By Frank Bieszczat
This paper
addresses the current state of affairs between
It is
estimated that around 25 million Kurds are located within the borders of
The few
sociologists who addressed the Kurds over the first half o the 20th
century tended to regard the Kurds as backwards, unchanged for over 4,000
years, and extremely disorganized.[4] Historically,
Kurdish society was based on a tribal structure, and it is this structure that
has often been identified as one of the primary roadblocks to Kurdish unity.[5]
The governments of each of the four countries
in which the Kurds are found have oppressed the Kurds at different times to
different degrees. In
The Turkish government’s war on Kurdish culture included works by Turkish “scientists” claiming that Kurds were actually just mountain Turks, and the word Kurd was defined in a 1971 Turkish dictionary as a community of Turks that have largely changed their language.[11] Kurdish village names were changed into Turkish names.[12] The Kurdish language could not be used in television or radio broadcasts.[13] Kurdish-language education was banned, and the Kurdish history did not appear in history books.[14] The constitution of 1982 banned the Kurdish language outside the home until its repeal in 2001.[15]
Currently,
Article 301 of the Penal Code is the avenue by which the Turkish government
wages its war on the Kurdish culture.[16] Article 301
prohibits the public denigration of
Oppression
against the Kurdish minority, by Saddam Hussein, in
A history
of the relationship between
Abdullah
Ocalan was born into poverty in a farming village on the border of the Kurdish
region in southeastern
The key
turning point in Ocalan’s life took place in 1972, when he was arrested and
imprisoned for seven months after being found guilty of participating in an
illegal protest of the killing of leftist militants.[29] While in prison,
Ocalan was exposed to a number of members of leftist groups and observed the
inner-workings of such groups.[30] Ocalan emerged
from prison in 1972 having lost his faith in democracy, and convinced that
armed rebellion by Turkish Kurds was necessary to effect tangible change.[31] He immediately set
to work looking for friends that sought to follow the same course, culminating
in the first official meeting of seven men in
The PKK’s growth in popularity and strength is largely a byproduct of its early focus of differentiating itself from other groups pursuing similar leftist-Kurdish agendas and actively pursuing their elimination. The PKK also focused its energies on destabilizing the tribal structure that Ocalan saw as an impediment to Kurdish unity.[33] In the late 1970s the PKK gained support by focusing its attention and violence on members of powerful Kurdish tribes that were affiliated with the ruling Turkish party.[34] The PKK’s first armed action took place in 1978, and was against a tribal family connected with a right wing Turkish party.[35] The killing was in response to the killing of a PKK member by one of the family’s members.[36] As a result, the PKK demonstrated its willingness to fight and garnered some popular support.[37]
The
violence against Kurds expanded to armed conflict against other Kurdish
liberation groups,[38] Kurdish “village
guards” armed and paid by the Turkish government,[39] and Iraqi Kurds
who wanted the PKK out of northern
In 1980 the
Turkish military staged a coup that inadvertently enhanced the PKK’s power significantly.[42] Prior to the coup
in 1979, Ocalan directed all PKK to flee
A central
strategy for the PKK has been the use of armed rebellion aimed at forcing
Heavy casualties have been incurred on both sides since the fighting began in 1984, with estimates in the range of 30,000 to 40,000.[53] Contributing to the high number of casualties for the PKK is the youth of many of their fighters. During the early 1990s, the number of casualties skyrocketed because many of the new recruits were 14-15 years old, and were not as skilled fighters as the older rebels.[54] The fighting, though, has not been constant. In 1999, following his arrest and death sentence, Ocalan called for a stop to the fighting by the PKK.[55] The PKK, though, renounced this self-imposed ceasefire in 2005.[56] It is possible that the success of the Iraqi Kurds in gaining autonomy contributed to the resumption of attacks.[57] The group may have felt somewhat shamed by the lack of progress in comparison to the Iraqis, and felt pressure to interrupt what they viewed as stagnation.[58]
Additionally, a ceasefire was declared in 1993 in response to requests by the progressive newly elected president Turgut Ozal.[59] The ceasefire was designed to give Ozal the opportunity to gain the political capital necessary to develop and implement a solution to the “Kurdish question.”[60] Unfortunately, Ozal died of a heart attack shortly after the ceasefire’s beginning.[61] Others believe the ceasefire was the result of a successful military campaign launched in the early 1990s that severely hampered the PKK.[62] Whatever the motivation, the ceasefire lasted only two months and ended with an ambush and killing of 33 off-duty soldiers.[63] Whether the ambush was actually authorized is disputed, but based on Ocalan’s tight control over party activity, it seems unlikely the ambush would have occurred without his approval.[64]
Ocalan has
always stayed loyal to a socialist model of government as the ideal for a free
A striking feature of the PKK is the complete devotion required of members of the party. In order to become a full-time member of the party, one must forsake his or her private life and become completely devoted to the party.[70] Devotion includes severing the relationship between a member and the member’s spouse.[71] “Having been approved as a member of the party is perceived as an introduction into a novel way of living rather than being a member of a political organization.”[72] Additionally, sexual relations was not permitted and could lead to an arrest, trial, and death sentence.[73] The harsh restrictions on sexual activity had a positive effect on recruitment because it made Kurdish parents more willing to allow their children, especially daughters, to join the party.[74] The strategy was successful, and by 1993 one-third of the PKK fighters were female.[75]
Retirement
from the party is absolutely not allowed, and attempts to leave the party often
result in death.[76] Mere suspicion of
disloyalty was enough to warrant death as many of the new recruits in the late
1980s were killed.[77] Ocalan distrusted
many of these new recruits because many were educated professionals, and he
feared they were actually Turkish agents.[78] The assassinations
of ex-members in
In order to
understand the current conflict and analyze its possible outcomes, it is
necessary first to identify the major parties and the interests that will most
likely drive them. The four key parties in this dispute exerting most influence
are
The primary
decisionmaking party is
Given the vigor with which the Turkish government has consistently opposed even the recognition of a Kurdish ethnicity, it comes as no surprise the government is ardently opposed to the recognition of an independent Kurdish state within its borders.
Historically,
the government has been strongly opposed to the creation of an independent or
largely autonomous Kurdish state in northern
As is always the case, a government’s foreign policy is greatly influenced by the state of its internal politics. Of particular importance is the relationship between Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP party, and the Kemalists which dominate the military. Historically, the military has played a very active role in Turkish politics and has exerted significant influence in determining its leaders. The Kemalists have been antagonistic towards the AKP party because it represents a threat to their longtime dominance of Turkish politics.[90] The military justifies its distrust of the party, and the pressures it has placed on the government since it has becoming the ruling party, as necessary to protect the secular Turkish government from Islamist rule.[91] Erdogan maintains the AKP is a conservative, democratic party and that he is not an Islamist, but many Kemalists do not believe him.[92]
The
military’s presence puts pressure on the current government to take a hard line
against the PKK. Both the military and the AKP want to present themselves as
hard-liners against the PKK in order to secure greater public support.[93]
In addition to the military, the government is under pressure from the public
to respond to PKK attacks with force.[94] A recent poll
found 81% of Turks supported a military incursion into
A hotly
debated topic in
As the
accession process has floundered, public support for EU accession within
Any
decision the Turkish government makes regarding the viability of a military
solution to the PKK must take into account the effort that would be required significantly
to dismantle the PKK in northern
Despite
improvements in military technology since the 1990s, it would be naïve to think
that eliminating the PKK presence in northern
The shortcomings of military
campaigns of the past, though, may not necessarily indicate similar results in
the present because
Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s the PKK’s stated objective was for a “free
The long
history of Kurdish mistrust of the Turkish government and the Turkish political
process may deter the PKK from accepting anything short of independence.[123]
This is especially true because since the late 1990s the PKK and the Kurds have
enjoyed a certain level of autonomy in southeastern
The PKK’s
strategy will be influenced by its current level of strength in addition to its
overriding goals. While not as strong as it was at its height in the early
1990s, the PKK is healthier than it has been over the last couple of years. In
1993, at the height of the PKK’s popularity and power, the number of armed
rebels ballooned to around 10,000, in addition to as many as 60,000 armed
civilians.[126] Currently it is
estimated there are only 3,000 PKK rebels in northern
The PKK’s
primary goal will be to survive and maintain the ability to continue strikes on
The
The
Historically,
Additionally,
Protecting
the oil supply from
The
It is
difficult to determine what
Despite his
position as Prime Minister, al-Maliki has very little influence over the course
of events. It is understood that the two powers in northern
Jalal
Talabani, in addition to being President of Iraq, is himself a Kurd from
northern
Talabani
has maintained his moderate tone in the present situation. Just as he did in
the 1990s, Talabani has appealed to the PKK to stop fighting and pursue
democratic avenues.[165]
Talabani, though, has stated
Of the
three main players, it is Massoud Barzani who potentially has the greatest
influence over the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK. Barzani took over leadership of the
Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1979 following the death of his
father.[167] The KDP was the original
Kurdish resistance party in
In the
early 1980s Barzani and Ocalan formed an alliance which allowed the PKK to
build camps and launch attacks on
Consistent
with prior practice,[175]
Barzani’s recent behavior has been more militant than Talabani’s.[176]
Barzani stated the Iraqi Kurds would defend themselves against any Turkish
strikes against PKK rebels within
Barzani
appears to be mainly concerned with the possibility that
This
section will address possible courses of action available to
The massive
buildup of troops on the Iraqi border and the rhetoric of Turkish officials
have created the perception that a large scale invasion into northern
The Turkish
government seems to find invasion an unattractive option, and would much prefer
some alternative solution. The government has said troops will not be sent in
if the militants disarm.[184]
The government has also exhibited reluctance to initiate a substantial military
operation by considering alternative strategies including economic sanctions.[185]
Many still believe a non-military solution, which
In fact, the
large buildup of troops was probably never meant to actually be used as an
invading force, but rather for negotiation purposes.[187]
For this reason, it is important for
Historically,
Turkish threats of military action against its neighbors have proved to be a
more effective strategy by which to deal with the PKK than direct military
confrontation. For example,
One cost which would result from a
large scale invasion is the possible consequences regarding the oil running
from
Another
cost to consider is how a Turkish invasion of
A large
invasion would also deprive
There is also reason to believe that the frequency of PKK attacks is about to diminish. Historically, the PKK has reduced or suspended its attacks from the mountains during the winter months because of the harsh weather.[200] In fact, it is common practice for the PKK to offer a ceasefire as winter approaches, only to break it in the spring of the following year.[201] If the attacks decrease, as they usually do, over the winter Erdogan may find himself with a couple of relatively attack-free months in which public pressure for a military solution will diminish, and alternative solution can be pursued. Over the last couple of weeks, reports of attacks have lessened and optimism for a non-military solution has grown,[202] perhaps a sign of things to come.
One
additional reason to avoid invasion is the delay allows time to gauge the
effectiveness of limited mountain strikes with improved technology.
Not only is
it in
Turkish
officials have already publicly considered the use of economic sanctions against
One significant benefit of general economic
sanctions is it puts pressure on the northern Iraqis, and Barzani in
particular. It is uncertain whether Barzani is in a position to force the PKK
out of
The
economic impact on
So long as
Any political gains made by Kurdish politicians or Kurdish parties have consistently been undercut by the armed activities of the PKK.[218] Any member of a Kurdish political party is faced with the hindrances of being branded a PKK sympathizer, and being told a political solution is impossible until the PKK abandons its military tactics.[219] Current members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) have not helped the situation by calling for Kurdish national independence in the midst of current tensions.[220]
Recently,
Turkish prosecutors have succeeded in acquiring an indictment against all 20
DTP members of parliament before the
Article 301
is a problematic statute which needs to either be amended or repealed. Article
301 has been a major impediment to
One encouraging
sign, although overshadowed and perhaps negated by the recent indictments, is
the recently drafted amendments to Article 301 which are to be presented to the
Parliament.[228] Turkish politicians need
to support the amendments to Article 301 because the current statute allows
overzealous prosecutors too much flexibility in bringing charges, and is
contributing to the current tension and instability within
One other
issue
Thus far,
the Turkish government has handled the situation exceedingly well.
[1]Sabrina Tavernise, In the Rugged Northern Iraq,
Kurdish Rebels Flout
[2]
Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: the
Kurdish Fight for
[3] GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan-maps.htm.
[4] Ali Kemal Ozcan, Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan 140 Routledge 2006).
[5]
[6] Marcus supra note 2, at 10.
[7] Ozcan supra note 4, at 78.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Marcus, supra note 2, at 18.
[13]
[14]
[15] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 9.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Marcus, supra note 2, at 126.
[20]
[21] Marcus, supra note 2, at 10.
[22]
[23]
[24] Ozcan, supra note 4, at 93.
[25] Marcus, supra note 2, at 15.
[26]
[27]
[28] Ozcan, supra note 4, at 88.
[29] Marcus, supra note 2, at 23.
[30]
[31]
[32] Ozcan, supra note 4, at 93.
[33]
[34] Marcus, supra note 2, at 46-47.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]Steven Bryant & Camilla Hall, Turkey Says Army Killed 15 PKK Fighters Near Iraq (Update2), Bloomberg, Oct. 31, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=amuzgRsMszwE&refer=home; David Clarke &Thomas Grove, Turkish Planes Bomb Iraq Kurdish Village: Iraqi Kurd, Reuters Canada, Oct. 24, 2007, http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=uri:2007-10-24T194100Z_01_L13546086_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-TURKEY-IRAQ-COL.XML&pageNumber=2&summit.
[54] Marcus, supra note 2, at 170.
[55]
[56]Michael
Kuser, Will War Worries Hit
[57] Goading Ankara to Overreach, The Economist, Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10130690.
[58]Goading Ankara to Overreach, The Economist, Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10130690.
[59] Marcus, supra note 2, at 212.
[60]
[61]
[62]
Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
Global Terrorism Analysis, published by
the
[63] Marcus, supra note 2, at 214.
[64]
[65] Ozcan, supra note 4, at 101.
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73] Marcus, supra note 2, at 197.
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
George Friedman, The Geopolitics of
[81]Gareth Jones, Most Turks Back N.
[82] Marcus, supra note 2, at 103.
[83]
[84] World Oil Prices Strike Record Highs on Turkey-PKK Tensions, AFP, Oct. 15, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g4eVJTMIlrvBHqDxrznollDm0kdA.
[85] Christopher Torchia, Turkey: Any Attack on Iraq Not Invasion, Guardian Unlimited, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7042510,00.html,.
[86]
Michael Kuser, Will War Worries Hit
[87] Christopher Torchia, Turkey: Any Attack on Iraq Not Invasion, Guardian Unlimited, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7042510,00.html
[88]
Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
Global Terrorism Analysis, published by
the
[89]
Eric Oddo, The
[90]
Human Rights
[91]
[92] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 15.
[93] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 29-30.
[94]
[95] Gareth Jones, Most Turks Back N.
[96] Turkish Commander Says Turkey Preparing for Cross-Border Operations, International Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/15/europe/EU-GEN-Turkey-Iraq.php.
[97] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 30.
[98]
[99]
The island is populated by a Greek majority and Turkish minority. The Greek
Cypriot majority enjoys international recognition of its independence and has
been admitted into the EU.
[100]
[101]
[102]
[103]
[104] Unearthing the Past, Endangering the Future, The Economist, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9987685.
[105] Omer Taspinar & Philip H. Gordon, Turkey on the Brink, Brookings Institution, Summer 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/summer_turkey_gordon.aspx.
[106] Gareth Jones, Most Turks Back N.
[107] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 9.
[108] Marcus, supra note 2, at 103.
[109]
[110]
[111]
[112] Turkish Commander Says Turkey Preparing for Cross-Border Operations, International Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/15/europe/EU-GEN-Turkey-Iraq.php.
[113]
Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
Global Terrorism Analysis, published by
the
[114]
Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
Global Terrorism Analysis, published by
the
[115]
Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
Global Terrorism Analysis, published by
the
[116] Guy Ben-Ari & Sam Brannen, Turkey’s Military Options for Confronting the PKK in Northern Iraq, World Politics Review, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1324.
[117] Guy Ben-Ari & Sam Brannen, Turkey’s Military Options for Confronting the PKK in Northern Iraq, World Politics Review, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1324.
[118] Report:
[119] Ozcan, supra note 4, at 104.
[120]
[121]
[122]
[123] Marcus, supra note 2, at 82.
[124]
[125]
[126]
[127] Gareth Jones, Top Turkish Court to Consider Shutting Kurd Party, Reuters, Nov. 23, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL23715926.
[128] Michael Kuser, Will War Worries Hit
[129] Guy Ben-Ari & Sam Brannen, Turkey’s Military Options for Confronting the PKK in Northern Iraq, World Politics Review, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1324.
[130] Marcus, supra note 2, at 181.
[131]
Michael Kuser, Will War Worries Hit
[132] Andrew Purvis, Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington, TIME, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1680526,00.html.
[133] Steven Bryant & Camilla Hall, Turkey Says Army
Killed 15 PKK Fighters Near
[134] Iraqi Kurdish Leader Calls for Talks with Turkey, Promises to Defend Homeland, International Herald Tribune, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/19/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq.php.
[135] David Clarke &Thomas Grove, Turkish Planes Bomb Iraq Kurdish Village: Iraqi Kurd, Reuters Canada, Oct. 24, 2007, http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=uri:2007-10-24T194100Z_01_L13546086_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-TURKEY-IRAQ-COL.XML&pageNumber=2&summit.
[136]
George Friedman, The Geopolitics of
[137]
[138]
[139]Barbara Starr, U.S. Military Looking at Alternatives in Case Turkey Cuts Access, CNN, Oct. 13, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/10/12/us.turkey/index.html.
[140] Daniel Fried, The United States and Turkish Relations and the Challenge Ahead, DISAM, July 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_3_29/ai_n19396139.
[141] Barbara Starr, U.S. Military Looking at Alternatives in Case Turkey Cuts Access, CNN, Oct. 13, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/10/12/us.turkey/index.html.
[142] Barbara Starr, U.S. Military Looking at Alternatives in Case Turkey Cuts Access, CNN, Oct. 13, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/10/12/us.turkey/index.html.
[143] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 11.
[144] Daniel Fried, The United States and Turkish Relations and the Challenge Ahead, DISAM, July 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_3_29/ai_n19396139.
[145] Daniel Fried, The United States and Turkish Relations and the Challenge Ahead, DISAM, July 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_3_29/ai_n19396139.
[146] Turkey and America: Indispensible Allies at a Crossroads, The Brookings Institution, 35-36, May 10, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0510turkey/20070510.pdf.
[147] Andrew Purvis, Erdogan Talks Turkey in Washington, TIME, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1680526,00.html.
[148] Turkey and America: Indispensible Allies at a Crossroads, The Brookings Institution, 21, May 10, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0510turkey/20070510.pdf.
[149]
Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
[150] Turkey-Iraq: Kurds, If Attacked, We Shall Strike at Oil, AGI, Oct. 19, 2007 http://www.agi.it/world/news/200710191942-cro-ren0101-art.html; PKK Could Attack Oil-Pipelines: Agency Reports, EuroNews, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.euronews.net/index.php?page=info&article=449214&lng=1.
[151] World Oil Prices Strike Record Highs on Turkey-PKK Tensions, AFP, Oct. 15, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g4eVJTMIlrvBHqDxrznollDm0kdA.
[152]
Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
[153]
Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
[154]
[155] Turkey Getting U.S. Intelligence on PKK, Associated Press, Oct. 31, 2007, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hKZ2pJRRO2bl3CvsmdIkbTtDbjHgD8SKDAN82.
[156] Sedat Laciner, The Existence of the PKK Terrorism in Iraq and the United States, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=49631.
[157] Steven Bryant & Camilla Hall, Turkey Says Army
Killed 15 PKK Fighters Near
[158]
[159] Sabrina Tavernise, Kurdish Rebels Ask for Talks with Turkey, International Herald Tribune, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/23/europe/23turkey.php?page=1.
[160] War Update: Iraqi Leader Cracks Down on Rebel
Kurds, newday.com, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.newsday.com/news/printedition/world/ny-wokurd245429862oct24,0,507193.story.
[161] Marcus, supra note 2, at 41.
[162]
[163]
[164]
[165]
Michael Howard, Turkey Bombards Northern Iraq
After Ambush, Guardian Unlimited,
Oct. 21, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2196358,00.html.
[166]
[167] Marcus, supra note 2, at 68.
[168]
[169]
[170]
[171]
[172]
[173]
[174]
[175]
[176] Iraqi Kurdistan Warns Turkey on Incursion,
MSNBC, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21380016/.
[177] Iraqi Kurdish Leader Calls for Talks with Turkey, Promises to Defend Homeland, International Herald Tribune, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/19/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq.php.
[178] Iraqi Kurdistan Warns Turkey on Incursion,
MSNBC, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21380016/.
[179] Sabrina Tavernise, In the Rugged Northern Iraq,
Kurdish Rebels Flout
[180]
[181]
[182] Christopher Torchia, Turkey: Any Attack on Iraq Not Invasion, Guardian Unlimited, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7042510,00.html
[183] Gareth
[184] Turks Move to Ban Pro-Kurdish Party, International Herald Tribune, Nov. 16,
2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/16/europe/turkey.php.
[185] Evren Mesci & Hidir Goktas, Turkey Aims for
Targeted Sanctions in Northern Iraq, Reuters
Canada, Nov. 1, 2007, http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-11-01T161520Z_01_L13546086_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-TURKEY-IRAQ-COL.XML&archived=False.
[186]
Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
[187] Guy Ben-Ari & Sam Brannen, Turkey’s Military Options for Confronting the PKK in
Northern Iraq, World Politics Review, Nov. 7, 2007,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1324.
[188] Marcus, supra note 2, at 270-71.
[189]
[190]
[191] Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
[192] Turkey-Iraq: Kurds, If Attacked, We Shall Strike
at Oil, AGI, Oct. 19, 2007 http://www.agi.it/world/news/200710191942-cro-ren0101-art.html.
[193] Evren Mesci & Hidir Goktas, Turkey Aims for
Targeted Sanctions in Northern Iraq, Reuters
Canada, Nov. 1, 2007, http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-11-01T161520Z_01_L13546086_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-TURKEY-IRAQ-COL.XML&archived=False.
[194]
Michael Kuser, Will War Worries Hit
[195] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 10.
[196]
[197] EU Calls for
Restraint as Turkey Launches Air Strikes, Deutsche Welle, Oct.
24, 2007, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2845423,00.html.
[198]
Linda Young, E.U. Criticizes
[199]
[200] Sabrina Tavernise, Kurdish Rebels Ask for Talks
with Turkey, International Herald
Tribune, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/23/europe/23turkey.php.
[201] Sabrina Tavernise, Kurdish Rebels Ask for Talks
with Turkey, International Herald
Tribune, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/23/europe/23turkey.php.
[202]
Deputy PM: Turkish Military Operations Would
Destabilize
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[205] Iraq Asks Turkey for Time to Take Steps Against
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[206] Gareth Jones, Most Turks Back N.
[207] Turkish Commander Says Turkey Preparing for Cross-Border Operations, International Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/15/europe/EU-GEN-Turkey-Iraq.php.
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[209] Evren Mesci & Hidir Goktas, Turkey Aims for
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[217] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 14.
[218] Marcus, supra note 2, at 207.
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[223] International Crisis Group, supra note 2, at 10.
[224]
Gareth Jones, Top Turkish Court to Consider
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[227]
Gareth Jones, Top Turkish Court to Consider
Shutting Kurd Party, Reuters,
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Andrew McGregor, Turkey’s Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
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the