By Juan Morales
“I
saw, moreover, and with fearfulness, that the very same persons who before the
Revolution had held high positions (not to mention their sycophants and
lickspittles), now held them again…. I
could see with my own eyes, then, how all the trash of the past rose to the top
again, the waters being once more roiled.
And therefore I began to fear for my life, just as before.” Reinaldo
Arenas
I. Castro’s Application of the “Spirit of Marti” in Modern Cuba
Cuban
history, since the turn of the 20th Century, has been one of
volatility and domination. During the
periods of Spanish colonization and American influenced governance, the Cuban
people have rarely been able to truly experience independent and democratic
existence. Either because of its natural
resources or its strategic location, the race to control and utilize the Cuban
island has long been an issue of international importance.
From
the era of Columbus’ discovery when Spain was granted sovereignty over Cuba by
papal decree, to Jose Marti’s call for independence, to the enactment of the
Platt Amendment after Spain’s defeat to the United States, and finally to
Castro’s Revolution, the prospect of a free and democratic Cuba has always
seemed just out of reach. Eduardo Moises
Penalver characterizes Cuba’s
recent history by suggesting that, “The most striking feature of the 1959
revolution, when studied within the broader context of Cuban history, is its
ultimate continuity with earlier movements for change in Cuban history. Indeed, the causes of the Cuban revolution
stretch back into the Spanish colonial era; they were nourished by decades of
bloody struggle for independence and over a half-century of neo-colonial
domination by the United States.” In each period of Cuban history the
particular government in power has had to deal with a people restless over
their livelihoods and seemingly discontent over their sense of national
pride. In every instance, subversive
organizations and rebellious groups have attempted to undermine the very
foundations of power in Cuba. In building a nation it will always be the
government’s charge to deal with opposition and criticism. Perhaps even more telling is exactly how the
government deals with that opposition and criticism. In Cuba’s
case governments have often dealt with the burden of criticism harshly, a
tradition that continues to this day.
In
particular, it is Spain’s
long history in Cuba
that has laid the foundation for Cuba’s
current political and ideological situation. Loree Wilkerson writes in Fidel
Castro’s Political Programs from Reformism to ‘Marxism-Leninism that,
“Although the revolution freed Cuba
from the bad practices of Spanish colonial administration.”
The treatment of Cuba
by Spanish colonials fueled the drive of leaders such as Simon Bolivar and Jose
Marti. In turn, the influence of these
leaders seems to have served as the catalysts for several revolutions in Latin
America. These revolutions
seemed to have been aimed at, ideally, restoring a sense of national pride
after long periods of colonial domination.
In many ways Cuba
has experienced two revolutions. Spain’s
defeat by the United States
in 1898, after Marti’s insurgency gained political support in the United
States, signified what was supposed to have
been the independence of Cuba. The Cuban people were eager for the
opportunity of self-governance, yet had their hopes and ambitions usurped by
American industrial and political interests.
Passage of the Platt Amendment, the carte blanche for U.S.
involvement in Cuban affairs, was the quick death for any hope of true Cuban
autonomy. Indeed, according to Tad
Szulc, in his book Fidel: A Critical Portrait,
even high-ranking U.S.
officials acknowledged the significance of the Platt Amendment on Cuban
independence. Szulc writes, “Leonard Wood, the last governor-general, wrote
President William McKinley that ‘there is, of course, little or no independence
left in Cuba
under the Platt Amendment.”The
spirit of Marti, long a source of inspiration for Cubans, had once again been
betrayed. That betrayal continues to
this day in Castro’s Cuba. The concept of liberty and self-governance
championed by Marti served as a primary source of inspiration and support for
Castro’s revolution. Despite that
inspiration, Castro’s governance of Cuba
has thwarted the spirit of Marti by codifying into law its own
self-preservation while simultaneously suppressing the very liberties the
revolution served to represent.
II. Jose Marti and Cuban
Nationalism
When
we consider the ideals and principles set forth by Marti we can begin to
understand his influence. As has already
been written, the history of Marti’s Latin America, and Cuba
in particular, had long been one of domination, manipulation, exploitation, and
oppression. Whether by means of invasion, colonialism, or imperialism, Marti
envisioned a new Latin American zeitgeist of self-reliance and
self-governance. Penalver distinguishes
the goal of Cuba’s independence movement, “Unlike the leaders of other Latin
American independence movements, the leaders of the Cuban War for Independence
sought to not only free Cuban from foreign rule, but also to transform the
structure of Cuban society.” For Marti it was the presence of Spanish
interests in Cuba
that inspired his vision for a free and culturally independent Cuba. It is this vision that would seem to have
been the genesis for Fidel Castro’s cultural and political revolution.
The War of Independence launched
against Spain
by Marti and his contemporaries had, initially, proved successful. However, the war for independence eventually
began to unravel. Ana Otero writes that
the war’s “…main objective was to gain Cuban sovereignty and independence, but
it was impeded by a lack of political organization and cohesiveness. The Ten Year War, Jose Marti, Cuba’s
quintessential hero and poet argued, was ‘lost only through a lack of
preparation and unity.”
After the death of Marti the rebel army faltered and Spain
began a harsh purge of captured rebels and alleged sympathizers. The atrocities committed by Spain
were widely reported in the United States
and throughout the world. Spain’s
actions and the struggle for a free and independent Cuba
resonated with Americans at the turn of the century. This resonance prompted
calls for American intervention. Though
the McKinley administration resisted U.S.
intervention in Cuba,
after the suspicious explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, intervention proved
politically inevitable. After a brief
period of war, on July 17, 1898, Spain
surrendered Cuba
to the United States
and a period of American imperialism began.
For
Castro, and many of the Cuban people, the Spanish-American War had been a lost
opportunity of enormous proportions.
While technically achieving independent status, Cuba
had simply been transferred from a colonial resource to an imperialist
one. Further exacerbating Cuban
resentment was passage of the Platt Amendment by the United States Congress, an
amendment providing the United States
the naval base at Guantanamo. The U.S.
military presence in Cuba
has long served as a source of animosity for Cubans, Castro in particular. As Dan Gardner writes in America’s Thorn in Cuba’s Side, “There is the Guantanamo
of history, the pride of an imperial era that became a trip in the Cold
War. There is the Guantanamo of Cuban
nationalism, a nagging reminder of colonial humiliations and a symbol of the
difficult relationship between the little island and the giant to the
north. This is the Guantanamo
that itches under the skin of Fidel Castro.” The Platt Amendment also secured the right
for U.S.
intervention whenever it deemed necessary in Cuban affairs. Though referring generally to Latin
America, Richard Goodwin summarizes in Remembering America
the harsh reality of Western influence on Latin America
and Cuba during
the period of Castro’s pending revolution, Goodwin writes, “The countries of Latin
America were not emerging from the confused strife of postwar
colonial revolutions. They had been
independent for almost two centuries. But not totally. The
great power to the north had shadowed, sometimes dominated, their evolving
societies. Setting ourselves up as the
protector of the continent, we had frequently intervened with private capital,
or, occasionally, with military force to advance our own interests.” In this political environment the right of Cuba,
and much of Latin America for that matter, to govern
itself according to its own self-interests did simply not exist.
The
period of Spanish and American dominance in Cuba
had lasting effects on its societal and cultural mores. In their own way, each system of governance
gave rise to its own form of social hierarchy.
For the Spanish it was the governing class and those given exclusive
rights to industrial and commercial interests.
The Cuban populace became the fuel running Spain’s
colonial exploitation of its own natural resources. To avoid the risk of complete resentment and
rebelliousness of a colonized people, it is necessary to allow some to reap the
benefits of their colonization. Apart
from the governing class, there were Cubans who worked with Spain
to maintain the status quo, and in so doing, reaped the material and monetary
benefits. Ana M. Otero, a refugee who
fled Cuba in
1962, explains that, “Politically, control of the island rested with the
captain-general, the father of a small, poorly paid bureaucracy of officials
appointed by Spain
who expected to gain profits from graft and corruption and return to their
country wealthy. Many, however, stayed
in the island and mixed with the criollos.
By the eighteenth, many of these Spaniards residing for generations in Cuba
had created their own blend of criollo aristocracy – wealthy land and
plantation owners who seldom visited their own homeland.” Goodwin described the system Otero details as,
“social structures which, in almost every Latin country, had allowed a handful
of wealthy oligarchs and generals to prosper while the mass of the population
was imprisoned in hopeless poverty.” As
a result there existed, in Cuba,
essentially two societies. There were
the vast majority of Cubans who lived in poverty and for whom the promise of
autonomy and democracy simply did not ring true. And, as Otero and Goodwin suggest, just
beneath the strata of the governing elite there arose a class of Cubans who
would, for generations, become an entrenched and powerful faction of the social
order.
With
U.S.
intervention in Cuba
it is this faction that, under the guise of autonomy, became the ruling
elite. Capitalism, for them, served a
dual role. One the one hand, the
laissez-faire aura of U.S.
economic policy in the first half of the twentieth century simply permitted
them to “capitalize” on their already acquired and inflated material
wealth. The distribution of wealth
during this period of Cuban “independence” was highly disproportional. On the other hand, the perception that Cuba
enjoyed independence reinforced the ruling class’ perception that their
accumulated, and burgeoning, wealth had been acquired in a completely
legitimate manner. Shortly after its
independence from Spain,
the Cuban economy was in a state of collapse. For the majority of Cubans the
economic hardships were punishing and this period of Cuban “independence” was a
volatile time for the island nation.
Otero describes this bleak period by suggesting that, “Cuba’s short
period of independence from 1902 to 1959 was marred with U.S. interventions,
fractious political groups, incessant rebellions, unfettered public corruption,
economic instability, erratic price fluctuations, and a succession of
presidents whose terms were characterized by venality, nepotism, incompetence,
graft, and despotism.” As a result of this instability and thus,
economic vulnerability, U.S.
investment and capital flooded Cuba
resulting in its once proud and productive agrarian and industrial sectors
becoming whole subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. As the classic model would
suggest, the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. However, the U.S.
influence on Cuba
went far beyond capitalistic economic policies.
As Cuba
became flooded with American nationals and tourists, industrial, and corporate
influences, American culture also began to creep its way into the Cuban
experience. In essence, it appeared to many Cubans that the imperialist influences of the United
States began to erode away any notion of a
Cuban identity.
III.
Castro’s Revolution
In many ways Castro’s
revolution found its genesis in this loss of national identity and pride. By appealing directly to Marti’s sense of
nationalist philosophy, Castro attempted to position himself as Marti’s
ideological heir. Indeed, when tried for
his failed attack on the Moncada Barracks and asked who was
the “intellectual author” of the attack Castro’s reply was “Jose Marti!” Castro’s subsequent imprisonment swelled his
popularity and Batista eventually released him after mounting public pressure.
After his release from prison Castro was exiled to Mexico and immediately began his plot to overthrow the
Batista regime.
It is
proper, at this point, to understand that, apart from Marti’s sense of
nationalism, Castro had yet to submit to one particular political
ideology. During the early days of
Castro’s “Movement” members of the Communist party were excluded. According to Szulc, Castro himself states,
“We didn’t speak of Marxism or communism in those days, but of a social
revolution, of a true revolution, of the role of imperialism in our
country.” During his exile Castro
outlined a program for Cuba
that appeared more socialist than communist; but even then it went undefined.
His plan included a distribution of land among peasant families; a drastic
reduction in rent prices, public housing to reduce overcrowding, and expanding
electricity to areas yet covered.
Appealing to the masses, as his plan clearly intended to do, was part of
Castro’s calculated effort to gain popular support for his pending revolution.
Little purpose is served in
recounting the specific details of Batista’s fall and Castro’s victorious
revolution except to say that despite an initial puppet government, Castro
moved quickly to consolidate his power.
Castro’s intent was to publicly project an image of responsibility and
stability for the revolution he had just won.
Outward appearances and actions suggested that Castro’s intent was
democratic reform, yet his private actions conveyed an opposite purpose. He
purged the nation of Batista supporters and military leaders who were loyal to
the old guard. His fiery and demagogic
speeches served to undermine the president and sway public opinion. Szulc points out that Castro always believed
that the, “moderate regime under Urrutia was transitory, unacceptable in the
long run as an instrument of the revolution, and this is why he had to create a
‘hidden government’ to move the nation rapidly along the revolutionary road
while the unity concept with the Communists was being ironed out.” In the meantime, to appease the United
States Castro promised free elections and
asserted that he was in fact not a communist.
He did, however, suggest the caveat that democracy in Cuba
would not be possible until the Cuban people were both educationally and
healthy enough to appreciate it.
To serve his political end, Castro
had to really win the hearts and minds of the Cuban people. At the beginning of the revolution it would
appear he had achieved the former. His
revolution and the expulsion of Batista had proven immensely popular. Everywhere Castro appeared or spoke throngs
of people greeted him and held on to his every word. But to maintain the revolution Castro
believed a complete overhaul of the Cuban psyche was also in order. He believed that for the revolution to truly
succeed it was necessary to change the culture of Cuba. It is imperative to understand that rough
transition of circumstances and events that lead to the Cuba
of today. Thus began the systematic
process of building a nation by transforming the mindset of its people; thus
began Castro’s cultural revolution.
For Castro it was not enough that he
would govern a nation according to the dictates of his political ideology, the
masses had to support the very ideals of revolutionary thought and
culture. According to Roger Reed, in The
Cultural Revolution in Cuba, one of Castro’s most influential comrades,
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, believed “it was necessary to create socialist
“consciousness” through political education and participation in revolutionary
activities.” Castro reiterated that point by stating, “the great task of the revolution is essentially the task of
forming the new man… the man of truly socialist consciousness, the man of truly
communist consciousness.”
To achieve this end it was necessary to erode or abolish support for those
existing institutions that still had significant emotional and educational
impact on the Cuban people.
IV. The Shaping of a New Cuban
Identity and the New Man
One of the first steps in this
struggle for the very minds of Cubans was to invoke the spirit of Marti and the
struggle against colonialism and imperialism.
As Marti became a heroic figure in the struggle against Spain,
so Castro positioned himself as the heroic figure in the struggle against
Batista and Yankee imperialism. Because
the Cuban people themselves did not fully understand, at that point, the
intricacies of Castro’s long-terms plans for Cuba,
it was necessary appeal to their baser emotions. By erecting posters of himself and Guevara
throughout Cuba,
in their dramatic poses, military uniforms, and gruff appearances, they became
symbols of the struggle that the average Cuban could relate to. Instead of appearing as distant, elitist
leaders with little interest in the masses, the constant presence of Castro and
Guevara, if even in poster form, gave the impression that the people were being
watched and cared for. This sense of
omnipresence would, however, begin to take on a more aggressive and intrusive
form as the revolution solidified its grip on power. Further perpetuating that sense of physical
presence were Castro’s infamous long speeches broadcast throughout Cuba
via television and radio. By directly
appealing to the people, while also indoctrinating them, Castro further
appealed to their sense of nationalism.
For the first time the Cuban people had a leader who spoke to them, who
seemingly sought to explain his actions and motives. And during these “conversations” Castro would
remind the people that enemies of the revolution would always try to undermine
the progress he sought for them and their livelihoods. It was this “us against them” mentality that,
initially, endeared many of the Cuban people to Castro in the early days of the
Cultural Revolution.
Suppression of Informative
& Educational Institutions: The Media and Universities
After Batista’s fall it was an
immediate goal of Castro’s government to control those medial outlets once
loyal to the deposed dictator. Castro
believed that reactionary elements of the media would begin to manipulate the
revolution’s message, and in so doing, rival his direct appeal to the people. As a result, Castro began to seek suppression
of independent and critical journalists.
Newspapers such as Alerta and Puebla,
and the radio station, Radio Mambi, were shut down. Eventually even newspapers not directly
associated with Batista, such as Presna Libre and Bohemia,
began to feel the pressure of Castro’s demand for conformity. Castro began to denounce newspapers and
journalists who didn’t laude the revolution or criticized what they perceived
to be a trend towards restriction and repression of free thought and expression. To counter criticism Castro would
editorialize in Revolucion, the revolution’s official paper, accusing
critics of his government as either being traitors of the revolution or
supporters of the imperialist powers that had degraded and exploited the Cuban
people.
For
those that supported Castro and the revolution the accusation that critical
journalists were traitors was tantamount to an indictment. Groups of Castro supporters would often
harass and intimidate critical journalists, at times even acting out
violently. After this sense of siege and
oppression any notion of a free press began to dissipate. When pro-Castro journalists took leadership
over the Journalists Guild, the guild passed a resolution allowing the
inclusion of “coletillas (little tail)” in articles critical of the
revolution. As Szulc writes, the
coletillas were “postscript(s) appended at the end of every article, news
dispatch, editorial or photograph that happened to disagree with the official
line on anything.”
It
should be noted, and this will be discussed in more depth later, that Castro
didn’t see these restrictions as censorship per se. Indeed, none of the basic liberties that he
would eventually curtail contradicted Castro’s own concept of freedom and
liberty. As Szulc further writes,
“Castro’s view was that only the revolution brought real freedom of the press
to Cuba to
replace the right-wing biases of the bourgeoisie.” For Castro the advancement of the revolution,
which would bring true freedom and enlightenment to the people, must take
priority. As Castro himself
phrased it, “We must explain the fundamental principles of the Revolution, its
reason, and its justice; we must discredit enemies of the Revolution, and the
arguments of the enemies of the Revolution… And since all information media is in
the hands of the Revolution, we should place that formidable power at the
service of the formation of a strong revolutionary consciousness in the people,
never neglecting this point.”
What
we can discern from this statement is that, in essence, for Castro the
revolution comes before everything else.
It is a theme that Castro would repeat again and again. Yet for Castro, swaying public perception
through the media was not the only means available to him; nor the only means
he intended to exploit. For the
revolution to also succeed it was important for the people to be educated.
Che
Guevara believed that the most pressing task of the revolution “is the
political and ideological education of our people.” For the people to truly support the
revolution they had to understand it; they had to understand its goals and
principles. While Castro could directly
control primary and secondary education, it was his assault on the university
system that warrants discussion. As with
the press, there existed elements within academia that were either associated,
or outright loyal, to the Batista regime.
The nature of higher education is to foster ideals, intellectual
curiosity, and free thought. Because
academia and the revolution would be competing for the minds of young Cubans it
was necessary for Castro to control the university institutions as well.
In
1959 students and professors formed the University Reform Commission. The purpose of the Commission was to pressure
academics and students who had either been affiliated or supporters of
Bautista. Castro was also able to
manipulate the election of the Federation of University Student’s (FEU)
presidential election. With the
Commission solidly behind him and puppet control of the FEU Castro’s control
over universities was almost complete.
There still existed the University Council, a body comprised of
faculty-elected members that served as the highest governing university
body. Castro sought to control this body
by suggesting that two of its members were counter-revolutionaries and
demanding their ouster. When the body
refused to oust the two members the FEU demanded the resignation of the entire
University Council and, when it refused, the council was dismissed and replaced
with pro-Castro members.
So
that there would be no mistake as to who truly ran the university system, in
1960 Castro created the Higher Council of Universities. The Minister of Education, who reported
directly to Castro, ran the Higher Council.
Finally, in 1962 all institutions of higher learning were
nationalized. In the end, Castro’s
efforts to gain control of all elements of education and higher learning had
been successful. The education of all
young Cubans could now be steered by the revolution’s ideology and further
indoctrinate support for Castro and his government. Education would now become
another tool in which Castro could manipulate the masses.
Suppression of Cultural
Institutions: Literature and Cinema, The Church
Castro
also used the media and arts as a means of manipulating the Cuban psyche. By establishing the Institute of
Cinematographic Art and Industry (ICAIC) Castro sought to directly control what
images and concepts were presented to the Cuban people in the day’s most
popular format. The ICAIC, according to
the law establishing it, explained its purpose by suggesting that, “The cinema
constitutes, by virtue of its characteristics, an instrument of opinion and
formation of individual and collective consciousness and it can contribute to
the depth and clarity of the revolutionary spirit and help to sustain its
creative vitality… The cinema is the most powerful and suggestive media of
artistic expression and it is the most direct and extensive vehicle of
education and the popularization of ideas.”
It was the purpose of the ICAIC to produce films
that idolized the revolutionary and idealized the revolution. The ICAIC also produced documentaries on
various subjects pertaining to the revolution.
One of its most famous documentaries, “Muerte al Invasor,” dealt with
the Bay of Pigs and the successful turning back of the U.S. supported
invasion. It was through these films and
documentaries that the revolution transformed, for many Cubans, from an
abstract concept of governmental and ideological change to a collective movement
they were all engaged in. By
personifying the revolution, be it through documentaries of Castro and the
other revolutionaries, or by depicting the revolution as a means of change and
culture in the lives of fictional, yet relatable, individuals, the ICAIC played
an integral part in the Cultural Revolution.
The lines between art and propaganda, as a means of cultural
transformation, are not new. And while
film may have been the most successful means of communicating with the masses,
Castro also extended his control over literature and the press.
With
his control of the various institutions that vied for the minds and intellect
of the Cuban people, Castro had positioned himself as the sole source of
information and intellect available. His
omnipotence in all forms of Cuban society assured that only his interpretation
and perceptions of thought and ideals were perpetuated and adhered to. In what they heard, read, and learned the
Cuban people were being served a form of culture manufactured specifically to
Castro’s taste and preferences. They
were being told that the revolution would bring to them what colonialism and
imperialism had not, a sense of nationalistic pride and freedom. Yet there remained one institution Castro had
yet to completely control. And in many
ways it was it seems likely that this institution would serve as his biggest
challenge. It is one thing to attempt to
control the thoughts and ideals of a people, in essence to have sway over their
mind and body. It is quite another to
attempt to replace that sense of spirit and soul an individual feels in
relation to their faith. Castro,
however, was attempting to not only build a new nation, but to change a culture
long oppressed and long exploited. To do
so Castro wanted the Cuban to people to not only see him as their leader, he wanted them to see him as their source of
inspiration. To achieve that end it
would be necessary to alter that long entrenched institution filling that void,
it would be necessary for Castro to challenge the church.
Initially,
Castro was compelled to co-exist with the Catholic Church. An institution so ingrained into the social
consciousness was just to strong an institution to
disturb. Ironically, it was the Church
that fired the first shot. As Castro’s
Marxist ideology became more apparent, the Church began to resist. The Church began to disseminate articles
making it clear that a Marxist/Communist government contradicts the freedoms
and liberties individuals are entitled to.
According to Reed, the church became more vocal in its defiance of
Castro’s revolution. He writes that the
Archbishop of Santiago, Enrique Peres Serantes, was blunt when he stated, “The
great enemy of Christianity is Communism.” In 1960 the Catholic Bishops released a
circular stating that, “Catholicism and Communism correspond to two conceptions
of man and the world that are totally opposed, and which may never be
reconciled.” Upon release of the circular Castro began to
crack down on priests who articulated it to their parishes. As a result, priests were detained and
threatened. A television program
produced by the Catholic Church was eventually shut down and the program’s
director accused of promulgating anti-government propaganda.
Castro
accused the clergy of being a tool of imperialists, specifically the United
States. After the Bay of Pigs clergy men
and women were placed under house arrest and churches were routinely occupied
by the military and vandalized. Because
of this persecution many of the clergy either fled Cuba or were deported. Castro would eventually nationalize all
private schools, including parochial ones.
As Wilkerson writes,
“…aside from incidents of harassment of Church officials, which
may have been arranged by the regime, no direct government intervention took
place until Catholic radio and television programs were closed in September,
1960. This was followed by the closing
of Catholic periodicals which had adopted a critical attitude toward the regime
or Communism.” Slowly, the Church began to lose its
influence and Cubans began to attend services less and less. In part it was done out of loyalty, many
Cubans believing that Castro represented their interests better than the
Church. Yet many others began attending
mass less and less out of fear of oppression or retaliation. By creating such a hostile environment Castro
was able to significantly alter the influence of an already crippled
church.
With
the Church out of the way Castro had really neutered most aspects of cultural
influence apart from his own government.
Szulc characterizes the effects by noting that, “Castro’s handling of
Cuban intellectuals, writers, and artists, forcing the country’s cultural
community into an ideological straitjacket and depriving it of the last ounce
of freedom in the sense accepted in the non-totalitarian world, was one of his
masterful exercises in power, intimidation, and manipulation.” In Castro’s Cuba
there was little room for indoctrination not in line with the revolution’s
goals and ideals. The indoctrination was
perpetuated in line with the government’s future intention for political
domination and survival. Blas Roca, the
Secretary General of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), the political party
of Castro’s government, put Castro’s logic this way, “We cannot permit the
reactionaries, the agents of imperialism, and the great property owners, who,
for some wear religious clothes, to use the temple which is of prayer and
pulpit… to carry out counterrevolutionary propaganda, to serve Yankee
imperialism against Cuba, to sow confusion in the Cuban people, and to oppose
revolutionary measures.”
The Ideology of the Revolution
and the Emergence of the New Man
Prior
to Castro’s ascension to the presidency, during the puppet term of President
Manuel Urrutia, it was not entirely clear whether or not Castro intended to set
up a communist regime. Many of the
principles Castro claimed as inspiration for the revolution, including those
championed by Marti, seemed in accord with the concept of civil liberties and
democracy. Castro advocated national
autonomy, self-governance, and civil liberties for the Cuban people. Yet it
became quickly apparent that Castro’s interpretation of self-governance meant
that he, as personification of the Cuban people, governed according to his sole
discretions. Castro may have also
championed self-expression and independence, but such expression and
independence would not be tolerated when in conflict with the revolution. Richard Goodwin, a top advisor in both the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, recalls that, “Even Castro, from his base
in the Sierra Maestra, had found it desirable to proclaim to devotion to
democracy, lest his revolution be drained of popular support or be aborted by
American intervention.” Conversely, Castro’s call for universal
health care, the elimination of illiteracy, public housing, universal
education, and the right to work seemed to suggest his preference for a
socialistic society. During the period
of Urrutia’s presidency the United States
could not discern exactly what to expect from Castro’s revolution and what
long-term impact it would have on U.S.
interests and dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
It
was during this period that Fidel Castro visited the United
States.
Just prior to his arrival, in a speech in Havana on April 9th,
1959, Castro said, “We want that when elections come… that everybody be working
here… that all the children have a school… that all families have access to
hospitals… that every Cuban know his rights and his duties, that every Cuban
know how to read and write… Then, we can have truly democratic elections.” This speech, so close to his American visit,
served as notice that Castro’s trip would be different from past Latin American
leaders. While not officially received as
a head of state, Castro met with Vice President Nixon and several cabinet
members and members of Congress. “’We
are not Communists,’ that if there happened to be any Communists in his
government, ‘their influence is nothing,’ and that he did not agree with
communism” is how
Szulc describes Castro’s stance during his U.S.
visit. And yet, despite these denials and denunciations, Castro’s social
reforms began to raise the concerns of the United
States and other democratic nations.
As relations between Cuba
and the United States
became further strained over economic and property interests, Castro began to
see the Soviet Union as a more practical economic and
ideological partner. Castro’s 1st and 2nd Agrarian Reform
Laws contributed greatly to this strained relationship. The 1st Agrarian Reform Law sought
to break up the large monopoly on Cuban land acquired, over time, by wealthy
landowners and foreign corporations. U.S.
corporations who had land confiscated protested to the United
States government that Cuba’s
compensation for the land was far below its fair market value. The U.S.
government demanded the Cuban government fairly and promptly compensate the
corporations for the seized land.
Instead, Cuba
enacted the 2nd Agrarian Reform Law.
Eduardo Penalver describes the law, enacted on October 3,
1963, as, “much more far-reaching than the first. While the first law left medium-sized private
farms more or less intact, the second law sought a wholesale nationalization of
virtually all Cuban agriculture. The
reach of the second reform law reflected the radicalization of the revolution
that occurred in the period between 1959 and 1963.” As the United
States became increasingly frustrated and
alarmed at Cuba’s
ongoing slide toward socialism, Cuba
sought to strengthen its Soviet ties for both economic and political support.
According
to Jason Bell, in his article Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S.
Policy: An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act,
the United States
also played a large part in pushing Castro toward Soviet support. Bell
points out that, “In May, 1960, the United
States ordered U.S.
oil companies in Cuba
to refuse to refine Soviet crude because they were concerned that Cuba
was turning toward socialism. When the
refineries refused to process Soviet oil, Castro responded by nationalizing the
refineries.” The fact is that as Cuba
came to rely on Soviet oil and its promise to purchase Cuba’s
entire sugar crop, Castro began to more openly embrace the communist political
ideology and antagonize the United States
with Soviet support. David Shamberger,
writing in the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review suggests
that, “Early in the Castro years, Cuba
and the Soviet Union developed a relationship of
comradery and cooperation. Initially,
Communist party members gradually assumed government positions. Next, Cuba
and the Soviet Union completed their first commercial
transaction in 1960 when Cuba
received Soviet oil in exchange for sugar.” The seizure of U.S.
oil refineries, the decision to no longer buy Cuban sugar, and the Agrarian
Reform laws collectively played a part in the demise of American-Cuban
relations. According to Jason Bell, the
Kennedy administration, after tolerating as much Cuban defiance as politically
practical, announced the trade embargo. “On February 6th, 1962, President Kennedy imposed a
formal trade embargo between the United States
and Cuba,
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 3447.
President Kennedy reasoned that such an embargo was necessary because
the Cuban government was at odds with the “principles and objectives of the
Inter-American system,” and Cuba’s
alignment with the Soviet powers posed a security risk for the United
States as well as the Western
Hemisphere.” After the imposition of the embargo Cuban
reliance on the Soviet Union was total. If Castro had ever truly intended democratic
reforms in the U.S.
tradition the imposition of the embargo ended any such possibility. To maintain Soviet support Castro slowly
adopted the Marxist policies and ideologies consistent with the Soviet
model. Finally, on December 1st, 1961, Castro declared
what ideology the political party of the revolution would be based. Castro declared that the party would have a,
“’Marxist-Leninist program adjusted to the precise objective conditions of our
country,’” that this would no longer be a ‘secret,’ and that ‘today we shall
see to it that to be a Communist is a merit.’”
Though
Castro’s revolution had, for some time, simply existed as an ideology in and of
itself, the revolution had promised a resurgence of Cuban nationalism,
self-governance, and full autonomy. These were themes and concepts easily
understood by a weary and uneducated Cuban people. Apart from the lines of political ideology,
Castro would also define the revolutions in terms of social welfare. In a telling speech Castro defined his
revolution as, “The right of the peasants to land; the right of workers to the
fruit of their work; the right of children to education; the right of the ill
to medical and hospital attention; the right of youth to work; the right of
students to free, experimental, and scientific education; the right of Negroes
and Indians to the ‘full dignity of man’; the right of women to civil, social,
and political equality; the right of the aged to a secure old age; the right of
intellectuals, artists, and scientists to fight, with their works, for a better
world.” In any event, Castro would explain his
politically ideological transformation by pointing out that, “The more experience
we have of a revolutionary reality and the class struggle in the process of
revolution, the more we are convinced of the absolute truth of the writings of
Marx and Engels and Lenin’s brilliant interpretation of scientific Socialism.”
Just
how deep Castro’s convictions regarding the communist ideology were prior to
the revolution is up for debate.
However, as time progressed Castro seems to have morphed his
revolutionary ideology with the Marxist ideology. Perhaps the antagonistic relationship between
Castro and the United States
played a pivotal role in his ideological transformation. His initial experience with communists in Cuba
seemed to have little impact on his overall goal of social revolution. As Szulc points out, “Fidel always knew where
he was going, adjusting strategy and tactics according to changing political
situations; he dreamed of sweeping revolution, but not of a Communist
revolution defined by the Cuban Communist party.”
Yet, in Remembering America, Richard Goodwin recounts that, “’Fidel was
always a communist,’” Che Guevara told me later in the summer of 1961, ‘but if
he admitted it you would never had let us reach Havana.’” Whatever the origins of Castro’s ideological
revolution, it is apparent his aims were as much political as they were
social. It is this pursuit of a social
revolution in Cuba,
a social revolution not entirely embraced by all Cubans, which has been the
source of controversy and criticism in Cuba
since Castro’s rise to power.
Having
pacified most purveyors of Cuban intellect and culture, eliminating U.S.
political and economic influence over Cuba,
and securing Soviet political and military support, Castro’s aspiration for
radical social change in Cuba
could commence. As Roger Reed points
out, the goal of Castro’s government was far larger than a change in
leadership, “The Cuban Revolution was much more than an effort to topple
Batista and replace him. Castro and most
of the other rebels aspired to make radical changes in Cuba’s
political and economic system aimed at ushering in a new era of social justice…
They wanted to change the change the way people think.”
To
build the foundations of his new society Castro set up special schools for both
the military and civilians aimed at instilling and perpetuating
Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Those in
the military who attended the ‘Troop Instructors Schools’ were considered to be
on the front lines of Cuba’s
social revolution. It was they who would
be the ears and eyes of the revolution and have the most direct contact with
the Cuban people. Tad Szulc writes that
it was one of, “Castro’s principle(s) that the Rebel Army must play a leading
ideological role in the revolution…”
While military personnel trained at their respective schools, young Cubans were
also subject to a rigorous education in the ideology of the revolution. Castro understood that indoctrinating young
Cubans in the Marxist ideology was an advantageous means of perpetuating
support for both the revolution and, ultimately, support for himself. The Nico
Lopez Central School
became a conduit for future leaders of the Communist party. Szulc explains that, “By late 1961 over
thirty thousand persons went through the indoctrination schools…”
Castro strongly believed education was the key in achieving the “New Man”
consciousness. Referring to his attack
on the Moncada Barracks in 1953, Castro made the analogy that, “there remained
the most difficult Moncada of all, the Moncada of the old ideas, of old selfish
sentiments, of hold habits of thinking and ways of viewing everything… and this
Moncada has not been completely taken.” Part of this “New Man” concept had much to do
with the collective good. Che Guevara
would comment that to achieve this, “Individualism as such, as the action of a
single person in the social environment, must disappear in Cuba.”
In this sense Castro’s revolution served as much a cultural means as a
political one. Castro would attempt to
change the collective consciousness of the Cuban people so that the revolution
would not only be one of political and nationalist ideals, it would raise a
generation of Cubans who thought only of themselves as part of a collective
Cuba and, through their actions, serve Cuba first and their individual desires
second.
V.
The Constitution of 1976
For
Castro, however, it was not enough to reform and rebuild the consciousness of
the Cuban people. It was also necessary
for Castro to codify into law the ideals and principles that the revolution
encompassed. In many ways the Cuban
Constitution of 1976 represents what appears to be an enlightened document; it
acknowledges past wrongs and lays the foundations for what some would perceive
as an egalitarian society based on the concept of basic liberties and the
collective good. In its preamble the
constitution alludes to the past struggles of Cuba
and then lists various segments of the Cuban people who have, as a result of
colonialism and imperialism, been exploited in the past. The constitution begins, “We, Cuban Citizens,
heirs and continuators of the creative work and the traditions of combativity,
firmness, heroism and sacrifice by our ancestors: by the Indians who preferred
extermination to submission; by the slaves who rebelled against their masters;
…by the workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals who struggled for over
fifty years against imperialist domination; … by those who defended the
Revolution at the cost of their lives, thus contributing to its definitive
consolidation…” The preamble appeals to that sense of
national pride that Marti and Castro hoped to re-establish. By alluding to Cuba’s
difficult history, and Castro’s subsequent victorious revolution, the preamble
would appear to encompass the collective struggle of Cubans and present the
constitution as insurance that such struggle will never again be
tolerated. In this way, the constitution
serves Castro’s sense of collective consciousness as he solidifies his hold on
power.
In
that vain, the Cuban Constitution of 1976 also served a politically practical
means as well. To achieve his revolution
Castro had to ensure that his form of government, with him as head of that
government, would go politically unchallenged. As Michael B. Wise explains in
the Cuba
and Judicial Review that, “The Constitution of 1976
follows the Marxist-Leninist approach of its
model, the Soviet Constitution of 1936. It differs from other socialist models
primarily by creating a strong president, permitting the same person to serve
both as president of the Council of State and President of the Council of
Ministers.” Under this structure Castro, as head of state
and head of the government, had complete control over all functions of Cuba’s political
reach and power. The constitution also
gives Castro sole power over the course of Cuba’s economy. Stephan M. Bleisteiner suggests that
the constitution helped to, “establish a centrally-planned, state-owned, and
state-controlled economy.” The constitution would appear to be both a
benevolent document while also maintaining strict control over the Cuban people.
Because the constitution appears to straddle the fence between both the
idealistic and the politically practical, it is worthwhile to explore both
aspects of the 1976 Cuban Constitution a little deeper.
The Idealism of the 1976
Constitution
In
its preamble the Cuban constitution declares that the State is “AWARE” that,
“only under socialism and communism, when man has been freed from all forms of
exploitation – slavery, servitude and capitalism – can full dignity of the
human being attained;”
Castro believed that under a socialist form of government the revolution could
best be achieved. As Szulc points out,
under the new constitution, “normal societal requirements would be reflected,
but the existing structure or philosophy of the state would never be
affected. In this sense, the future of Cuba
was set in granite.” This future, as Castro envisioned it, would
be one in which generations of Cuba
would enjoy the essentials for human development and sustainability.
The 1976 Constitution as a
Means of Maintaining Power
The constitution of 1976 codifies into law the
maintenance of Castro’s hold on power in Cuba. By force of law it means to ensure that the
socialist revolution, as interpreted by Castro, is the sole inspiration for
governance. Szulc writes that the
constitution, “hailed Jose Marti, who ‘led us to the people’s revolutionary
victory,’ then Fidel Castro, under whose leadership the ‘triumphant revolution’
was to be carried forward. Thus
enshrined in the constitutional text, Castro was in effect named Leader for
Life as a law; the corollary was that it would be unconstitutional (and not
just ‘counterrevolutionary’) to challenge him.” Apart from defining Castro’s role, the
constitution also explains how the Cuban people are “represented.” In Cuba’s Transition to a Free
Market Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws
and Legal Institutions, Matias F. Travieso-Diaz describes exactly how Cuba’s
representative government is structured under the 1976 constitution. Travieso-Diaz
writes, “To supervise state administration, the government created municipal,
provincial, and national assemblies. Representatives
for the municipal assembly were directly elected and these delegates then
elected members of the provincial assembly who in turn selected members of the
National Assembly of People's Power (National Assembly). However, the National Assembly, the single-chamber
legislature created by the 1976 Constitution, is not a true legislative body
and suffers from a ‘rubber-stamp image.’” Travieso-Diaz goes on to describe the
National Assembly’s twice-annual meetings as perfunctory and never
substantively debating legislation. The
National Assembly has never significantly altered or outright rejected
legislation proposed by Castro and considered by him as necessary to the
survival of the Revolution. Apart from
the National Assembly, the constitution also takes steps to alter the rights of
Cuban people in challenging the State while maintaining the appearance of an
open society. Richard Schmidt and Kevin
Goldberg write that, “The Cuban constitution provides the top layer. The Constitution purports to protect
fundamental freedoms; in reality these freedoms can be exercised only in the
name of Socialism… The Cuban constitution is drafted to ensure that the
priorities of the state triumph over the rights of the individual.” In this way, the constitutional rights
enjoyed by the Cuban people would appear to end where open criticism of the
State begins.
Castro
has maintained that as the embodiment of the Cuban people he speaks for them
and with them in all matters related to the State. Article 3 of the
constitution suggests that, “In the Republic of Cuba, the
sovereignty resides in the people, from whom all of the power of the State
emanates.” This is a far different
concept of governance than Cuba had been
accustomed to. It is a concept long
before championed by Jose Marti during the rebellion against Spain and one that
inspired Cubans to pursue their own freedom. Indeed, the preamble to the Cuban
constitution alludes to the fact that Cuba is “GUIDED by
the ideology of Jose Marti.” By taking the spirit of
Marti, the drive for a newfound nationalism and self-governance, Castro appears
to manipulate his position as head of the State by suggesting that
self-governance exists by nature of his sole representation of the Cuban
people. To that end, despite enumerating
rights afforded to the Cuban people, the Cuban constitution also indicates that
those rights end where the preservation of the socialist state begins. Essentially, criticism of the socialist
government structure is not tolerated.
Article 53 of the Cuban constitution declares that, Citizens have
freedom of speech and the press in keeping with the objectives socialist
society.” Article 9 seems to catch the irony of the
constitution’s ideals by both enumerating the functions of the State as well as
articulating the pursuits of the socialist ideal. It declares that the State, “guarantees the freedom
and full dignity of men” while also stating that the government, “channels the
efforts of the nation in the construction of socialism.” Nicolas Gutierrez puts it more plainly by
writing that, “Article 9 of the 1976 Constitution confesses that laws ‘are to
echo only the will of the working people,’
and that only ‘socialist legality is binding on the State, which is to be
officially controlled by the Communist Party. Since
there is neither national nor international consensus as to what constitutes
‘socialist legality,’ Article 9 has the de facto effect of providing
‘constitutional’ cover for the official repression of all opponents of the
communist police state.”
By establishing
himself as the sole leader of Cuba and the sole
purveyor of Cuban thought Castro has been able to maintain his hold on Cuba’s government
for over forty years. The constitution
also alludes to Cuba and its
government after Castro. As it is
currently set up, upon Castro’s death his younger brother Raul becomes leader
of the Cuban people. Raul Castro shares
Castro’s ideology and concept of governance, so that even in death Castro’s
influence over Cuba’s future will
continue. Perhaps Schmidt and Goldberg
summarize best Cuba’s government
when they write, “In the pyramid structure of Cuban government, the common citizen
sits at the bottom, subject to arrest at any time for violating vague laws
drafted by a judiciary that reports directly to Fidel Castro… Arrested citizens
are brought before judges elected by the people in elections with no opposition
party candidates. Their lawyers, along
with the Attorney General trying the case, will be members of this single party
as well, and will be sworn to uphold the ideals of Socialism.”
The constitution
has conveniently served as both a source of inspiration for the revolution and
a tool for its continuing hold on power.
But what effects have, in the final analysis, has all this had on the
Cuban people? It is simple to analyze
the disparity between the Cuban people’s constitutional rights and the
realities of free expression and thought in Cuba. It is also simple to distinguish “democracy”
practiced in the United States with the
“democracy” Cubans live under day to day.
Yet, apart from the politics, Cubans also require the same essentials of
life that all individuals need to survive.
What is the status of Cubans today, 40 years under Castro?
VI. The Cuban People Today
Despite
the promise of an egalitarian society, there are segments of Cuban society that
enjoy more privileges than the rest.
Hernandez Truyol points out that, “Surveys of Cubans in 1971 and 1986
show that there are ‘privileged groups’ in Cuban society. The privilege can be based on status, i.e.,
having high political or military rank or being a foreign diplomat, or tourist,
or having some connection, such as being a close family member, friend or lover
of one who has privileged status.” Put another way, Franciso
Valdes paints a very sinister picture of the greed the current elites exhibit in order to maintain their position. Valdes writes, “Havana elites would rather
sell the country to opportunistic and ravenous neocolonial capitalists from
Canada and Europe – most noticeably, and some would say ironically, the old
colonial master, Spain – and to accommodate the growing prostitution and sex
tourism on the island from the ‘decadent’ societies with which Havana elites
choose to conduct ‘business,’ than to accept even a modicum of political or
economic decentralization.” In total contradiction to the constitution,
the evidence would suggest that women and blacks have had significant trouble
in achieving equality under Castro’s government. Again, Hernandez Truyol writes, “… in
reality, neither women nor blacks have achieved equality. Although both groups have made some gains,
they both largely have been excluded from the power structure. Indeed, at a 1974 Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) Congress,
Castro recognized that women’s equality was not yet a reality.” As is evidenced, Cuba has not been
successful in achieving its goal of an egalitarian society. In the same way under Spain and the U.S. that
a class of elite enjoyed the privileges of their position, so too in Castro’s
Cuba do military and government officials enjoy privilege. The privileged and powerful have not been
eliminated under Castro’s leadership; they’ve simply changed from one group to
another. But apart from the continuing
struggle for equality in Cuba, the Cuban
people still face many other significant problems.
Economically,
the Cuban people have long endured the U.S. embargo imposed
by President Kennedy in 1962. Relying
heavily on Soviet support, Cuba was dealt a
tremendous economic blow when the Soviet Union collapsed and,
almost overnight, ended its subsidy of the Cuban economy. Bell indicates that, “With the end of the
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union have grown to accommodate each
other, and that accommodation has also neutralized Cuba’s importance.” Put another way, the fall of the Soviet Union sent Cuba’s economy into
a nosedive. Penalver writes that, “With the
disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, beginning in 1989… the Cuban economy entered
into a period of acute crisis… The economic crisis of the early 1990’s forced
the Cuban government to enact a series of economic reforms.” Those economic reforms took a tremendous toll
on the basic amenities the Cuban people had been accustomed to including health
care, food, and public housing. As a
result of the economic crisis, the Cuban government called on Cubans to “make
more sacrifices for the common good. The
additional sacrifices included going to rural areas to work on agricultural
projects or participating in micro-brigades for no pay, but simply hope of
governmental recognition and getting bonus points that might buy them a
‘reward,’ such as a vacation.”
The
lack of fuel for energy has led to blackouts that can last up to 16 hours a
day. In her most telling account,
Hernandez Truyol writes that, “Some report the mood of the country as
‘desperate’ and ‘hopeless.’ There are
claims that suicide rates have risen.
Increased attempts to leave the country were met with brutal force by
the government… Crime, particularly ‘theft, black marketeering and economic
fraud’ has reportedly increased.” Yet, despite all these problems, it is not
entirely clear what type of government Cubans may actually want. Many Cubans still adhere to the principles of
the socialist revolution and are reluctant to completely change their form of
government. What may be clear is that
Cubans aren’t necessarily willing to convert to a United States form of
democracy. As Jason Bell explains,
“While many Cubans want change, Cubans on the island fear democracy… Cubans
live between encroaching walls of worry.
They fear nothing will change soon to improve their decaying
existence. Yet they also fear the ground
will suddenly shift, drawing them into a maelstrom of post-Castro pain.” Such an attitude is understandable, for with
any significant change in government there is a volatile period of
transition. The Cuban people have been
living a volatile existence most of their history, and though they may desire
some new form of government or leadership, they fear change nonetheless. This can be easily understood. Having been promised basic liberties and an
egalitarian society, the reality is that life under Castro has been restrictive
and economically difficult. On his many
visits to Cuba Professor Michael Wallace Gordon has seen the Cuban people
living not only under tough conditions, but also living with little hope of a
future or those small components of life that motivate individuals to explore
their creative and worthwhile endeavors.
He writes that the thing that most sustains him is, “my determination to
see a Cuba that follows
Jose Marti’s comment that ‘the spirit of a government must be that of the
country.’ He did not mean that the spirit of country must be that of the
government. The spirit of this country
seeks greater opportunity for Cubans to make choices, open a business and
employ others, work in and be paid by a hotel, exploit an invention, or
practice law… if my eyes, and ears do not deceive me, many others are waiting
for these same opportunities.” Castro’s call for a “New Man,” one who
understands and adheres to a collective consciousness and a collective good is
a call even he has unheeded. Castro has
consistently focused his consciousness on maintaining his hold on power and
oppressing those who challenge it.
Castro has taken the spirit of Marti and manipulated it in a way, and
codified it in a way, that it would be hardly
recognizable to Marti himself. Castro
has, in essence, taken his place in the line of governments that have exploited
and oppressed the Cuban people for centuries.
Ana
Otero, herself a Cuban refugee, writes poignantly, “To the Cuban people, the masses,
people like my biological family, who have endured austere years of
unprecedented rigors, it can no longer foster a spirit of hope. Today, they confront a stark and bleak
reality which forty years of failed promises and exhortations can no longer hide.” What the future holds for Cuba only time will
tell. Whether the continuation of Cuba’s oppressive
government continues under Raul Castro or whether a post-Castro Cuba can pursue the
liberties and self-governance long promised remains to be seen. But perhaps there is reason to be optimistic,
for the history of Cuba has long been
one of struggle and adversity, and Cuba will continue
to exist long after Castro and his revolution have passed into history.
WORKS CITED
Ana Otero, To the People Sitting in Darkness: A Resolve
for Unity and Integration. 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 1133, 1143.
Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Out in
Left Field: Cuba’s Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 Fordham Int’l L. J. 15
(1994).
David M. Shamberger, The
Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective Vehicle for Redressing U.S. Property
Claims in Cuba and Accelerating the Demise of the Castro Regime, 21 B.C.
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 497 (1998).
Eduardo Moises Penalver,
Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the Property
Reforms of the Cuban Revolution. 52 Fla. L. Rev.
107, 112.
Francisco Valdes, Diaspora and Deadlock, Miami
and Havana: Coming to
Terms with Dreams and Dogmas, 55 Fla.
L. Rev. 283 (2003).
Loree Wilkerson, Fidel Castro’s
Political Programs from Reformism to “Marxism-Leninism 11 (University of Florida Press 1965).
Jason Bell, Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S.
Policy: An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act 25 U. Miami
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 77 (1993).
Manuel A. Mesa, The Cuban
Anachronism: A Static Nation in a Dynamic World, 5 Fla.
Int’l L.J. 247 (1990).
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz
& Steven R. Escobar, Cuba’s Transition to a Free-Market Democracy: A
Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 Duke J. Comp.
& Int’l L. 379 (1995).
Michael Wallace Gordon, Thinking About Cuba:
Post-Castro Began a Decade Ago, 15 Fla.
J. Int’l L. 311 (2003).
Michael Wise, Cuba and Judicial Review, 7 Sw. J.L.
& Trade Am. 247 (2000).
Nicolas J. Gutierrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights: Castro’s
Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba, 5 U. Miami Y.B. Int’l
L. 51 (1996-1997).
Richard Goodwin, Remembering America 148 (Little Brown & Company).
Richard Schmidt, Jr. & Kevin M. Goldberg, Castro – Alive
and Well – Continues Forty Years of Controlling Cubans’ Speech, 16-WTR Comm.
Law. 3 (1999).
Roger Reed, The Cultural
Revolution in Cuba.
9 (University of Geneva Press 1991).
Stephan M. Bleisteiner,
Some Lessons for Cuba from the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe 3 U. Miami Y.B. Int'l L. 173 (1995).
Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical
Portrait 96 (William Morrow & Company 1986).
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(1994).
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Eduardo Moises Penalver,
Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the Property
Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 Fla.
L. Rev. 107 (2000).
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and Havana: Coming to
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Gate U. L. Rev.
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(1995).
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& Int’l L. 379 (1995).
Max J. Castro, The
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Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 493 (1998).
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