the Search for International Trading Partners.
J. M. Wretzky
Professors Perritt and Lazar
Table of Contents
Part I: The Rule of Law as an ideal; the “thick” and the “thin” 1
1.1 Thin version and rule of law reform 2
1.2 Thick version and rule of law reform 3
1.3 International Monetary Support and rule of law 4
Part II: Role of law in
2.1 Socialist legality 5
Part III: Structure of the Cuban Government & Recent Reforms 8
3.1 Single Pillar Structure 8
3.2 Criticism of the Single Pillar Structure 10
3.3 Recent Reforms 10
Part IV: The Courts and Judiciary 11
4.1 Structure of the Judicial System 12
4.2Training of Judges 13
4.2(a) Professional Judges 14
4.2(b) Lay Judges 14
4.3 Independent Judiciary & the Notion of Legislative Review: 15
Part IV Conclusions 16
5.1 International Monetary Support 16
5.3 The Future 17
What underlying goals are these
rule of law reforms meant to promote? Does
These questions are ones which I
explore in order to try to predict
Although rule of law, and certain
reforms associated with it can be imbued with capitalist underpinnings, rule of
law in its most thin version is applicable to
Ultimately, those governments
that can reconcile
Part I: The Rule of Law as an ideal; the “thick” and the “thin”
Rule of law as a concept has been
traced all the way back to Aristotle’s time;
yet trying to pinpoint exactly what the rule of law means is a difficult task,
for its meaning is at best vague and obscure,
leading to many different formulations of the concept. In
trying to comprehend exactly what encompasses the idea of rule of law, numerous
documents have been examined, and out of the many, I found the ideas of Randall
Peerenboom to be the most useful when trying to disentangle the notion of rule
of law from other ideologies with which it is associated at times. I base my
1.1 Thin version and rule of law reform
The most basic notion of rule of law is summed up by the famous statement by John Adams, that the rule of law represents “a nation of laws, not men.”  Under this notion, referred to as the “thin” version of rule of law, predictability of law, limitations of coercive powers of government and an independent judiciary are key elements.
This notion of the rule of law, in its barest form, seems appealing. In fact, many have argued that it is possible to reconcile this notion of rule of law to almost any type of government—that the core of the ideal—that the exercise of all power, public or private, be subject to limitation by law—is compatible with a large portion of the political economy spectrum, a spectrum extending from laissez-faire capitalism on the extreme right, to the democratic welfare state in the center, to perhaps even the socialist command economy on the extreme left.
In terms of rule of law reforms, under this “thin” version of the rule of law, a legal system should be organized in a manner that is clear, consistent, and prospective. Government should be structured in such a way as to prevent the arbitrary use of power of the state against the individual. Laws should be widely disseminated so that people can conduct themselves accordingly. All agree that an independent judiciary is crucial to this structure, but the actual architecture that is set in place to achieve this is not uniformly agreed upon. Other corollaries to the thin rule of law are the existence of an active civil society, and a hearty legal culture.
1.2 Thick version and rule of law reform
In its “thick” version, Peerenboom sees the rule of law as incorporating a specific political framework—a framework that is tied to the ideas of capitalism and the free market. This version seems especially favored by international development agencies, seeking to promote rule of law reforms in order to assist developing nations and nations in transition on the road to democracy. For institutions such as these, democracy and capitalism are intertwined. The specific rule of law that these institutions seek to enforce is that relating to contracts—granting and enforcing individual property rights within a state that can be relied upon by non native parties within the judicial system of the state.
In theory, the “thick” version of the rule of law creates the groundwork that is purported to be necessary to promote investment in transitioning nations by granting and strengthening individual property rights; this “thick” rule of law supposedly creates a safer environment in which both local and foreign investors can do business. In principle, the rule of law reforms help to spark investment in the economies of these countries, which then is said to advance the overall state’s economy and then the overall social welfare by redistributing wealth, improving access to justice, and reinforcing individual human rights.
Many development institutions condition receipt of aid money on specific government reforms designed to open markets to capital investment, the most prominent of these being the World Bank and the IMF’s “Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP’S).” It is argued that these measures lead to sustainable economic development, although there are conflicting empirical studies. Adjustment policies can include cuts in government spending on health care and education, increases in the cost of food, health care and other basic necessities, mandates to open markets to foreign trade and investment, and privatization of state-run enterprises. I tie these SAP’s to the notion of the “thick” rule of law because policies such as these are often promoted under the guise of democratic reforms, and therefore can be described as containing a specific political framework, that structures reforms in order to alter the current governmental organization. These reforms are infused with a specific political agenda, which is imposed in the name of the rule of law.
1.3 International Monetary Support and rule of law
It is uncontested that
the revolutionary political and social system established in this constitution [.
. .] having demonstrated its capacity to transform the country and create an
entirely new and just society, is irrevocable, and
Given this political position, it seems unlikely that the Cuban government, as it is today, will voluntarily submit to the types of capitalistic market reforms that are contained within the “thick” notion of the rule of law, and one can predict that it will not be seeking aid from such institutions as the IMF or the World Bank.
Another consideration that plays
into this prediction is
The “thin” version of law as described supra, and reforms associated with it are considered less with capitalist agendas and are mainly concerned with strengthening institutions to ensure that its standard of a government of laws not men is met. Reforms undertaken pursuant this “thin” version of law are more aimed at strengthening institutions such as the judiciary and general democratic participation and debate in the governing process.
In parts III and IV, I discuss
Part II: Role of law in
Understanding the role that law
plays in Cuban society is important to the discussion of whether “rule of law”
reforms are necessary for this state in order to attract international
Many criticisms levied against
It is claimed that the government
2.1 Socialist legality
The role that law plays in a
socially organized community has different understandings. According to Marxists beliefs, there is no
room for “law” at all. Under this
theory, once society moves towards real community interests, the role of law
will “wither away”.
The reason for this position stems from the fact that in Marx’ view, the role
that law plays in capitalist societies is to maintain and protect the existing
(unequal) status quo; that of a society based on class. Law in this situation only protects those
with power. Pure Marxists claim that it is this system
that leads to many of society’s ills, including crime and poverty.
Once this class structure is erased, and the laws that uphold it are abolished,
there is no need for this superstructure, for it only serves to protect the
institution which created it, and it addresses only the problems that stem from
According to Marxist theory, once the revolution has done away with the
structures that create inequality, the law will cease to be necessary.
This view is completely utopian, and has proved to not be true (although it
does perhaps account for the abandonment of legal institutions in
Other socialist thinkers have
reflected on this view, and have reached more of a compromise position. This
position recognizes that law is necessary, at least to the extent that the
society in question has not yet reached the socialist ideal.
It is under this understanding that
In contrast to capitalistic
democracy, which serves to protect individual property interests, Cuban
socialist legality serves to protect the rights of the collective. It is normal
then, that many of the individual’s “fundamental rights” guaranteed by
None of the
freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to what is
established in the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence and
objectives of the
Socialist legality is seen as dynamic; the goal of the revolution is to use the laws of the nation to reach a more “pure” social democracy. The process is considered an ongoing one, slightly paternalistic, in that it grants more participation in governance as the educational and cultural level of the masses is uplifted. The idea is initially, a strong, strict government is needed to guide the people, and as society is changed and the population becomes more accustomed to popular participation in the democratic process, more rights and opportunities for public participation are granted.
Socialist society is strengthened
by providing the tools that a society needs in order to be participants in the
democratic process. This is why
education is so important in
As we are well aware, it is a common occurrence for governments to limit civil liberties in times of threat, even in our own country.
Part III: Structure of the Cuban Government & Recent Reforms
3.1 Single Pillar Structure
The structure of the Cuban
government is laid out in chapters nine and ten of the Cuban Constitution. Its
structure is that of a single pillar, with the National Assembly of People’s
Power (NAPP) being the “supreme body of state power.” The Council of State,
which acts as the executive committee of the NAPP, is elected by the NAPP and
comprises the president, his vice presidents and “twenty three other members.” Fidel Castro is the president of the Council
of State, and president as well, of the Council of Ministers, the highest
administrative authority in
Although it is stated in the
constitution that the Council of State is “accountable for its action to the [NAPP],
to which it must render accounts of all its activities;”
the fact that the President of the Council of State is also the head of the
and the President of the Council of Ministers,
renders the extent of this accountability questionable. Until reforms are
enacted that allow for more transparency as to the functioning of these highest
bodies of power,
Frankly, it is unclear whether the Council of Ministers is a body that is distinct from the Council of State, or whether it is in fact the same thing. Both bodies seem to be composed of the same members; various constitutional provisions describe similar duties and powers. Reforms allowing more transparency of the deliberative procedures of these institutions would serve to add a greater amount of legitimacy to these bodies. One thing that is clear is that the President of the Council of State is the apex of the single pillar structure of the Cuban government.
This single pillar structure is taken from the Marxist-Leninist ideology which, instead of having a tri-partite system, adopted the idea of a strong central government, called the unity of power principle. This means that actual decision making is centralized in a few hands while, in theory, all power, is ultimately traced back to the election of the Municipal Assemblies. As described supra, the notion of socialist legality presumes that at the start of the revolution process, the vanguard will oversee the cultural and educational uplifting of the masses. A strong government with power that is centrally located is viewed as necessary to implement this transformation.
There are no adversarial
political parties in
The Communist Party plays no
formal role in the nomination of candidates. The
role that the Communist Party plays is more of a rudder, directing the broad
policies of society.
They have no legislative initiative or authority.
It is undeniable though, that the Communist Party in
One interesting aspect of the NAPP is that they are only scheduled to meet twice a year. This allows the members of the National Assembly to maintain their regular employment; in fact, members of the National Assembly do not have offices or staff to assist them. This would seem to remove the existence of professional politicians from the equation; a construct that is criticized by many scholars, one going so far as to label them “an oligarchy with a particular class-interest.”
As a result of reforms instituted in 1992, the National and Provincial Assemblies are now elected by direct popular vote. The NAPP is responsible for among other things, discussing, reviewing and instituting new legislation. Between meetings of the National Assembly, the Council of State is authorized to enact legislation, called decree-laws, which take effect immediately, but are submitted to the NAPP for ratification or revocation at the next scheduled session of the Assembly.
3.2 Criticism of the Single Pillar Structure
Critics of this regime point to this single pillar structure as being one of the primary problems with regard to rule of law, in that is grants too much power in the hands of one small group, the Counsel of State, with the NAPP serving only to “rubber stamp” decisions made by this body. It is true that power is centrally located, yet, as explained supra, this is in keeping with the principles underlying socialist legality.
The thin rule of law is not tied
to any particular form of government structure, and in theory, it is possible
to reconcile this single pillar structure with the concept of rule of law. In
the case of
3.3 Recent Reforms
Reforms undertaken since the fall of the
These reforms can either be seen as a hollow gesture to give the appearance of democracy, or the reintegration of popular participation in government policy can be recognized as the fulfillment of socialist legality. It has been 46 years since the revolution, the literacy rate of the population is at about 96.8%, and the people are educated about their form of government, and the goals that it is meant to realize. Through the use of debate and referendums sponsored by the mass social organizations, the population has become accustomed to group participation in decision making.
According to Debra Evenson, an attorney and scholar of the Cuban legal system, the national organizations have had increasing influence over policy and legislation since the 1990’s. As one example of this, she points to a draft proposal on modifying the social security law that was shelved as a result of union opposition. Another example she gives is that of the FMC participating in the drafting of the Family Code. It would not be a stretch to think that the reforms allowing for more popular participation in government are a real movement towards the ideal of socialist democracy, and have effectively broadened the scope of popular participation, but whether such broader participation is undermined by an essentially “closed at the top” bureaucracy remains an open question.
Part IV: The Courts and Judiciary
Corollary to the rule of law is a strong independent judiciary. Reforms aimed at this institution serves to legitimize the legal system in the eyes of the populace, and those in the international community.
Since the revolution, numerous reforms have been instituted in the courts and the legal training of judges. The courts suffered greatly at the beginning of Castro’s government. A large portion of this decline was the reorganization of the government from a capitalist to a socialist form of government; the fallout of the revolution. Additionally, as stated supra, in section 2.1, pure Marxism does not see much use for law and the courts, and it was perhaps thought that these institutions would “wither away” as a result of the transformation to socialism.
Since the first few years of the revolution, once the change in regime was complete, the Governing Council of the Supreme Court and other governmental bodies have worked together to analyze the judiciary with a critical eye, introducing reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of the judicial system, educating judges, and raising the quality and availability of legal services.
From a research point of view,
finding information on the various administrative and legislative reforms in
4.1 Structure of the Judicial System
At the top of the structure of
the judicial system in
In 1977, after the adoption of the new Cuban constitution, the courts were overhauled again. An important aspect of this reform was the change in the way the judges were appointed. Prior to this law, the Council of Ministers appointed the Supreme Court judges. In removing this power from the hands of a smaller, potentially less democratic body, and allowing the NAPP to elect the members of the Supreme Court, the process was made more transparent and accountability was increased, although the Ministry of Justice was still responsible for training and screening judicial candidates, and nominating them to the legislature.
The 1980’s provided even more strengthening of the court system. During this period, the Governing Council of the Supreme Court began to look critically at their newly organized system, and worked with the Ministry of Justice to address problems such as a poorly trained judiciary, and started pinpointing problems in the day to day functioning of the courts. During this period and into the 1990’s, critical examination of the functioning of the court system was ongoing.
Ley No. 70, Ley Sobre los Tribunales Populares was enacted in 1990. Evenson states “Its express goal was to improve further the court system [….] and to develop mechanisms for the continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of the system.” This reform was followed by another strengthening reform, Ley No. 82 De Los Tribunales Populares, enacted in 1997, which removed the court system from the oversight of the Ministry of justice, and made it an autonomous institution. The Governing Counsel of the Supreme Court is now responsible for the administration, organization, and finances of the courts.
These reforms came from within
Additionally, the codification of these laws and their availability to the public makes the process of how the judiciary conducts itself as an organization more transparent and accountable. Reforms of this type serve to strengthen the rule of law as envisioned in the “thin” version.
4.2 Training of Judges
Many saw the judges of the former regime as corrupt and biased in favor of the elite, and very few judges were given adequate training in the years following the revolution. As a result of the reforms detailed supra, the profession is continuing to advance, in terms of its independence and legitimacy.
4.2(a) Professional Judges
Professional judges in
This provision for non removeability except in certain limited circumstances helps to strengthen the independence of the judge. Judges know that they cannot be removed simply for failure to decide “the wrong way.” Allowing judges to sit for as long as they are able removes the judges from the whim of political pressure, and enhances the legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole.
Judges must not only have the requisite legal training, but they must pass a competitive examination in order to apply to enter the judiciary. Anyone with the requisite training may apply. They are screened by the Ministry of Justice in order to assure that they meet the necessary requirements as stated by law, (being a member of the communist party is not a requirement) and then they may be presented as part of a slate of candidates to the respective legislatures for election.
4.2(b) Lay Judges
The reforms enacted in 1973 created the position of lay judges, who participate in trials at all levels of the judicial system as part of a panel of judges. Just as professional judges serve the courts of the assembly that elects them, so do lay judges. The elected term for lay judges is five years, but during this period, lay judges maintain their regular employment and only participate in trials for about 30 days out of the year.
The Ley De Los Tribunales Populares sets out the number of judges that serve on each panel. At the Municipal and Provincial levels, there are two lay judges and one professional judge. Trials conducted by the Supreme Court have two professional judges and one lay judge. Just as with professional judges, party membership is not a requirement.
Commentators note that lay participation in the judicial process “fosters democracy by checking executive despotism and ensuring independent decision making; it contributes to citizenship training; and it legitimates the decisions made”. Commentators note “the lay judges have equal prerogatives and obligations, are not bashful and often vote in opposition to their professional colleagues, and provide particularly useful input at sentencing as representatives of the common citizen.” In this way, the inclusion of lay judges can be seen as rule of law reforms within the “thin” notion of rule of law, by creating a judiciary that has one extra layer of independence from political pressure, an effort to avoid so called “telephone justice.”
4.3 Independent Judiciary and the Notion of Legislative Review:
Chapter XIII of the Cuban constitution sets out the role of the courts. Article 121 assures that the courts are “set up with functional independence from all other systems and they are only subordinated to the National Assembly of People's Power and the Council of State.” Article 122 provides that “The judges, in their function of administering justice, are independent and only owe obedience to the law.” Ongoing reforms have strengthened this constitutional language.
As Professor Michael B. Wise
points out in his article, “
It is true that the concept of constitutional and legislative review is absent from the power of the courts. Yet it is important to note that the notion of judicial review of legislation is not a uniformly accepted doctrine in all democratic societies, and its absence does not indicate that the judiciary is not independent in its functioning. Scholars are not unanimous about necessity of judicial review in a government structure. Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan write in their essay, “Democracy and the rule of Law:”
Judicial musing…is no substitute for civic deliberation. Rule by judiciary supposes that the only way to deter oppression is to impose external restraints on the political process. But because such restraints deny the moral competence of citizens, they undermine the very process of reflection . . . which might lead to a more mature collective morality. Elitist politics breed only a mob [.]
Reforms undertaken in the past 35
years have shown that the independence of the judiciary is taken seriously in
Part IV Conclusions
There are still problems in Cuba, mainly the lack of transparency with regard to the functioning of the uppermost levels of the government, as pointed out supra, in Part III, and the restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of the press alluded to in section 2.1.
Unquestionably, more reform is needed in the areas of transparency and accountability with regard to the functioning of the Council of Ministers. Additionally, (in keeping with the ideology of socialist revolution), as the goal of educating and uplifting the masses is met, restrictions on free speech and freedom of the press should be eased, since ostensibly the population is now capable of critical thinking, and can decide for itself what is and is not “in keeping with the objectives of socialist society.” 
5.2 International Monetary Support
As described infra at Part I, because of the close connection with capital
market reforms and “thick” rule of law reforms that much international
development aid is conditioned on, “thick” rule of law reform is unlikely to
Countries that are doing business
During the period following the
collapse of the
5.3 The Future
Castro’s plan for the future seems to be one that utilizes the intellectual capital that they have built up since the revolution. The government has invested in the education and well being of its populace. With a society that has how many degreed people, it is hoped that their intellectual capital, focusing on technology and healthcare can be used as a trade export.
The people of Cuba and their neighbors have watched as the economic reforms instituted by the United States in many other Latin American countries have failed to create long lasting economic reform and are now looking to make alliances amongst themselves that will allow them to act independent of the United States, and shape the region themselves.
Whether or not
I do not believe that once Castro
dies, the ideological underpinnings of Cuban society will drastically be
In the end,
 Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology 1, 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
 See generally, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1997). See also Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1449, 1451 (1990) (noting "the unstable meaning of the phrase" given that "rule and law are themselves the targets of continuous interpretation and reinterpretation").
 See Eric W. Ortz, The Rule of Law in
 John Adams, The Report of a Constitution, or Form of Government, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as cited by Phillippe Nonet, The Rule of Law: Is That the Rule That Was?,125, 127 supra n. 1.
Peerenboom, “Asian Discourses of Rule of
Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries,
 See John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 Transnatl. L. & Contemp. Probs. 429, 435 (2003); see also Christine Sypnovich, The Concept of Socialist Law (Oxford U. Press, 1990).
 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 33-38 (Rev. ed., Yale U. Press 1977).
 Reitz, supra n. 6 at 443; see also Kim Thachuk &
Maria Dakolias, Attacking Corruption In The Judiciary: A Critical
Process In Judicial Reform, 18
Wis. Int'l L.J. 353, 360-361 (2000). “[. . . ] for example, the constitutions
 Peerenboom, supra n. 2.
 Reitz, supra n. 6 at 432.
 Ibid.; See also Peerenboom, supra n. 2.
 Prasenjit Maiti; “Humpty Dumpty Had A Great Fall: Would Globalization Impact On States Dissolution?”, accessed at <http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v1.1/prasenjitmaiti.html>
 See for example, The World Bank’s Programmatic Financial Sector Adjustment Loan for Paraguay, accessed at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20435868~menuPK:34468~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html> “The objective of this loan is to strengthen the financial condition of the private and public banking sector in Paraguay, in order to reduce its vulnerability to future shocks and negative impacts on economic growth, as well as increase the flow of credit for domestic investment.”
 See, e.g., World Bank Annual Report 2002, at 56 ("The percentage of investment projects with satisfactory outcomes rose from 69 percent in fiscal 1999 to 78 percent in fiscal 2001.") accessed at <http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2002/PrintVersion.htm>. But see, The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty, A multi-Country Participatory Assessment of Structural Adjustment, Prepared by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), ch. 9, accessed at <http://www.saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf>
 See, Maiti, supra n. 9.
 Generally, see Lucien J.
Dhooge, “Fiddling With Fidel: An Analysis
Of The Cuban
 Reitz, supra n. 6 at 442.
 Ibid at 445-446.
 See, Debra Evenson, Law and Society in Contemporary
 Ibid at 16-17.
 See e.g., Mauricio
Dhooge, supra n. 18, citing U.S. Department Of
 See, Report
to the President: Commission for Assistance to a Free
 See, e.g., Vladimir I. Lenin, The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution ch. 1 (1917), available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/index.htm>
 See Sypnowich, supra n. 6, ch. 1.
 Ibid. at 24.
 Ibid at 1.
 Ibid at 24.
 Evenson, supra n. 22, at10.
 Evenson, supra n. 22, at 10.
 Evenson supra n. 22, at 12.
given by the Fidel Castro Ruz, at the
 See for example, Amnesty
International, Amnesty International Report for
 See USAID Budget, Cuban Program Summary accessed at
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/lac/pdf/cuba_cbj_fy05.pdf> (“Proposed FY 2005 obligation $9,000,000”).
 See for example, Korematsu v. United States, 323
 Ibid., Art. 95.
 Ibid., Art. 74.
 Ibid., Art. 75(m).
 Ibid., Art. 93(b).
Evenson, supra n. 22, at 30, fn. 56. (“Unfortunately there is virtually no information available regarding how the Council of State functions,[or] how often it meets. . .”)
 E.g., Cuban Const., art. 96. (“The Council of Ministers is composed of the head of state and government, as its president, the first vice president, the vice presidents, the ministers, the secretary and the other members that the law determines.”); see also, Cuban Const., art 74 (“[. . . ] the Council of State, which consists of one president, one first vice president, five vice presidents, one secretary and 23 other members.”)
 Cuban Const. art. 93.
 Michael B. Wise,
 Ibid. at 259.
 Cuban Const. art. 5
 Evenson, supra, n. 22, at 31.
comments of NAPP President Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada as reported by División de la Agencia de
Información Nacional (
 Ley Electoral Title V describes the process of nominating candidates for election. The process for nominating candidates is outlined in arts. 81, 82, 83 of the Ley Electoral. Accessed at <http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/le_t5_htm.htm>
 Evenson supra n. 22, at 31.
 Cuban Const., art. 88. (“The proposal of laws is the responsibility of: the National of People's Power; the Council of State; the Council of Ministers; the commissions of the National Assembly of People's Power; the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions and the national offices of the other social and mass organizations; the People's Supreme Court, in matters related to the administration of justice; the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in maters within its jurisdiction; the citizens.”).
 Evenson, supra n. 22, at 27-28.
 Philip Allott, The Emerging International Aristocracy, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 309 at 327 (2003).
 Ley No. 72, Gaceta Oficial Ext., No. 9, (November 2, 1992).
 Cuban Const., art. 70.
 Ibid at Art. 75(c), (d), (u).
 Reglamento de la Asamblea Nacional de Poder Popular, (December 27, 1996).
 Evenson supra n. 22, 29 -30.
 Ibid. at 30.
 Gail Reed, Summary of Resolutions Adopted at Party
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (This number represents the lowest number provided for literacy rates: it represents females over the age of 15. The literacy rate for 15-24 year old men and women is reported at 99.8%, as of 2002). Accessed at <http://www.uis.unesco.org/countryprofiles/html/EN/countryProfile_en.aspx?code=1920.htm>
 Evenson supra n.22, at 31.
 Ibid. at 32.
 See Edgardo Buscaglia, Obstacles to Judicial Reform in Latin America, in Justice Delayed: Judicial Reform in Latin America, ch.2 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).
 Accessed at http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/leg_cub_htm.htm
 Accessed at http://world.altavista.com/
 Evenson supra n. 22, at 53.
 Ibid. at 54.
 Ibid. at 55.
 Ley No. 82 De Los Tribunales Populares, Title II, Chapter 1, article 15-2, accessed at <http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/ltp_t2_htm.htm>
 Evenson supra n. 22, at 56
example, in 2002, the National Union of Cuban Jurists hosted the "International Conference of the
Challenges of the XXI Century and the role of International Law" in
 The laws of the Court system are available online at <http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/>,and are disseminated to the public in the paper version of the Gaceta Oficial,
 See Randall
 Ley No. 82 De Los Tribunales Populares, article 66-1(a) as accessed at <http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/ltp_t3_htm.htm>
 See Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 851, 864-866 (2002).
 Ley No. 82 Art. 42 (1997).
 See Evenson supra n. 22, at 59-60.
 Ley No. 1250 (1973).
 Ley No. 82 Arts. 52.2, 52.4.
 Ibid. arts. 35.1, 38.
 Ibid. art. 23.3.
 David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in
 Eric Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 529, 551 (2004).
 Cuban Const. art. 122.
 Michael B. Wise, supra n. 54, at 262.
 Ibid at 263,265.
 Cuban Const. art., 75(b), (c), (d), (Granting legislative review to the NAPP).
 Kim Thachuk and Maria Dakolias, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial
 Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the rule of Law in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology 125,127 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
 Thachuk & Dakolias supra n. 101, at 360-361.
 See United Nations Document, Combating Corruption for Development:
The Rule of Law, Transparency and Accountability, p. 11 accessed at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005786.pdf>
 Cuban Const. art. 53.
 CIA World Fact Book, accessed at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html#Econ> See also, Cuba and Venezuela Sign Millionaire Bilateral Trade Agreement
 Law No. 77 on Foreign Investment (1995).
 Roland G. Simbulan, The Fundamentals in Health And Fundamentalism in Population Policy: Reaction to DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit’s Assessment on Health and Population accessed at <http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/responce02.html >
Zack, Globalization's Unlikely
Fidel Castro Ruz, Speech (
 See for example, Agreement between the president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the President of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba for the implementation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (December 14, 2004) accessed at <http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2004/ing/a141204i.html>
Michael Wallace Gordon, Thinking about
 Current President of the NAPP.
See Peter Schwab, Legal Issues in International Politics