A Hypothetical Secret Service Agent's Perspective on Potential Unrest in Belarus

By Igor L. Solodovnik

Chicago-Kent College of Law

The Law of National Building

Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

19 May 2006


The aim of the work is to look at the political events in some former socialistic countries that have been called “Color” or “Soft” revolutions (further “SR”) by journalists. The paper takes the point of view of those political forces, against whom these revolutions were aimed.

The last presidential elections in Belarus (March 2006) brought another victory to President Alexander Luckashenko, the Last European Dictator, as the media often call him. Relatively stable situations expect presidents and governments in other countries that emerged after the USSR collapsed (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbajdzhan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). At the same time political powers in those states realized that their old fashioned badly camouflaged dictatorship style of ruling is not viable in the conditions of the beginning of the 21st century.  These governments will search for new forms of keeping their powers and new forms of ruling over their peoples.

The question is why they must change their way of ruling?

The chain of democratic, bloodless “SR”s in Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan were obviously unexpected and shocking events for the governments of the countries named above. Only in late 2005 Russia, for example started to fight back to regain its positions in Georgia and Ukraine (and it’s necessary to confess Russia succeeded greatly in those actions). It took some time for them to understand that in the modern world a dictator’s, autocratic or just poorly democratic regime can fall without traditional coups d’etat, long term and terrible bloody revolutions like the Russian Revolution and Civil War of 1917-1921, without open international suppression or invasion. That’s why the new measures of governmental answer to the “SR” challenge must be worked out by those powers.

In fact, the policy focused on the making governmental control more and more powerful developed in those countries for almost all the period after 1991. This policy strengthened since the end of the 1990s, but still it remained mainly “old-style” dictatorship measures. Presidential power increased in Russia and Belarus, replacing elected governors by appointed ones in Russia, increasing the role of presidential dynasties in Azerbajdzhan, Kazakhstan, using referendums to strengthen presidential power in Belarus, an operetta-like dictatorship of Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan. The latter is marked with especially imposed economic and social suffering on the people and totally denied any idea of human rights. They increased control over the political parties, movements, NGOs in Russia, Belarus, Azerbajdzhan at the same time trying to keep the democratic face. At last the world could see bloody suppression of the riot in Andizhan in Uzbekistan 2005. (The riot was not a “SR” and it really could cause problems with increasing radical Islam in the region, but the way this riot was suppressed by the governmental forces terrified observers abroad.) All of those measures were directed on the intensifying of the autocratic regimes targeting by the “SR”.

The “old” fashioned autocratic measures can prolong the existence of the regimes that have some additional powerful elements. Russia is a huge country, with nuclear weapons, a permanent member of Security Council, now also a member of G-8. Sue to the favorable world economy situation Russia gets big amounts of money from export of oil and natural gas. The Turkmenistan dictatorship is based also on large oil and natural gas deposits and its location in a very disturbing region. These countries could expect more successful realization of the autocratic policy as those which can rely on certain reserves of natural deposits. The political regimes there will always have some natural recourse to use it for financing of their activity, will feel themselves less dependant from the international community and less vulnerable to the possible economic sanctions.

Other undemocratic countries will have to face the danger of “SR” for their autocratic regimes. This danger should cause them to search for new ways of prevention and suppressing movements that can cause “SR”. This activity must be directed in various fields of political, social, economical life, and will be worked out by different governmental bodies, but one can assume that one of the most important decision makers in this process will be the secret services of those countries.

Despite the fact that the processes of democratization in Russia are supposed to be the most crucial for the world and democracy building in Azerbajdzhan and Middle Asia countries will be the most interesting for the scholars’ research, this paper focuses only on Belarus. First of all this country is very interesting to author, second it takes key position in the Central Europe, third historical and mental closeness of Belarus people to Ukrainians gives us unique chance to speculate about the possibility of Belarusian type of Ukrainian Orange revolution using the comparative methodology.

Belarus is not so large and populated (about 10 millions inhabitants) to be considered a big country, but its location (traditionally it’s considered an Eastern European country, but by the geographic location it is purely Central European country) makes it absolutely important in the European policy. 

Belarus, like Ukraine, suffered most than other countries in WWII: three years of occupation depopulated it on more than 25%, and absolutely ruined its economy. Belarus was a founding member of the UN. Belarus got independence in 1991 with the collapse of USSR. President Alexander Luckashenko was first elected in 1994, and after a special referendum, constitutional limitations of maximum two terms presidencies were abolished.

Belarus under the leadership of Luckashenko always was the most loyal Russian ally. Since 1996 a project of new commonwealth or confederation of Belarus and Russia has been developed.

Belarus is populated by Byelorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, Polish, and a small Jewish community, but all those peoples in Belarus are very close by culture and mentality. There are no significant distinctions among the population of the different regions (that was an issue in Yugoslavia, still a problem for Georgia, Azerbajdzan, Tadzhikistan).

The Belarusian economy is in pretty decent position for the transforming country; governmental owned industries exist along with private enterprise, but the private sector is under strict governmental control. Social programs (pensions, medical care, and education) are developing and average level of living is higher than in Moldova, Ukraine, and majority of the regions of Russia. The real achievement of Luckashenko’s government is that Belarus does not have a big external debt.

At the same time modern Belarus is a purely autocratic state in terms of governmental control over the society, absence of really broad mass media, opposition to the Government, and the number of cases of human rights violations.

The international community at whole, the EU, the USA, international governmental organizations, and NGOs, often were trying to press the Belarus regime; it was declared a “pariah country” and these pressures encourage Belarus to search for the political allies among the other “pariah countries”. Luckashenko’s good relationships with Cuba and Venezuela are well known; an attempt to cooperate with Libya also took place. In such conditions an international isolation of Belarus was considerable.

The key position of the Belarus in the Central Europe also means that Belarus can be or can be not main trail, a territorial space throw which the European political culture can influence Russia. At the present time Belarus is a country that can finally change the European geopolitical balance from Russian-Western soft opposing to European democratic prevailing and approach the reality of unite Europe from Atlantic to Ural.

These are just several of most important from a lot of reasons and conditions that make Belarus and its political fate so important for Europe and world at whole. Further development of the Belarus as an under-controlled Russian autocratic ally, satellite, or as a Central European democratic state can define the fate of the continent and fate of the democratic-oriented part of the world for the nearest decades. Also, in term of geopolitics and historical trends western-like changes in Belarus can be and will definitely be a serious push for real democratization of Russia, not returning to Eltsin decade of political anarchy, but development of real and effective democratic institutions in Russia.

Modern undemocratic governments in the former USSR countries are formed by the people educated, brought up and mainly shaped by former USSR Communist party or Komsomol nomenclatura, KGB middle level officers (far from the brilliant ones), and fresh incredibly rich and influential people entrepreneurs the media call “oligarchs”. All those people reached the top of uncontrolled power during the period after the USSR collapsed.  Even a shadow of real democracy in the “western” style is dangerous to them for numerous reasons.

Soviet-style politicians and bureaucracy are really extremely far from understanding and accepting the very idea of human rights, rule of law, and democracy with real opposition and free mass media – all those elements are dangerous for the people taking some official positions in post-Soviet undemocratic countries. Taking some kind of official position usually means not only some material advantages, much more important, that “the position” supplies certain level of upper social level, social status. This social status can be converted into material advantages through banal corruption, through the system of necessary and useful connections, and through access to the special social guarantees not available for other citizens. It fact, bureaucracy and officialdom in those countries are very much like those in Medieval times or absolute monarchies. They comprise officials and clerks desperately interested in keeping status quo for their own sake.

So called “oligarchs” are the necessary part of those political regimes as well. Their main interest in keeping the status quo is combined with an understandable looking for stability and also from a certain level of fear for the fate of their fortunes, most of which were started and developed with serious violations of law. Democracy with the government and officials under the constant social, media and opposition control; regime of rule of law with the principle of the equality before the law, absence of preferences are really threaten those people. For them it is not only a case of some potential material damages but also a question of degradation of their special social status in the society.

Their fear and desire to suppress to any kind of political liberalization and movement towards democracy make them search ways to stop spreading the democracy and certain social values within their native countries. At the same time those people have to realize that nowadays the times of old fashioned dictators like Stresner, Hussein, Pol Pot[1] are gone and they have to conduct their suppressing politics cleverer, more artificial.  We do hope the days of Pol Pot are gone, because nowadays the world is more open for media, more dependent on the international cooperation in economy, overcoming of natural disasters, and the existence of those isolationists’ regimes are less and less likely.  The victories of the democratic revolutions in Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan were obviously unexpected for the undemocratic countries of former USSR, that’s why we think that now those countries, those governments and those countries’ secret services will have to handle with the revolutionary processes much more carefully. We have to admit that still we have no evidence that international community has enough resources, forces, legal backgrounds and most important political will to intervene in those countries where the democracy and human rights will be suppressed too brutally.

It is reasonable to assume that sometime in the spring or summer of 2005 the secret services of Russia and Belarus were ordered to analyze: what has happened in those countries, and how to avoid such a scenario in Russian and Belarus. This paper is an attempt to imagine what kind of report or analysis could have been worked out in a respond to such an order.

The structure of the paper is the following: the main part opens with the imagined order, given by the chief of the Belarus KGB to the analytical department of the KGB to perform the analysis. It is followed with the analysis produced in response to the order. The paper then offers conclusions.

The paper uses the real name of Belarus KGB chief, General S. Sukharenko, “Chief of the Analytical department of KGB of the Republic of Belarus Colonel Ivanevich I.I” – is an imaginary character.

The “documents” below try to keep official structure of such documents. The style and language of the “documents” are not the same as the real ones – it would be pretty difficult to put it in English, so that is rather an attempt to find proper words in English, reflecting the ideas and approaches of modern Belarus KGB officers.

I.                   The task.

KGB of the Republic of Belarus

April 31 2005                                                                                                        Minsk

Order No 0007.

“The chain of the changes in political regimes orientations in many countries of former Soviet Union republics[2], in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, traditionally considered to be in the USSR-Russia political influence zone face us with possibility of the attempts of similar changes in our country. Political leaders and the President find that changes in political regime in our country will be unwilling for our people and will continue enforcement of NATO influence on the territories of Central and Eastern Europe.

Next presidential election on March 2006 will prove again absolutely total support of the policy of our President by the people of Belarus. At the same time political pressure from the aggressive NATO block, USA, EU and theirs recent allies is constantly increasing and we can assume that new victories and achievements of our country will caused new steps in the direction of seizure of power in Belarus.

The military power, political support from Russia and our Central European location will be the barriers on the way of direct military force operation against Belarus. That’s way we consider the scenario of war against Yugoslavia in 1999 not probable for using against Belarus nowadays. The way of usage inside (inner) enemy is much more likely variant that can be used by NATO, USA, EU and theirs allies.

The way of seizure power by the usage of the technologies tested already in other countries seamed the most probable and possible for Belarus.

That’s why it’s necessary: to find out how is it possible to avoid such crucial political change or not to let what was called in mass media “Color revolution”, “Soft revolution” in Belarus.

To reach this task we order you:

to analyze the events that took place in former socialistic countries of Central Europe and some republics of a former USSR that lead to these unwilling for us political changes from the collapse of socialistic system in Central and Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Treaty till present and answer the following questions:

1.                Was it possible to avoid those revolutions?

2.                If so, till what moment [till what event] was it possible?

3.                Was it possible to stop those events, when the revolutions themselves started already?

4.                What has happened? What are those “Color revolutions”? What events we can call “Color”-“Soft” revolutions?

5.                What were the reasons of those revolutions?

6.                What were the conditions under which those revolutions could occur?

7.                Who took part [supported] those revolutions among social, national, religious groups of the populations [inside] of the countries? Who supported the revolutions abroad (politicians, parties, outstanding individuals, medias)

8.                What is the strategy of the “Color”-“Soft” revolution?

9.                What tactics do they use?

10.            What measures can be taken to avoid; to stop; to reverse the “Color”-“Soft” revolution?

11.            What legal support for such policy must be made beforehand?

12.            What international responses should be expected to the state policy [the strategy] to avoid; stop; reverse the revolution?

13.            How distinguished the foreign influence was on those revolutions?

Responsible for the executing (execution): Chief of the Analytical department of KGB of the Republic of Belarus Colonel Ivanevich I.I.

Deadline: June 31, 2005.

To all departments and branches of the KGB: to give all necessary help and information by the request of Analytical department.

Head of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus

General Sukharenko S.

II. The Report

KGB of the Republic of Belarus

June 31 2006                                                                                                           Minsk

Analytical Report

On the request of order of the Head of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus No 0007, from April 31, 2005 our department worked out the following analytical report. 

For describing of the events lead to the changes of political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, former republics of USSR we decided to use the term “Soft Revolution” as the one that define those events maximally precisely and briefly. Further we use abbreviation “SR” for the definition. 

To achieve the goal we decided to focus on the experience of “SR”s that took place in Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan. The experience of other Soft Revolutions of the earlier period 1989-1990 (often called “Velvet Revolutions”) is not suitable for such a task, because of the following reasons:

The Velvet revolutions in Central Europe were caused in a big way by different reasons, mainly on the wave of mass wish of the population to quit the socialistic system and transfer to the western style economic and political systems. The political conditions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1989-1990 were different also – the bankruptcy of the socialistic ideology seemed obvious, traditional support from the Soviet Union was disappearing, all these countries had unsuccessful experience of the suppressions of the popular uprising in 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and beginning of 1980-th in Poland.

Other similar democratic broad social movements like liberal revolution in Lebanon, or protest movement in Israel took place in too different conditions under the influence of too different reasons and that’s why we can’t rely on the analyze of those events (the analyze of those events will not be useful for us).

Soft Revolutions took places in the countries declared democratic, in condition of open market economy, in the societies that did not have the experience of recent (within the one or two generations’ life period) social uprisings or movements.

The powers in states, were the Oppositions initiated Soft Revolutions, did not take the Oppositions seriously (properly) and the easy victories of the revolutions seamed to be sudden for these powers.

What was it?

The understanding of the nature of the SRs is necessary for true understanding effective countermeasures against SR. During and after SRs we have been analyzing a great number of theories and guesses about “what was it?” that were formed.

The level of trustworthiness of these theories depended from the deepness of the analysis one made about the SRs and from the author of the theory, from political orientation of the author or a party influencing him.

Two main camps of the theories are opposing each other: one asserts that SRs were necessary and useful for the countries where they occurred, and other pointes only negative results of the SRs for the countries, societies, neighboring countries.

The supporters of the SRs define them as a logical stage of the development of the democracy in post totalitarian societies, like natural and positive process of the spreading of the Western-values world (human rights oriented world), positive element of the world globalization process. The advocates of the SRs mainly focused on the negative situations existing in the countries before the SRs (absence of democracy, high level of corruption, violations or at least negligence regarding human rights, dependency of the mass media, underdeveloped economy, tendency to be isolated from the international economic and political systems, and limited power of marginal political groups and parties), and described only positive changes that happened afterwards (liberalization of the political regime, economy; broad international support of the country after the SR; beginning of the struggle against corruption; confirmation of the respect to human rights, free mass media).

The opponents of the SRs’ usually represent political camps defeated during the SR. They pay attention only to the negative effects of the SRs. They point to mistakes and cheatings by new powers, their missteps in management and picking up the top party members, economic situation that did not change to the better, but often became worse, on the changing one corrupted officials on others, dependency of the new political regimes on foreign countries (mainly USA, some EU countries). Special and very important point of the anti-SRs ideas is the international political orientation. Obvious pro-Western direction of the development of post SRs countries caused fear and anger among those who still tend to see the West mainly as former Soviet opposition and competition. This argument has a special influence on elderly people, for whom USSR and socialistic system seem to be positive and fair, but lately it became popular also among the young people due to the improving pro-governmental propaganda and popularity of marginal political groups and parties.

Many of those who try to explain “what was it?” tend to label “SR”s as either all good or all bad.

Among the supporters of the “SR”s were popular explanations that “SR”s are some kind of natural development of the “democracy” and “human rights” in the post- socialistic societies; or that it was Western help, sort of “white man burden” for the countries suffered from the absence of democracy and violation of human rights; “SR”s were also declared as a legal and effective way of modern political struggle.

The opponents of the “SR”s were much more creative in the “labels” and “theories” defining “SR”s.

Maybe the most wide spread in Russian speaking information space is the idea that “SR”s are realization of the Western aggressive policy oriented on the destruction of the power and political influence of Russia and its allies; against generally Russian oriented world. The most often they call Zbignev Brzezinski[3] as a designer for such a policy. It’s necessary to say that it’s really possible to use many of his quotations, articles and interviews to prove such a theory.

A sort of sub spices of the previous theory is the idea that “SR“s are purely CIA operation focusing on reducing of military and political power of the rudiments of the USSR. To prove this idea its supporters point on the US political and finance help to the “SR”s, a big percentage of the American based NGOs, which supported “SR”s, the origin of the new Presidents of Georgia and Ukraine wives, who had Netherland and US citizenships.

During the “SR” in Ukraine there was an attempt made by several parties and observers to declare “SR” as a part of Masonic and Zionist conspiracy to capture the world power. This theory did not get real development mainly by the obvious split of powerful Ukrainian Jewish community on two opposing each other camps as for the “SR” in Ukraine. Now the theory is under development by several marginal parties and politicians in Russia and Ukraine, but it can’t expect serious recognition.

In some blogs and sites devoted to the “SR”s an ironic definition was born – “A revolution of millionaires against billionaires” – showing that certain political groups after the “SR”s were just replaced by some other “oligarchs”.

The analyze of the actual events and different theories about the “SR”s brings us to conclude that “SR”s were something in between among those different theories. To master the situation with the “SR”s we must treat one as an objective process, caused by the various mainly inner reasons; that has both supporters and enemies inside the country and in international community; that closely linked with the problems of international policy and international orientation of the country; it’s possible under condition of popular support of considerable part of the population.

The role of the governmental bodies created to protect, support and supply the very existence of the state and legal political regime in those “SR”s is of a great interest for this analysis. The activity of secret police forces, law enforcement, military personal during the “SR”s were not effective in all cases of the “SR”s, as the results were ineffective to save the falling governments. What were the reasons of such situation?

It’s obvious, and we already marked that “SR”s were unexpected for the regimes, it means that the government at whole and its force block in particular did not conduct the right policy against the “SR”s. But it may seams odd that there was no any attempt from the personnel of the force block of the government to handle the situation on local levels. There were no open, dramatic and of course tragic contradictions between the soldiers, officers and those who were trying to lead the “SR”s in the streets and squares. Many could think that polices and armies even supported the “SR”s. There wese no cases of open disobeying of them to their seniors’ orders, but there were such possibilities.

We think it’s useful to analyze this phenomenon from the social perspective of those who directly faced demonstrations, movements in the streets and squares. How the officers and soldiers of the secret police forces, law enforcement bodies and armies accepted those events, how loyal they were to the governments, how far they would have gone in case if governments would take strict position, for example ordering them to dissolved demonstrators in any ways.

Analyzing of this experience we can try to use it towards the situation in Belarus, predict possible position and behavior of the personal of state structures, traditionally called “force block”, “force structures”, “punishing bodies”. For common definition of all the personal of those structures, we are going to use abbreviation SPLEMP.

Secret Police, Law Enforcement and Military Personal [SPLEMP][4].

The secret police of the states were not prepared for dealing with strategy and tactic the Oppositions used. There were a lot various reasons of such a situation, but we can try to focus on several principal of them.

In terms of tactics secret services of former socialistic countries tended to use old-fashioned tactics used during the 20th century that was based on the superiority of the Secret Services in the governmental structure and the society; possibility to use all spectrum of measures in achieving the goals; political stability and reasonable management. The secret services in such countries worked for decades being not tied down by the legislation, court system, mass media, public opinion and the style of their work turned into not professional enough. The collapse of socialism at whole and collapse of the Soviet Union especially actually paralyzed secret service work for several years. From 1991 till the end of the 1990s these Services got used to work in the new economic, social, governmental and social structures.

One of the most prominent results of these changes was mass high level corruption and transformation of the state secret services into a kind of share-holding companies working to gain profit. Secret Services started to take illegal bribes for negligence in detecting and investigating; they started to take semi-official money for certain kinds of “special services” – special IDs for example; the officers “helped” some businessmen to overcome problems with registration, bureaucracy, tax administrations, police, fire departments, public health department and took money for it, if the businessman did not want to take such “special services”, he could have been forced to do it either by sending mass inspections to his business, or even by using criminal racketeering methods. Top officers of the secret services often were involved in scandals about their engagement in arms traffic, smuggling, and drug trafficking and so on.

In such situation even old methods and tactics of the secret services were not efficient and the tactical level of the secret services at whole and professionalism of the officers decreased greatly. Secret Services were not ready to operate in the governmental interests in the new conditions of relatively open society, free mass media, and attention to the inner situation from abroad, necessity to cooperate and coordinate its activity with the court system.

Any attempts of the secret services to deal with new elements of the open society like free mass media, independent journalists led to mainly negative results. Secret Services were accused in kidnappings, torturing and murdering of many so called independent journalists. The disappearing of the Ukrainian journalist Georgy Gongadze, who was believed to oppose President L. Kuchma on September 2001, was immediately taken by his colleagues and Opposition as a result of his murderer by the order of Presidential administration. This event started the first attempt of mass protest movement “Ukraine without Kuchma”. In this entire story Ukrainian Secret Service (SBU) proved to be unprofessional, a helpless and loose body. The political scandal was also based to a considerable extent on the testimony of former presidential bodyguard major M. Melnichenko who escaped abroad and declared he had secretly made tapes proving Kuchma’s orders to murder journalist Gongadze. The betrayay of this highly rank Secret Service officer showed moral degradation of the personal and decreased SBU reputation in the society even more. The Gongadze case is not finally resolved yet.

Along with such obvious failures in their activities Secret Services were trying to show and prove their necessity by artificial scandals and fake cases. Like a case of conspiracy tended to renew communist power and USSR in Ukraine. The fake character of such scandals became known in mass media and society immediately and those awkward provocations discredited Secret Services more and more.

We can conclude that Secret Services were rather ready to suppress classic revolutionary movements with secret societies, conspiracy, and armed struggle and so on. They just did not take as a serious danger for the government and existing regime those Oppositional groups, who did not hide, did not sabotage, and did not do anything, that could be expected from true revolutionaries. 

As for the strategy of the Secret Services we can assert, that there was no real strategy, the same as general governmental conception, no strategic inner policy. We assume that it was an inherent feature of transiting society and emerging state.

The level of loyalty of SPLEMP was not sufficient. Officers, enlisted and draft soldiers[5] were not satisfied with their economic, social position granted them by the existing powers, systematic cheating by the government and were rather to take waiting position in the conflicts between powers and oppositions. It’s possible to say that SPLEMP was largely disappointed by the governments and regimes and in such a way were ready to observe the political struggle passively.

The basic idea of the peaceful activity of the oppositions in the “SR”s did not create the huge threat of the oppositions and “SR”s themselves among the police and military personal and they in mass were ready just to keep relative peace and maintain order in the streets. The image of the “enemy” in Opposition was not formed beforehand also because many of the Oppositions’ activists (students, businessmen, teachers and professors, other intellectuals) were not taken as socially dangerous elements. The “enemy image” was formed lately in emergency situation during the development of the “SR”s and lacks of the measures of informative war did not let to do it effective enough for the governments. The Oppositions even after the beginning of mass pro-governmental propaganda still did not look like either an obvious armed enemy or an element destructive for the countries, nor even like limited “golden youth” group. The SPLEMP under those conditions had no inner motivation to suppress those Oppositions as a self defense for the state.

Many of the SPLEMP did not support the powers because they just did not trust those powers.

In Serbia SPLEMP remember, that the power did not help to those of them who took part in the politically controversial military and police actions (operations) on the territory of Serbska Krajina (Croatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Kosovo. Milosevic government also was taken by the SPLEMP like a loser government that lead the country to shameful, large damage defeat, economical problems, NATO missile and bomb attacks.

SPLEMP in Georgia were poorly disciplined, had morale impairments from military defeats in rioting regions and strongly depended from the territorial principle of formation of the units.

SPLEMP in Ukraine felt used by the power that systematically cheated and betrayed its people. Cancelling of the SPLEMP benefits, ridiculous level of salaries, cutting of the military personnel number; exposing propaganda about so called “fight against corruption in the law enforcement” that took the form of mass witch hunt, or rather 1930- style Stalin cleanings; fate of the patrol police officers, who executed the orders in forcing protest movement in 2001-2002 “Ukraine without Kuchma” and who were than fired and sued as governmental powers attempted to justify themselves; terribly low level of trust of the population to the law enforcement as a result of the extremely poor management, or rather absence of management in law enforcement; odious personality of the Internal Minister M. Bilokon; many other objective and subjective reasons did not let to SPLEMP be among the true supporters of the ruling regime. 

Especially controversial and badly calculated for the SPLEMP was the biography and image of the pro-power presidential candidate V. Janukovich, who had criminal records and was considered to be involved in connections with organized criminal groups. Such background was taken by many SPLEMP as absolutely inappropriate for the future President of the country. 

SPLEMP in Kyrgyzstan was in a condition of degradation, was disappointed with long and fruitless presidency of Ascar Acaev, observed catastrophic social and economic situation in the country.

Thus, we can see that SPLEMP were not ready to fight for the protection of the existing regimes. They were not interested in the defense of their governments. Conditions under which they were forced to take action didn’t let them feel that their active and strict position taken against the “SR”s would lead to some kind of improvements in their everyday lives, and might even create worse conditions.

This obvious contradiction between the interests of the top of the regimes straining  towards stability and keeping the situation as it had been before and SPLEMP that did not feel serious danger in possible changes for themselves – this contradiction did not let the powers to use force potential of their SPLEMP effectively and in whole capacity.

A special issue for SPLEMP involved in the “SR”s’ events was the possibility for using foreign contingents in favor of the existing regimes. It would be the most serious mistake to consider the very idea of possible usage of foreign SPLEMP contingents in the suppression of the revolutionary movement inside the country. Even unproved information, that there was a squad of Russian “specnaz” on the territory of Ukrainian airport, ready to help to Kuchma’s government during the Orange revolution in December 2004 was used by many Ukrainian oppositional and foreign medias as a way to show foreign involvement in the domestic events, absence of actual support of the regime inside the country, cruelty of the government, ready to use mercenaries against own people. And what was possibly the situation occurred government was forced to justify its own activity. This justification adds the score to the Opposition and makes the government weaker even in the eyes of the supporting part of population.

Low level of governmental attention towards the management, current social and economic problems, and discipline among SPLEMP caused the weakening and turning political powers to be defenseless in the conditions of social protest movements and uprisings.

In all Soft Revolutions the Oppositions were attacking and the Powers were defending sides of the conflict. This defensive position of the governments leads to feeling that government is a potential loser, and more and more supporters appeared among the oppositional forces. Responding rather than taking the initiative turned to be dangerous for the regimes in the times of “SR”s. The more reactive the powers were, the lousier their positions looked. We can conclude than “SR” was destined to win from the moment when the government takes the challenge of the “SR”. All events afterwards are designed to decrease the governmental power of existing regime and takeover the governmental power itself.

As the “SR”s started as legal opposing to the existing powers, grew as wide popular opposition to the political power and government particularly and turned into bloodless protest movement at the last stage of the developing struggle, we can assume that the last point in the development of the “SR” at which government still can take a chance in defeating of the “SR”, when government actually can stop the very development of the “SR” is dealing with legal opposition. Thus the point of no return in the case of “SR” is legal, constitutional dealing with official opposition and not allowing it to grew in popular oppositional movement.

Only open, nonviolent, based on the legislation dealing and cooperation with the opposition can guarantee the existing regime from the danger of “SR”. It also means that government has to realize certain the very basic demands opposition usually has, especially in the sphere of protection of human rights, freedom of speech and opposition participation in local governing.

Trying to define the actual countermeasures against the “SR” we should first define the basic approach government must have towards the problem. These basic, general approaches will define the way government should deal with the opposition and corresponding social, economic and international aspects of the potential “SR”.

To work out the countermeasures effective enough to avoid and struggle against “SR” we must strictly keep the following principles:

Principles of the governmental countermeasures:

a.       Initiative and aggressive style of activity. Government must challenge the opposition, not to wait for its challenge towards the government and then respond.

b.      Political power must never justify itself, power is always sure in its rightness  Justifying itself for things it’s done right or wrong political power, government put itself into position of weak looser. Such approach is inappropriate of course.

c.       Power must define and rely on its supporters among different groups of population inside the country and abroad as well. Making the social bases of governmental support wider must be achieved by well organized PR campaign.

d.      The PR level of the governmental propaganda must be on a highest level of modern PR technologies. The minimal possible level of governmental propaganda PR technologies must be not lower than the opposition’s one.

e.       The power must create and maintain its positive image in several respectable foreign mass media.

f.        The power must define and focus its attention on the problems of “risky groups”. There are several most disturbing groups of problems most probably caused social disappointment and mostly painful for the society. Usually these very problems are used by the Opposition for “recruiting” its supporters. (Traditionally in the past “SR”s there were: poor economy, corruption, abuses of power by the officials, disagreement of the part of population with the international policy of the country etc.) Constant governmental dealing with such problems will steadily improve the situations in the spheres and will give to the government additional positive points.

g.       The power must be extremely demanding to its party members (especially at the top). Political struggle in modern conditions depends more and more from the role and personality of each of the party members. Any scandal, any accusation, any kind of criminal record as for the crew member of political party, movement may be used by the political opponents in order to put shadow on the whole political movement.

Relying on these principles we worked out the following actual countermeasures government should undertake in order to avoid possible “SR”, or to stop growing of the political opposition till the level of popular movement, potentially ready to transform into “SR”.


1.                        Permanent governmental propaganda, informational aggression (pro-governmental mass media, web sites, publications increasing the trust of the people to the government) Governmental propaganda in order to be most successful and effective must be design in the newest PR achievements. All “SR”s actively used modern PR technologies and it turned to be absolutely successful. The necessity of the governmental propaganda built on the basis of state ideology is obvious and there are numbers of examples in our history, when effective propaganda was a cornerstone for the political or military achievements (Revolution 1917 and Civil War, building of socialistic system in 1920-30s; Great Patriotic War, after war period) and instead, when the governmental propaganda lost initiative, became formal and did not get support from the mass of people, it made the state and government weaker and lead to negative results (Khrushchev’s Float; soviet period 1960-1980th; Perestroika).

2.                        The crucial point for the governmental propaganda on the modern stage of development is its modern level. All possible techniques must be used: posters, radio, TV, internet, concerts, and lotteries – all mass events, where it’s possible to attract people’s attention will do.

3.                        We have to admit, that the methods of negative, or “counterpropaganda” used by governments in some of “SR”s  when the discredit information about the opposition was spread was used rather to the good of the opposition, that gained the image of suffering strugglers and gave to oppositions additional background to accuse powers in unfair election running.

4.                        It’s very important to find the right tone of the governmental propaganda as for the opposition. Openly enemy style in the description of the opposition can help them gain some new supporters among the society, that would possibly assume that if the government pay so much attention to those political forces, they might be really the mouthpieces, (voicers, spokesmen) of the will of essential group of population. Open repression against the opposing media is also a wrong tactic because it will cause accusation in violation of freedom of speech and information and encourage opposition to spread information in a kind of undercover, semi-forbidden way that again will make these pieces of information more attractive and persuasive for potential opposition supporters.

5.                        The right and the most effective tone of giving the information about the opposition perhaps will be limited, quite neutral informing about the parties, its programs, its activists and no information at all about any kind of scandals corresponding theirs’ activity. Scandals attracting the attention focus the attention of information consumers on the participants of the scandal, and make more publicity to them, that are absolutely unhelpful to us. Boring, not scandalous and unattractive information may be in old fashion Soviet news style perhaps the best way to inform about the opposition.

6.                        Along with the governmental propaganda about the local opposition a new and effective approaches towards the propaganda about the states where the “SR”s occurred must be worked out. Especially it’s important about the situation in Ukraine as the closest post-“SR” state geographically, by mentality, socially and economically.   In this case governmental media have much more flexibility to operate with the information. Visible failures and missteps of the winners in “SR” give the possibilities to show negative results of the “SR”. It’s better to give such kind of information in the comparison with the better situation in Belarus, underlining its stable and developing position. Good method of the predicting the danger of possible “SR” in Belarus would be making parallels between the politicians in post-“SR” Ukraine and activists of the opposition in Belarus.    

7.                        High attention towards the SPLEMP. Effective law enforcement and military management is necessary part of governmental policy. Although, SPLEMP are not supposed to be visible, both our citizens and international community should be under the impression they are not different than their foreign civilized counterparts. There is a vital need to keep them disciplined and well paid. Moreover, SPLEMP officers have to be recruited early among the most promising individuals (e.g. law students). The old Soviet time traditions of correct choice of the potential candidates (including social, educational, physical backgrounds; mandatory probation period; special additional professional training) can be of a great value today also. With respect to the military – there is a need to think about setting up a more professional army and at some point abandoning the draft. Soldiers drafted generate both costs and problems that in a long run destabilize the army.

8.                        Society and NGOs. We have to confess that total banning of any kind of activity to different NGO, especially based abroad brings first of all harm to the image of the government and country at whole. At the same time we should not let unlimited destructive activity of the odious NGOs that were involved in various “SR” s before. The right balance must be found. The NGO’s controlled by the government activity can be the right compromise. We should allow carefully pre-selected NGO’s to operate under discrete government supervision and than highlighting such a fact.  Allowing, again, carefully pre-selected, brightest individuals – system beneficiaries to take part in either student or professional international exchange, so they could spread a ‘word of mouth’ on government actions and get networked with highly influential people abroad.  Such actions undertaken by the Palestinian radicals in late 70ties in France turned out to be a great success and put into a question Israel’s policy with respect to even most radical Islamic groups (given the fact these actions took place after the Munich 1972 and some other terrorists actions). Towards the NGOs known as true supporters of “SR”s we can use more artificial tactics of the discrediting of its local members in eyes of their foreign headquarters first of all. To achieve it, we can expose some moments quite usual for our everyday life, but inappropriate for the Western people. Exposing of the misuse of money, involving in corruption, abuse of the position – such things made by the activists of local branches of NGOs will cut the support from abroad for such NGOs at least for some period of time.

9.                        Constant focusing on the problems of “risky groups” among students, businessmen, intellectuals etc. As long as they won’t be victimized, these groups can actually be used to support the system – as their very existence shows government openness for dealing with a various ideas. The representatives of the aforementioned groups should be invited to consult the government, different levels officials on the issues that set up the basis for these groups ideology. The trick is to listen, underline the fact of government’s engagement in a dialogue with them and through a course of actions undertaken – either put their credibility in question that would lead to a decrease of their importance before they actually grow in power or using the old Roman tactics: divide et impera. The later solution would be quite easy to accomplish given the constant selfish struggle of egos among the intellectuals.

10.                    To find both reliable and respectable foreign allies. This position concerns both governmental and individual level. We must confess that despite high authority, military, economic and political power of Russia, it’s not sufficient to have the only actual ally. Forced alliances with countries outsiders like Cuba, leading controversial international policy like Venezuela are rather harmful for the international image of Belarus, than bring some dividends. At the same time there are powerful political forces in the West Europe that are interested in the settling of the strict division of the Europe between EU and Russia and its allies. They are primarily the representatives of “Old EU members” – Great Britain, France and first of all Germany – those countries that have centuries long political tradition of the splitting of Central Europe among powerful empires. Modern political forces in West Europe which are ready to fix the EU and NATO borders along with the Western borders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are interested in reinsurance of their leading role in the EU and not letting to develop rapidly to new members of the EU in Central Europe; trying to settle constant natural gas supplying from Russia; aiming to decrease US influence in the Central Europe; at last, but not the least, they just traditionally do not recognize the territories to the East from Poland as an actual part of Europe (mainly in cultural and social sense). We can also expect if not support, at least neutrality from traditional isolationist political forces in US. Thus the best way for preservation of the existing in Belarus regime from the international and geopolitical perspectives is a sort of repetition of the 20th century Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact in the 21st century. Then we should explore such cooperation to the greatest possible extent. Having a good press abroad would attract foreigners to visit Belarus. Of course it is crucial to organize such a visit in a way the visitors are to see only what they are supposed to see and meet only those they are supposed to meet with. The visitors got to stay under an impression they are the decision makers with respect to both places visited and people met. Such a tactics used as a tool worked fine for many governments in the past i.e. Russian empire (Potemkin’s villages) and facilitated postponing the changes in Iraq (Saddam Hussein approach towards the UN observers). The key issue is: do not deny – encourage paying a visit than postpone it, finally agree and apply the aforementioned tactics.

11.                    Bureaucracy has to be limited. The bigger the governmental apparatus is the likelihood it would not work efficiently increases. Moreover, the monstrous administration generates costs that both society and international observers are aware of. In such a case it is almost certain the issue of government corruption is to pop up. To remedy such a situation and avoid any additional turmoil is to reorganize the administration in a way that would give an impression of ‘cleaning out the closet’. We should not diminish the meaning of renaming governmental agencies while not changing the core of their structure. Let us allow some – again – carefully pre-selected opposition representatives to head some of these agencies. Of course they will be deprived of any actual power of their respective agencies and departments. Being unable to provide any meaningful changes they are either to give up or we can easily make them responsible for all the actual or imaginary misconducts produced in a course of actions of the agencies and/or departments they head. At the same time anticorruption policy must be very balanced and accurate. We can not afford turning such a policy in just a formal way of “appointing” or occasional selection of some clerks just to show, that there is a struggle against corruption. In this case we will not reach the aim and citizens will keep complain about the corruption, while the clerks and officials will just look for new more artificial ways of corruption.

12.                    Secret Police strategy and new tactics must be worked out immediately. The basis of the strategy must be the idea of keeping and maintaining of political power at hands of legal government. At the same time this keeping of power must not create potential pressure and danger of accusations of human right violations, undemocratic ruling, wide scale corruption, fixing of autocratic regime, and limitation of free market economy. These are the main elements on which the first steps of “SR”s were founded. Present days conditions make us take into consideration the fact that international attention will be fixed on Belarus and it’s almost impossible to conduct really secret home policy. The tactics basing on the new strategy must not respond or react on the tactical actions of “SR”, but prevent emerge of the conditions in which it’s possible to develop “SR”. We consider necessary to create a special combined working group including the representatives of KGB, MIA, MFA, governmental media, stations, and municipal services in order to work out the actual elements of new tactics. An effort should be made to create a positive mythology, such as that surrounding the FBI in the United States before September 11, 2001. Most Americans though the FBI was always professional, strictly complied with the law, and was infallible in identifying and rooting out the enemies of American, both foreign and domestic.

13.                    Belarusian activity abroad can be shaped in two main directions. First is creating seeds of local conflicts, possible wars and pressure around the world in order to keep UN, US, EU, other countries attentions away from us. It’s an ultimate and highly risky measure that can be taken only in the absolutely harsh conditions. The second is keeping our people involved in international affairs, showing willingness to serve as mediators and/or advisors on any arising international conflict.  It would be also very feasible to use certain groups of our own educated citizens to be involved in all sorts of humanitarian aid actions. Such an action would result with a good feed back from an international community and serve as a cover for our services actions to produce the events facilitating conflicts taking place on other countries soil.

At the current level of political, economic and social development of Belarus these measures are to be sufficient to stabilize the modern political situation, put the opposition under the new kind, modern level governmental control, return positive international image of Belarus and hope for the stable and growing development of Belarus not breaking with the sharp social disturbances.

At the end we give the direct answers on the questions pointed in “The Task”:

1.      Was it possible to avoid those revolutions?

Yes it was possible under the conditions of constant and balanced governmental policy towards the possible revolutionary situation. Our “Principles” and “Countermeasures” gave the actual recommendation about home and foreign policy the government must conduct in order to master the situation.

2.      If so, till what moment [till what event] was it possible?

The point of no return in avoiding of “SR” can’t be identified precisely, but in general it is the last moment government maintains the actual supreme power and control over the society. The opposition must exist exactly like opposition – expressing the interests of minority of the population and not able to head broad popular movement leading to the “SR”. So it’s possible to avoid the “SR” till the moment when opposition turn into the struggling part aiming to seize the power.

3.      Was it possible to stop those events, when the revolutions themselves started already?

After the beginnings of the main events, called “SR” (broad social antigovernment movement, nonviolent demonstrations and meetings, international interest and pressing towards the government) it’s almost impossible to stop and reverse its development. The power that takes the challenge of the “SR” is doomed for the defeat.

4.      What is the strategy of the “Color”-“Soft” revolution?

The main aim of the “SR” is supreme power of course. In order to gain this aim “SR” uses untraditional strategy and untraditional forms of struggle. Main features of the “SR” strategy are: nonviolent active protest movement; broad usage of all possible media for spreading its ideas; applying for international community, NGOs, international law and international organizations as to the observers and mediators.

5.      What tactics do they use?

The tactics of “SR” in accordance to its strategy, includes peaceful demonstrations, usage of classical mass media (TV, newspapers, radio, posters, big boards), active usage of new age medias (internet connections, cell phones, sms) and usage of original medias (graffiti, pop-culture) for spreading of its ideas, long-term standing peaceful protests (tent camps in the squares of cities),

6.      What measures can be taken to avoid; to stop; to reverse the “Color”-“Soft” revolution?

As we already pointed above there could be measures for avoiding of “SR”, but not for stopping or reversing it. The actual measures for avoiding “SR” look at part “Countermeasures”.

7.      What legal provisions for such policy must be made beforehand?

All measures taken must be absolutely legal; each case of even minor violation of law will add points to the opposing side. Existing legal system permits the government to realize all necessary measures in order to maintain peace and order and avoid “SR” scenario. We do not recommend adoption of any kind of new pieces of legislation of restricting or banning character. It also can be interpreted by the opposition, international observers, and media as a sign of undemocratic, authoritarian style of governing in Belarus.

8.      What international actions should correspond the state policy [the strategy] to avoid; stop; reverse the revolution?

The government must rely on powerful and influential allies abroad. It’s necessary both for inside propaganda and for positive international image. Government should avoid direct contacts and acts of support from the most odious leaders of foreign countries (especially “pariah” countries). Government should start more active foreign policy cooperating even with countries traditionally unfriendly to Belarus, trying to find allies among some political forces in those countries.

9.      What has happened? What are those “Color revolutions”? What events we can call “Color”-“Soft” revolutions?

Among he dozens definitions of “SR” we decided to pick up most sufficient and less ideological. So we define that “SR” is an objective process, caused by the various mainly inner reasons; that has both supporters and enemies inside the country and in international community; that closely linked with the problems of international policy and international orientation of the country; it is possible under the condition of broad popular support of considerable part of the population. We understand by this process the events of confrontation between the government and opposition; transferring the actual power towards the former opposition as a result of confrontation and legitimization of this transformation.

10.  What were the reasons of those revolutions?

And again we tried to pick up the most sufficient among the numerous possible answers. The most obvious are: unsatisfied state of economic and social conditions of life of significant groups of population; dysfunctional government; objective characteristic of the open market economy with tendency for constant improvement; aiming of some part of population to have more Western-style life. Speaking specifically about the reasons of “SR”s in the countries we mentioned we should add that failures of the governments in Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan were based on systematic loosing of the initiative, poor PR, usage of old-style political technologies in those countries. Very important and separate reason was in low level of discipline in governmental bodies including SPLEMP.

11.  What were the conditions under which those revolutions could occur?

The conditions that let to the opposition to realize reasons of the “SR”s were weak political power of the governments that made possible to form and organize the oppositions into powerful revolutionary forces; foreign political support of the oppositions; oppositions’ possibility to use certain kinds of mass media not available to the governmental structures; low international political rating of the state; existing of definite social groups unsatisfied with their position in the political, social and economic structure of the state and society [students, small businessmen (proprietors), religious sects];  high level of corruption.

12.        Who took part [supported] those revolutions among social, national, religious groups of the populations [inside] of the countries? Who supported the revolutions abroad (politicians, parties, outstanding individuals, medias)

“SR”s inside the countries were supported by very broad social groups, by representatives of various properties, national, religious groups, high educated and not, employed by the governments, working for the private companies and self-employers, businessmen, students, intellectuals etc. Though the percentage of students, intellectuals and businessmen were relatively high in those events we can’t define the special moving forces of the “SR”s inside the country. Speaking about Belarus we can not see the social conditions for more active participation of specific social groups in possible “SR”. From abroad “SR”s were supported by the politicians and NGOs standing for spreading of so called Western values, human rights; popular support of the “SR”s abroad (again mainly in the Western world) was formed by the skilled and highly professional PR campaign.

13.  How significant was the foreign influence on those revolutions?

The influence did have place and it definitely encourage many of the “SR”s supporters. At the same time direct ruling over the “SR”s from abroad never was proved. We can conclude that the main part of foreign influence was in political encouragement of the transformations of the regimes towards more open, more democratic and more Western-oriented standards. Monetary support from the foreign governments most probably was not so big and granted throw the NGO financing.

June 31 2006.                                                            Chief of the Analytical department

 of KGB of the Republic of Belarus

Colonel                   Ivanevich I.I.

The Conclusion.

Taking example of Belarus the paper illustrates the work or secret services in autocratic countries as they search for new approaches towards dealing with oppositions, new strategy, tactics of prevention and struggle against potential political power transformation in form of “SR”.

This tendency is an inherent part of regular fighting for political power and the main distinguishing feature of it in present time – the form it can take.

The paper shows only the most obvious elements of new PR, tactical, political and legal technologies secret services will use by themselves, or will recommend using to other governmental bodies. A feeling of danger will encourage them to be more and more creative.

The paradox can occur that among the human recourses of secret services the most well prepared for dealing with “SR” successfully will be those who have more Westernizes approaches based on Western education or Western way of thinking or an attempt to use more advanced Western political and PR technologies against pro-Western “SR”. It’s hard to predict whether the “old style” camp or a new generation will take the decisive positions in secret services, but we think that “SR” will have chances in those countries, where secret services would be not flexible enough to take over new way of thinking and would keep recommend to the government to suppress and violate opposition; ban NGOs; create problems to free mass media.

The “SR” strategy and tactics are perfectly designed for activity in the condition of confrontation exactly with government using such “old style” recommendations. We think that in future political forces willing to democratize its country using the elements of “SR” will have to take into consideration that those Secret Services of autocratic countries have gain some experience from the previous “SR”s and had to become wiser.

The paper imagines a new generation of secret service, one realizing, that it’s vitally important to develop itself and to be ready to modern challenges. The author has no, even approximate, information about how significant is the part of Belarus KGB that ready to think in a new way, be flexible and qualified enough to confront successfully to potential “SR”. It means that the paper cannot predict confidently whether a modern Belarus KGB will operate in a new or will keep the old style.

The real people serving in secret Services and law enforcement bodies of undemocratic societies and often these are they who face the popular movements of “SR”, are not some kind of evil dragons. They are the part of people of their countries, they are sure they protect their people and countries; they are proud of their history and honor. Their wide spread rejection of Western international policy and suspicions about Western policy towards countries of former USSR can be explained as remnant of the Cold War Era, aggressive anti-West propaganda of Kremlin medias and lack of balanced information from the West. Taking into consideration that the majority of personal in secret services and commanding stuff of law enforcement have high educational levels[6] one can expect that effectively informing those people about “the West” and Western values will lead to positive changes in their attitude towards it and will make them less suspicious as for the processes of democratization.

Revolution is a bad event for people and country where it occurs. Revolutions of 1917 in Russia brought awful suffering, many millions of victims, cultural degradation for decades. This experience is still not a distant history for people in the countries of former USSR. No one would wish an actual revolution for Belarus people, who had too many sufferings in the 20th century. That’s why one hopes that Soft Revolution as a way of nonviolent and evolutionary democratic transformation is the ultimate way for democratization.


[1] Stresner – dictator in Paraguay; Saddam Hussein – Iraqi dictator; Pol Pot – leader of Khmer Rouge, Maoist oriented Cambodian bloody dictator

[2] “Former Soviet Union republics” – semiofficial term for the countries emerged after the collapse of USSR among Russian-oriented media, politicians, and officials. The term has a shadow of doubt in real and perspective independences of those countries.

[3] Famous geopolitical thinker, in post Soviet world often taken as a paranoiac and irrational enemy of Soviet and Russian  “world, civilization”.

[4] Usually in Russian speaking information space they use special term “force structure”, rarer “punishing structures” – here we use this abbreviation to underline that we focus primarily on the human resource factor in those governmental structures.  Traditionally personnel of those structures is taken in the society and medias as something monolithic, united by common interests, approaches and attitude towards life.

[5] There are both drafted part of soldiers in the post Soviet countries armies and enlisted, called “contracting”. The latter are supposed to be the bases for formation of professional military forces. In distinction from the draft soldiers, “contracting” personnel serve after mandatory draft term of service, service conditions are settled in contract, and they obtain certain salary (traditionally miserable).

[6] Officers in KGB have mandatory bachelor or master degree; officers in law enforcement as well. The latter have mainly law degree.