversy requirement). Once
there is a civil action presenting a qualifying claim arising under federal
law, § 1331's sole
requirement is met. District courts, we
have held, may then adjudicate, additionally, state-law claims "deriv[ing]
from a common nucleus of operative fact."
Gibbs,
383 U.S., at 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130. Section
1367(a) enlarges that category to include not
only state-law claims against the defendant named in the federal claim, but
also "[state-law] claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties." [FN6]
FN6. The Court noted
in Zahn,
414 U.S., at 302, n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 505, that when
the exercise of § 1331
federal-question jurisdiction and § 1332 diversity
jurisdiction were conditioned on the same jurisdictional-amount limitation, the
same nonaggregation rule applied under both heads of federal jurisdiction. But cf. ante, at 2622. The Court added, however, that "Congress
ha[d] exempted major areas of federal-question jurisdiction from any
jurisdictional-amount requirements," thus diminishing the impact of § 1331's
"matter in controversy" specification in cases arising under federal
law. Zahn,
414 U.S., at 302, n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 505.
The Court divides, however, on the impact of § 1367(a) on
diversity cases controlled by § 1332. Under the majority's reading, § 1367(a) permits
the joinder of related claims cut loose from the nonaggregation rule that has
long attended actions under § 1332. Only the claims specified in § 1367(b) [FN7] would be
excluded from § 1367(a)'s
expansion of § 1332's grant of
diversity jurisdiction. And because § 1367(b)
contains no exception for joinder of plaintiffs under Rule
20 or class actions under Rule
23, the Court concludes, Clark and Zahn have been overruled. [FN8]
FN7. Title
28 § 1367(b)
provides:
"In any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded solely on section
1332 of this title, the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule
24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section
1332."
FN8. Under the
Court's construction of § 1367, see ante,
at 2621, 2625, Beatriz Ortega's family members can remain in the action because
their joinder is merely permissive, see Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 20. If, however, their presence was "needed
for just adjudication," Rule
19, their dismissal would be required. The inclusion of those who may join, and
exclusion of those who should or must join, defies rational explanation, but cf. ante, at 2624, and
others adopting the interpretation the Court embraces have so acknowledged, see
Stromberg
Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,
77 F.3d 928, 932 (C.A.7 1996) (recognizing the
anomaly and inquiring: "What sense
can this make?"); cf. 14B
Wright, Miller & Cooper § 3704, p.
168 (3d ed.1998) (distinction between Rule
19 and Rule
20 "seems incongruous, and serves no
apparent public policy purpose").
The Court's reading is surely plausible,
especially if one detaches § 1367(a) from
its context and attempts no reconciliation with prior interpretations of § 1332's
amount-in-controversy requirement. But *2638 § 1367(a)'s text,
as the First Circuit held, can be read another way, one that would involve no
rejection of Clark and Zahn.
As explained by the First Circuit in Ortega, and applied to class actions by the Tenth Circuit in Leonhardt, see supra, at 2632, § 1367(a)
addresses "civil action[s] of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction," a formulation that, in diversity cases, is sensibly read to
incorporate the rules on joinder and aggregation tightly tied to § 1332 at the
time of § 1367's
enactment. On this reading, a complaint
must first meet that "original jurisdiction" measurement. If it does not, no supplemental jurisdiction is authorized. If it does, § 1367(a)
authorizes "supplemental jurisdiction" over related claims. In other words, § 1367(a) would
preserve undiminished, as part and parcel of § 1332
"original jurisdiction" determinations, both the "complete
diversity" rule and the decisions restricting aggregation to arrive at the
amount in controversy. [FN9] Section
1367(b)'s office, then, would be "to prevent
the erosion of the complete diversity [and amount-in-controversy]
requirement[s] that might otherwise result from an expansive application of
what was once termed the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction." See Pfander, Supplemental
Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case
for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. Pa. L.Rev. 109, 114 (1999); infra, at
2639-2640. In contrast to the Court's
construction of § 1367, which
draws a sharp line between the diversity and amount-in-controversy components
of § 1332, see ante,
at 2618; supra, at 2635, n. 5,
the interpretation presented here does not sever the two jurisdictional
requirements.
FN9. On this reading
of § 1367(a), it is
immaterial that § 1367(b)
"does not withdraw supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the
additional parties at issue here." Ante,
at 2620. Because those claims would not
come within § 1367(a) in the
first place, Congress would have had no
reason to list them in § 1367(b). See infra, at 2638-2639.
The more restrained reading of § 1367 just
outlined would yield affirmance of the First Circuit's judgment in Ortega, and reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's judgment in Exxon. It would not
discard entirely, as the Court does, the judicially developed doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as they existed when Finley was decided. [FN10] Instead, it would recognize § 1367
essentially as a codification of those doctrines, placing them under a single
heading, but largely retaining their substance, with overriding Finley the only basic change:
Supplemental jurisdiction, once the district court has original
jurisdiction, would now include "claims that involve the joinder or
intervention of additional parties." § 1367(a).
FN10. The Court's
opinion blends the two doctrines, according no significance to their discrete
development. See ante, at
2617-2619.
Pendent jurisdiction, as earlier explained,
see supra, at 2632-2633, applied only in federal-question cases and
allowed plaintiffs to attach nonfederal claims to their jurisdiction-qualifying
claims. Ancillary jurisdiction applied
primarily, although not exclusively, in diversity cases and "typically involve[d] claims by a
defending party haled into court against his will." Kroger,
437 U.S., at 376, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (emphasis
added); see also id.,
at 375, n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 2396; supra, at 2633-2634. As the First Circuit observed, neither
doctrine permitted a plaintiff to circumvent the dual requirements of § 1332 (diversity
of citizenship and amount in controversy) "simply by joining her
[jurisdictionally inadequate] claim in an action brought by [a]
jurisdictionally competent *2639 diversity plaintiff." Ortega,
370 F.3d, at 138.
Not only would the reading I find persuasive
"alig[n] statutory supplemental jurisdiction with the judicially developed
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction," ibid., it would also synchronize § 1367 with the
removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441. As the First Circuit carefully
explained:
"Section
1441, like § 1367, applies
only if the 'civil action' in question is one 'of which the district courts ...
have original jurisdiction.' § 1441(a). Relying on that language, the Supreme Court
has interpreted § 1441 to
prohibit removal unless the entire action, as it stands at the time of removal,
could have been filed in federal court in the first instance. See, e.g., Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson,
537 U.S. 28, 33, 123 S.Ct. 366, 154 L.Ed.2d 368 (2002); Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Graham,
489 U.S. 838, 840, 109 S.Ct. 1519, 103 L.Ed.2d 924 (1989) (per curiam). Section
1441 has thus been
held to incorporate the well-pleaded complaint rule, see City
of Chicago [v. International College of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 163, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997)]; [FN11] the complete
diversity rule, see Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. 61, 73, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996); and rules for
calculating the amount in controversy, see St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 291-292, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)." Ortega,
370 F.3d, at 138 (citations omitted and footnote
added).
FN11. The point of
the Court's extended discussion of Chicago
v. International College of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997),
in the instant cases, see ante, at 2622-2623, slips from my grasp. There was no disagreement in that case, and
there is none now, that 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) is properly read to authorize the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in removed cases. International
College of Surgeons was unusual in that the
federal court there was asked to review a decision of a local administrative
agency. Such review, it was
unsuccessfully argued, was "appellate" in character, and therefore
outside the ken of a court empowered to exercise "original"
jurisdiction. Compare 522
U.S., at 166-168, 118 S.Ct. 523, with id.,
at 176-177, 118 S.Ct. 523 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
The less disruptive view I take of § 1367 also
accounts for the omission of Rule
20 plaintiffs and Rule
23 class actions in § 1367(b)'s text.
If one reads § 1367(a) as a
plenary grant of supplemental jurisdiction to federal courts sitting in
diversity, one would indeed look for exceptions in § 1367(b). Finding none for permissive joinder of
parties or class actions, one would conclude that Congress effectively, even if
unintentionally, overruled Clark
and Zahn. But if one recognizes that the nonaggregation rule
delineated in Clark
and Zahn forms part of the determination whether "original
jurisdiction" exists in a diversity case, see supra, at 2622, then
plaintiffs who do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement would fail at
the § 1367(a)
threshold. Congress would have no reason
to resort to a § 1367(b)
exception to turn such plaintiffs away from federal court, given that their
claims, from the start, would fall outside the court's § 1332 jurisdiction. See Pfander,
148 U. Pa. L.Rev., at 148.
Nor does the more moderate reading assign different
meanings to "original
jurisdiction" in diversity and federal-question cases. See ante, at 2622. As the First Circuit stated:
" '[O]riginal jurisdiction' in § 1367(a) has the
same meaning in every case: [An] underlying statutory grant of original
jurisdiction must be satisfied. What
differs between federal question and diversity *2640 cases is not the
meaning of 'original jurisdiction' but rather the [discrete] requirements of sections
1331 and 1332. Under § 1331, the sole
issue is whether a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint; the
[citizenship] of the parties and the amounts they stand to recover [do not bear
on that determination]. Section
1332, by contrast, predicates original
jurisdiction on the identity of the parties (i.e., [their] complete
diversity) and their [satisfaction of the amount-in-controversy
specification]. [In short,] the
'original jurisdiction' language in § 1367 operates
differently in federal-question and diversity cases not because the meaning of
that term varies, but because the [jurisdiction-granting] statutes are
different." Ortega,
370 F.3d, at 139-140.
What is the utility of § 1367(b) under
my reading of § 1367(a)? Section
1367(a) allows parties other than the plaintiff
to assert reactive claims once entertained under the heading ancillary
jurisdiction. See supra, at 2633
(listing claims, including compulsory counterclaims and impleader claims, over
which federal courts routinely exercised ancillary jurisdiction). As earlier observed, see supra, at 14,
§ 1367(b) stops
plaintiffs from circumventing § 1332's
jurisdictional requirements by using another's
claim as a hook to add a claim that the plaintiff could not have brought in the
first instance. Kroger
is the paradigm case. See supra, at 2633. There, the Court held that ancillary
jurisdiction did not extend to a plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse party
who had been impleaded by the defendant under Rule
14. Section
1367(b), then, is corroborative of § 1367(a)'s
coverage of claims formerly called ancillary, but provides exceptions to assure
that accommodation of added claims would not fundamentally alter "the jurisdictional
requirements of section
1332."
See Pfander, supra, at 135-137.
While § 1367's
enigmatic text [FN12] defies flawless interpretation, see supra, at 2637,
n. 8,
[FN13] the precedent-preservative reading, I am
persuaded, better accords with the *2641 historical and legal context of
Congress' enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, see supra,
at 2633-2634, 2636, and the established limits on pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction, see supra, at 2632-2633.
It does not attribute to Congress a jurisdictional enlargement broader
than the one to which the legislators adverted, cf. Finley,
490 U.S., at 549, 109 S.Ct. 2003, and it follows
the sound counsel that "close questions of [statutory] construction should
be resolved in favor of continuity and against change." Shapiro, Continuity
and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 921, 925 (1992). [FN14]
FN12. The Court
notes the passage this year of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub.L.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4, ante, at 2627-2628,
only to dismiss that legislation as irrelevant.
Subject to several exceptions and qualifications, CAFA provides for
federal-court adjudication of state-law-based class actions in which diversity
is "minimal" (one plaintiff's diversity from one defendant suffices),
and the "matter in controversy" is an aggregate amount in excess of
$5,000,000. Significant here, CAFA's
enlargement of federal-court diversity jurisdiction was accomplished,
"clearly and conspicuously," by amending § 1332. Cf. Rosario
Ortega,
370 F.3d 124, 142 (C.A.1 2004).
FN13. If § 1367(a) itself
renders unnecessary the listing of Rule
20 plaintiffs and Rule
23 class actions in § 1367(b), see supra,
at 2639, then it is similarly unnecessary to refer, as § 1367(b) does,
to "persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule
19."
On one account, Congress bracketed such persons with persons
"seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule
24" to modify pre- § 1367
practice. Before enactment of § 1367, courts
entertained, under the heading ancillary
jurisdiction, claims of Rule
24(a) intervenors "of right," see Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 375, n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978), but denied ancillary jurisdiction over claims of
"necessary" Rule
19 plaintiffs, see 13
Wright & Miller § 3523, p. 127 (2d
ed. Supp.2005). Congress may have
sought simply to underscore that those seeking to join as plaintiffs, whether
under Rule
19 or Rule
24, should be treated alike, i.e., denied
joinder when "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332."
See Ortega,
370 F.3d, at 140, and n. 15 (internal quotation
marks omitted); H.R. Rep., at 29
("Subsection (b) makes one small change in pre-Finley practice," i.e., it eliminates the Rule
19/Rule 24 anomaly.).
FN14. While the
interpretation of § 1367 described
in this opinion does not rely on the measure's legislative history, that
history, as Justice STEVENS has shown, see ante, at 2628 (dissenting
opinion), is corroborative of the statutory reading set out above.
* * *
For the reasons stated, I would hold that § 1367 does not
overrule Clark
and Zahn. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.
125 S.Ct. 2611, 73 USLW 4574, 05 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5443, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7490, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 453
END OF
DOCUMENT