Introduction
Three and a half
years after invading Iraq, America
stands at crossroads. After a
lightning-quick military assault resulting in a toppling of Saddam Hussein’s
Baathist regime, progress in Iraq
is now at a virtual standstill. Violence
has embroiled the entire nation in gruesome bloodshed. Despite minor victories – like national
elections and the killing Al Qaeda terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – chaos and
violence continue to spread throughout Iraq. As early as the summer 2003, Iraqis began to
attack one another as the Sunnis fought to keep power and the Shiites sought to
retaliate for years of oppression. Many
believe Iraq
has officially devolved into a civil war as Iraqi-on-Iraqi, sectarian-motivated
attacks proliferates. The United States
military is caught in the middle attempting to stop the violence and eliminate
terrorists so the nationbuilding can continue.
Back home in the United States
the political landscape, which had previously been “red” with support for the
Bush Administration, switched allegiances and supported a wave of Democrats
into power in both the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm elections. Although issues like corruption and
immigration were key to the political take-over, the war in Iraq dominated the 2006 election
cycle. The rising storm of discontent was
sufficiently strong to remove Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from office
to bring in a set of “fresh” set of eyes to head the Department of
Defense. Approval ratings for President
George W. Bush and Congress are at all time lows. Each of these factors has moved the United States
government to a position where they are seeking new alternatives to salvage
some kind of success. As a result a
steady stream of diplomatic, political, and military advice was solicited by
President Bush in order to chart a new way forward in Iraq. This has included the bipartisan Iraq Study
Group (ISG), State Department diplomats, military historians, retired generals,
Defense Department planners, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This
paper seeks to analyze the options the United
States is considering moving forward in Iraq. To orient the reader, this paper provides a
brief history of the creation of Iraq and a description of its
political landscape. The paper also
provides a summary of major post-invasion actions that have influenced the
availability of future options in Iraq. The paper will consider and evaluate five
proposed directions for the future course of the US
in Iraq.
Finally, this paper suggests one
possible course of action to secure a stable democracy in Iraq.
I. Political
Landscape of Iraq
The
nation of Iraq has been an
influential power broker of Middle East throughout
recent history. Iraq gained notoriety at the end of the 20th
century when it invaded Kuwait
in 1990 seeking to increase its power and resources in the region. The defiance of United Nations (UN) sanctions
resulting from the Kuwait
invasion were influential in leading to the situation in Iraq today. Understanding the political landscape in Iraq, however, requires a historical look into how
Iraq had become a tyrant in
the Middle East.
A. Brief Overview of the Creation of Iraq
Although
Iraq
is often best known for its vast deserts and plentiful oil rigs, many believe
the area within its borders was once the biblical location of the Garden of
Eden. The area is a constant battleground featuring
the rise and fall of a number of empires including the Sumerians, Babylonians,
Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Parthians, Islamic caliphates, Mongolians, Seljuks,
Ottomans, and the British. Each empire left its own imprint on the
future of Iraq. The British colonial rule left Iraq
with three basic changes: 1.) an established, arbitrary border; 2.) unified
nation including Kurds, Sunni, and Shia; and 3.) continued the tradition of
rule by military force.
A.
British Empirical
Line Drawing
The nation of Iraq
we know today did not come into being until the early 20th
century. During the rule of the
Ottomans, the central part of Mesopotamia was governed as three provinces: Mosul (Kurdish north), Baghdad (Sunni center), and al-Basrah (Shiite
south). While the First World War raged in Europe, a
great struggle for influence in the Middle East created “chaos in Central Asia . . . a source of danger and promise” for
the British interests. British colonial administrator Lord Alfred
Milner described British imperial interests as securing the semi-circle from South Africa through Egypt,
Palestine, Mesopotamia,
Persia, India, and all the way to New Zealand “free from future
interference of ambitious powers.” Control over this semi-circle would provide a
contiguous land bridge connecting British areas of influence.
Following defeat
in the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was
divided amongst the British and French. As the Ottoman Empire
was collapsing, British envoys won the confidence of the Turkish leadership
causing the Ottoman armistice negotiators to demand to deal only with the
British. As a result, the British took control of Palestine, Jordan
and Mesopotamia, which included the Ottoman provinces of Mosul,
Baghdad, and al-Basrah,
gaining a crucial corridor to their far-East territories. To determine the border between Jordan and the new Mesopotamian state of Iraq, the British simply split the Syrian Desert at the mid-point of the Baghdad-Amman road
and then followed physical features to fill in the border. Thus the nation of Iraq came into existence by
arbitrarily melding three Ottoman provinces combining three sectarian groups
under one common government.
2. British Colonial Influence
The
British colonial control influenced the future direction of Iraq. The British imposed Faysal ibn Hussein
al-Hashim, an Arab from Syria,
as the King of Iraq in 1921. Al-Hashim was the first of three “Hashimite”
kings over the new Iraqi state supported by British colonial rule. The Hashimites were preferred to direct
colonial control, but the kings status as Syrian Arabs kept them from ever being
fully accepted by the Iraqi people. The
Hashmite government was the first in Arab history to face a military coup when
the military raised up to oust the pro-British executive cabinet, though
leaving the popular Hashimite King Ghazi because he had already established
himself as anti-British. When the Rommel’s German armored columns
threatened to take control of Iraq
with the help of some Iraqi pro-Nazis, the British rallied a military response
to keep their imposed government in place. By limiting the rule of Iraq to only
those the British supported and keeping them in power through use of force, the
British rule continued to ingrain Iraqis with the tradition of rule based on
might.
B. Rise
of Saddam Hussein
A
boy named Saddam Hussein was born during the British Hashimite reign – likely
April 28, 1937 – to a Sunni family in the Iraqi town of Tikrit. Hussein’s father died before his birth, but
Saddam grew up under the watch of his step-father, Hassan Ibrahim or “Hassan
the Liar”. Reportedly, Ibrahim was a career thief and
local bully and raised Saddam on petty crime. As a teen, Hussein educated himself to pass
the military entrance exam, but ultimately failed. Frustrated by the failure to gain admittance
to the Iraqi military, Saddam would eventually turn to a small political
resistance party called the Baath Party.
1. Growth
of the Baath Party
The
Baath Party was started in the 1930s in Syria as a Pan-Arab party seeking
the unification of a single Arab state. While advocating generally for pro-Arab
policies, the Baath Party remained secular or even hostile to Islamist
ideology. The members of the Baath Party were made up
primarily of intellectuals, soldiers, and students that pieced together a
political agenda focused on Arab nationalism. Upon encouragement from a family friend,
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein joined the Baath Party and became a
low-level security officer in the 1950s. The Baath Party seized control of Iraq away from
the Hashimite monarchy in 1958 in a military coup lead by General ‘Abd al-Karin
Qasim. However, the Party quickly became
disenchanted with General Qasim when he failed to support Pan-Arabist policy. In 1959, the Baath Party sent a seven member
assassination team – including Saddam Hussein - to assassinate Qasim but the
attempt failed. After the failed attempt on Qasim’s life,
Hussein was forced to flee the country to Syria for several years.
The
Baath Party managed to oust Qasim in a second military coup in 1963. However, the Baath Party emerged from the
coup ideologically split and ended up getting purged from power itself. While the Baath Party regrouped, Hussein’s
family friend, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, emerged as the leader of the streamlined
Party and Saddam was his right-hand man. In 1968, the Baath Party and group of
soldiers participated in their third military coup to return to power with
al-Bakr in control. The Baath Party would rule over Iraq
from 1968 until its removal and dissolution in 2003.
2. Centralization
of Power
To
solidify the Baath Party rule over Iraq, the Party sought to
consolidate political and military power.
Saddam Hussein was appointed as the head of the Jihaz Hunin, the Baathist internal security force, as well as the Deputy
Secretary-General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the main policy
making body. Hussein, whose self-professed hero was Joseph
Stalin, began a cold-blooded struggle for power. Hussein went on the offensive politically
outmaneuvering all opposition until he and al-Bakr were the only viable leaders
left. To reduce the risk of future military coups,
Hussein began to undermine the power of any potential military challenger and
replace them with his closest allies. As
head of the Jihaz Hunin, Hussein
allowed Nadhim Kzar, the chief of the Iraqi internal security force to conduct
ruthless torture and assassinations until he plotted to kill al-Bakr at which
point Hussein had him executed along with 35 others. Eventually Hussein’s power play would even
lead him to convince al-Bakr to give up his powerful leadership position with
the defense ministry to be replaced by Hussein’s cousin. Two years later, al-Bakr was forced to step
down from his position and Hussein took over control of Iraq on July
16, 1979.
Upon
seizing control, Hussein sought to eliminate the remaining potential
challengers. Hussein forced the
Secretary-General of the RCC to step down and confess to supporting a
Syrian-backed coup along with 54 alleged co-conspirators. To instill fear into even those who survived,
Hussein ordered the execution of the alleged traitors by firing squad and
required all the remaining Baath Party officials to be a part of the firing
squad. Having eliminated any short-term threat to
his power, Saddam proceeded to consolidate authority with only his closest
advisors, prevent low-level Party members from gaining clout by constantly
shifting their positions, and made sure all information went through him. By creating a regime built on fear and
discipline, Hussein created a monopoly of power that would keep him in power
for the next 24 years.
C. Alternatives Outside the Baath Party
As
discussions turned to the replacement of the omnipresent Saddam Hussein in
early 2003, the US
needed a group of politicians untainted by the Baathist regime that had
personalities powerful enough to demand the respect of the Iraqi people. Based on Iraq’s violent past, the party that
takes power must be strong enough to keep control of the country – by US military
might if necessary. Finding viable
alternatives would prove difficult because a generation of Iraqis had been
taught that “any sign of individual initiative could have been fatal under
Saddam.” For Saddam, indoctrinating Iraqis in
submission started as children where a “small boy is still in our hands and we
must transform him into an interactive radiating center inside the family” by
teaching “them to criticize their mothers and fathers respectfully if they hear
them talking about organizational and party secrets.” There were two basic alternatives to the
Baathist leadership in Iraq:
1.) Religious Leaders; and 2.) Political Exiles.
1. Influence
of Religious Leaders
While
claiming religious authority to lead the nation of Iraq, the Baath Party was not
particularly religious. Religious
leaders in Iraq were
permitted to exist so long as they did not interfere with the Baathist rule
over Iraq. After the Baath regime was toppled, the Iraqi
religious leaders began an intricate competition for political power.
For
the last thousand years, the Shiite population received religious instruction
from the hawza of Najaf. The leading Shiite currently on the hawza was the Iranian-born Ayatollah
al-Sistani. Al-Sistani is a traditional
Muslim leader who believes that a cleric should not be active in politics. Hoping to receive buy-in for the US occupation from the Shiite community, the US
coalition asked al-Sistani to endorse the occupation. Al-Sistani refused to endorse the occupation,
but also did not condemn the US
presence in Iraq. When the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) attempted to impose a constitutional commission selected by the CPA, al-Sistani
weighed in by insisting that a legitimate constitution must be created by
elected representatives. By doing so, al-Sistani thrust himself into
the spotlight of the new Iraqi political regime. Many commentators took al-Sistani’s moves as
a strong Iraqi embrace in democracy, however the call for democratic
representatives to draft the new Iraqi constitution may have been a purely
self-interested move seeking to ensure a Shiite majority would draft a friendly
document. Although al-Sistani’s early
adept political moves assured his status as a power-broker, it is unlikely that
al-Sistani will ever enter into elected politics because he has refused the granting
of Iraqi citizenship and maintains he will die an Iranian citizen.
A
second influential religious leader is the 32 year-old Moqtada al-Sadr. Moqtada is the youngest son of the martyred
Mohamed Sadiq al-Sadr. Mohammed was a part of the “speaking” hawza aligned with Iran’s Khomeini supporting that
religious leaders should be active in politics. When Mohammed eventually challenged the
Baathist regime supporting their overthrow, he was assassinated along with his
two older sons. Moqtada was the only son to survive to take
over the religious teachings of his father. Moqtada fiercely opposes the US
occupation and publishes an anti-American newspaper called al-Hawza. Seeking
to establish a religious government run by clerics, Moqtada attempted to
establish his own Iraqi government shortly after the US invasion. Al-Sadr has declared that democracy itself is
“un-Islamic” and must be resisted. After Moqtada was involved in the
assassination of a rival cleric, the CPA attempted to arrest al-Sadr, but soon
determined that his arrest would cause greater turmoil than his movement
itself. Today, al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, has
been grown in strength and influence and many believe that the Iranian-backed
Hezbollah has trained between 1,000 and 2,000 of the militia’s force. It is clear that Moqtada is a religious
leader that the US will be
forced to go around or through in order to create a stable democracy in Iraq.
2. Influence
of Political Exiles
During
the Hussein era in Iraq,
thousands of Iraqis fled the country seeking refuge around the world. Many of these exiles were influential in
encouraging the United States
and Great Britain to
initiate a war in Iraq. The difficulty for exiles, however, was that
none had the name recognition or the constituency base to garner national
support and almost every exile thrust themselves into the political spotlight
too soon and appeared to be a puppet for the US coalition. George Packer perceived the exiles as holding
lower popularity levels than the Americans themselves during the early stages
of the rebuilding.
One of the most
influential of the political exiles is a man named Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi is a Shiite Iraqi by birth, a
mathematician by British and US
education, a wealthy banker by trade, and an effective political leader of the
dissident group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC became an umbrella organization for
the opposition groups to the Iraq Baathist party which Chalabi was able to
garner tens of millions of dollars from the CIA. Chalabi’s INC party fell out of favor with
the Clinton Administration after it failed its own attempted coup and Chalabi
was accused of leaking information about the CIA’s other plans to destabilize
the Hussein regime. However, Chalabi played his cards right by
setting up roots with Republicans and neo-conservatives like the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI), Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Trent
Lott, Jesse Helms, and Newt Gingrich who would soon take control of Washington, DC. Backed by the support of Rumsfeld’s Pentagon,
many believed that Chalabi would be anointed the new leader of Iraq after
riding in victorious on the American tanks.
In the last days as the favorite son of the Bush Administration, Chalabi
was invited to the State of the Union Address by First Lady, Laura Bush. While Chalabi’s credentials and relationships
with the Republican officials made him the top choice by Americans
pre-invasion, Iraqis failed to accept Chalabi and other exiles as their leaders
when they arrived. They were seen by some to be simply another
group of warlords that were enjoying the spoils of the fallen Baathist regime. Chalabi was forced to take a backseat to
Iraqi “internals” – at least for the time being.
Another
influential exile is Kanan Makiya.
Makiya is a secular Iraqi intellectual, professor, and author. In 1989, Makiya published a book called Republic of Fear
describing the violence of Saddam and his Baathist party. In early 1991, Makiya thrust himself into the
public spotlight by becoming a vocal advocate encouraging the United States march into Baghdad to overthrow Saddam and his regime. Makiya worked with fellow exiles to draft
what they called “Charter 91”, a document advocating the creation of a Republic of Tolerance
through a democratic, secular Iraq. The ideas of democratic regime change held by
Makiya caught the eye of a number of neo-conservatives. In fact, Makiya was with President Bush when
the news showed Saddam Hussein’s statute being torn down in Baghdad. Makiya was eternally optimistic that all the
Iraqi people needed was the opportunity to choose democracy and they would
thrive.
II. Post-Conflict
Events that Affect Future Options
After
the military victory over Iraq
in 2003, it was necessary to rebuild the country from the months of extensive
bombing and the years of neglect from Saddam Hussein. Significant criticism has been leveled at the
Bush Administration that while the military victory was accomplished in record
speed, there was no significant thought put into establishing security in the
aftermath. The chaos that ensued
following the primary military conflict made the terrain very unstable for the
first Iraqi steps towards democracy.
A. Effect
of Looting on Existing Infrastructure
On
April 9, 2003, a statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad was pulled down by Iraqis with the
help of a US Marine Corp vehicle. In the days and weeks that followed, Iraqis
continued to express their distaste at the toppled regime and take advantage of
their freedom from tyranny to loot Baathist government buildings. The looting was so extensive that in some
government buildings the urinals had been removed and the electrical wiring had
been pulled out of the walls. The widely broadcast scenes of looting by news
organizations, prompted then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to respond
that
while no one
condones looting, on the other hand one can understand the pent-up feelings
that may result from decades of repression and people who’ve had members of
their family killed by that regime, for them to be taking their feelings out on
that regime…freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit
crimes and do bad things.”
Without orders to disrupt the
looting, US soldiers stood by and watched as locations across Baghdad were looted. On the eve of the critical 2004 Presidential
election, the New York Times reported
that the looting went beyond just commercial products and included the looting
of weapons dumps throughout Iraq
like the one at Al Qaqaa. Many fear these weapons were taken by local
militias and terrorists and may have been used to in the improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) which have been deadly killers of both Iraqis and the US
military. Across Iraq, industries that were not
protected by private security, including the oil industry, were crippled by
looting and a lack of funding. The Ministry of Oil in Baghdad, however, was the only government
building protected. This experience left the Iraqi public feeling
helpless to the lawlessness that set in and gave the new Iraqi government a
huge set-back before it had even started.
CPA officials put a dollar figure of $12 billion on the amount infrastructure
lost through the looting. The looting and violence also cost the Americans
the luxury of being considered liberators as Iraqis found quickly that the US force could
not or would not stop the criminal activity that threatened their homes and
businesses.
B. Imposition
of Political Change by the US-Led Military Forces
The
entire US
military strategy was designed around a quick transfer of power to the Iraqis. Before the war had even begun, President
George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive number 24 which
delegated the responsibility for reconstruction to the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), a new section of the Department of Defense. Then-Secretary Donald Rumsfeld picked retired
Lt. General Jay Garner to head up the new ORHA. In reality, much of the early nationbuilding
was delegated to the US
military forces because security and staffing shortages kept civilian workers
from implementing their own policies.
Garner
and the ORHA flew to Kuwait
to plan out their mission in Iraq. One month after arriving in Kuwait, the ORHA created an “Initial Working
Draft” of their post-conflict plans in Iraq. In its mere 21 pages, the ORHA outlined the
extent of its mission to prop up a sovereign government by August including
establishing government ministries, drafting and ratifying a constitution, and
electing national leaders. One of the spokes in Garner’s plans was to
leave the Iraqi military in place and continue to pay salaries. On April 21, 2003, five days after producing
the working draft of post-conflict plans, Garner received clearance and flew
into Baghdad to
start his mission. After only three days on the ground, Garner
was notified by Rumsfeld that he was going to be replaced by Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III. By May 10th, Garner was flown to Qatar to welcome Bremer and brief him on the
conditions he would find when he arrived in Iraq. On May 11, 2003, General Tommy Franks,
commander of the Coalition ground forces, got on Iraqi radio to proclaim that
the Baathist party of Iraq
had been dissolved. In early May, 2003, the Department of Defense
was already planning on reducing the number of the troops to below 30,000. In Garner’s two-page parting memo delivered
to President Bush, he described Iraq
as well on its way to full reconstruction.
C. Imposition
of Political Change by the Coalition Provisional Authority
On
May 12, 2003, the reconstruction efforts were taken over by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, with Ambassador Paul Bremer at the helm. In an interview with PBS, Bremer said his
instruction from President Bush was to “Go over there. Use your judgment as to
how things should transpire in terms of the economic, the political, and the
security situation, and give me your best judgment.” While in Iraq, the CPA made thousands of
decisions in an attempt to move the country towards democracy. Two of Bremer’s earliest decisions made in
his first four days in Iraq
were to dissolve the Iraqi Armed Forces and bar the top tiers of Baath Party
leadership from government service. One of Bremer’s first decisions was to
reverse the ORHA’s policy of incorporation and dissolve the Iraqi Armed Forces,
the Ministry of the Defense, and the Ministry of Information and terminate all
payments to those organizations. This decision made thousands of armed Iraqis
with military training unemployed – including a number of Iraqi generals who
were working with ORHA staff to help re-constitute the military and restart
military pay. Bremer counters that the Iraqi Armed Forces
had already been dissolved as a result of combat or desertion and his order
merely confirmed the situation on the ground. This order w
On May 16, 2003,
Bremer decreed that members of the top four levels of the Baath Party were
summarily removed and barred from government service. It is estimated that this included around
30,000 employees of the state. Employees in the lower ranks of the
prohibition were able to appeal the decision to the Supreme National
Debaathification Commission. Bremer defends his decision based on the US experience rooting out Nazi officials in
post-war Germany. The combined effect of dissolving the
military and intelligence apparatus as well as barring the top Baathist Party
members put thousands of Iraqis out of work with little love lost for the
American occupiers.
III. Alternatives
Available to the United
States
There have been
five major alternatives proposed as the next step for America to take in Iraq. First, the Bush Administration has long
described its strategy as “staying the course” in an attempt to outlast the
insurgency. Second, a near-term
withdrawal of US troops, either immediate or phased, has been proposed by
critics of the Administration. Third, an
increase in troop levels has been supported by a few policy-makers in an
attempt to provide greater security for the Iraqi people. Fourth, internationalizing governance of Iraq to a multinational
organization with experience in nation-building has been favored by some. Fifth, after sectarian violence has become
more prevalent, pursuit of a three-state solution splitting the country of Iraq based on
ethno-religious lines has received significant consideration. These alternatives will be described and
evaluated.
A. Stay the Course
PROPOSAL: Allow the civilian and military leaders in Iraq to
continue efforts currently in progress to establish the stability,
infrastructure, and leadership necessary for a healthy, liberal democracy.
1. Background
On May 1, 2003,
President George W. Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier to
announce the end of major conflict in Iraq touting “Mission
Accomplished.” When asked about the rising casualties in Iraq
on July 3, 2003, the President expressed confidence that the military strategy
was sufficient to deal with the increased threat and his message to terrorists
was to “bring them on.” As military conflict mired US troops in Iraq at the end of 2003, President Bush
described the US mission in Iraq in the
following way,
We will stay
the course until the job is done . . . And the temptation is to try to get the
President or somebody to put a timetable on the definition of getting the job
done. We're just going to stay the
course. And it's v’ry important for the
Iraqi people to know’that.
The “stay the course” strategy
became the mantra for Administration supporters against their opponents who in
their words wanted to “cut and run” by setting dates to begin withdrawal. It is important to look behind the rhetoric
to evaluate the effectiveness of the “stay the course” alternative.
2. Investing in Democracy
Part
of building a functioning democracy, is establishing a military that can defend
her country against outside aggressors.
The Bush Administration has pledged that it will remain until democracy
is established and the military is functioning independently. President Bush frequently summed up the US
exit strategy in the following terms, “As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down,
and when our commanders on the ground tell me that Iraqi forces can defend
their freedom, our troops will come home with the honor they have earned.” Although part of the “stay the course”
strategy, supporting the creation of a self-sufficient Iraqi military is
generally a goal supported by both political parties.
However,
accomplishing the US goal of
a free, capitalist, and democratic Iraq will require a long-term
commitment of troops. Each day American
troops remain in Iraq
the Iraqi people are reminded their country is still occupied by a foreign
nation. Restless Iraqis have become more
easily motivated to join insurgency efforts to fight both their American
occupiers and competing sectarian leaders.
The question is now posed whether “staying the course” in Iraq is actually supporting or opposing Iraq’s
transition to democracy.
3. Building Infrastructure
Part of the “stay the
course” alternative includes building the physical, political, and military
infrastructure for the new Iraq. By making the everyday lives of Iraqis better
than they were under Saddam, the US hoped to win the “hearts and
minds” of the Iraqis. However, much has
been said about the failure by the Bush Administration to create a plan for a
post-Saddam Iraq. The rebuilding of Iraq has further been hampered by
the continued lack of security and constant terror attacks.
One of the first
priorities after the fall of the Saddam regime was rebuilding the physical
infrastructure to a workable level. This
involved replacing that which was destroyed in the “Shock and Awe” air campaign
as well as the infrastructure Saddam allowed to deteriorate. A team sent in by then-Secretary of
Transportation, Norman Mineta, found the US-led invasion caused minor damage to
the transportation system. Through the efforts of the Department of
Transportation and funding from USAID, Saddam
International Airport
was able to reopen as Baghdad
International Airport
in July, 2003. Unfortunately, the oil, gas, and electrical
infrastructure continues to fare worse.
Nearly $6 billion has been spent in Iraq
updating the electrical infrastructure, however in February, 2006 Baghdad still receives
only six hours of electricity each day. Despite, the intentions of the US and her allies, Iraq’s current infrastructure
remains insufficient to handle the normal needs of modern Iraqis.
ANALYSIS: The policy behind the “stay the course” open-ended
will not likely lead to success by itself.
Infrastructure building, training, and responding with flare-ups of
violence has been the policy of the Bush Administration since the fall of the
Baathist regime in 2003. More than three
years later, however, Iraq
still fails to show significant signs of progress. In fact, the country appears to be less
stable today and more prone to violence, particularly sectarian-based violence,
than it did during the initial combat operations. The argument could certainly be made that Iraq today is
less stable than it was under Saddam Hussein when there was a state monopoly on
violence. The insufficiency of the “stay
the course” plan is revealed when American leadership in Iraq like
Ambassador Bremer announce that their instructions were to “use your judgment”
with a mere 10 days to prepare before taking over control of a foreign, complex
nation. Additionally, the open-ended
commitment of the “stay the course” strategy requires that the US stay involved in Iraq until the “job is done,” but
refuses to define the criteria for a completed job. The American people spoke out against the
current handling of the situation in Iraq through their vote in the
midterm elections in 2006. Although
aspects of the current plan like infrastructure building and troop training are
absolutely necessary to regaining stability, the current Bush Administration
policy has proven untenable.
B. Withdrawal of Troops
PROPOSAL: Begin the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq either
immediately or according to a phased schedule.
1. Background
One of the most
vocal advocates for an immediate withdrawal of US troops is Representative John
Murtha (D-PA), who released the following statement on November 17, 2005:
[T]he Iraqi
people and the emerging government must be put on notice that the United States
will immediately redeploy. . . . Our military has done everything that has been
asked of them, the U.S. can
not accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. IT IS TIME TO BRING THEM HOME.
Crediting Murtha with changing the
discourse on Iraq
and helping Democrats win back a House majority, House Speaker-elect Nancy
Pelosi endorsed Murtha in an unsuccessful bid to become the Majority Leader for
new Democratic majority.
A number of
political candidates – primarily Democrats – in the 2006 mid-term elections
adopted a compromise position by calling for the “phased redeployment” of US troops –
often according to a timetable. Policy-makers
differ on the length of the timetable and/or the conditions that would trigger
a phased withdrawal. One week after winning the majority of
Congress, incoming Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Carl Levin (D-MI),
stated:
“[W]e should
pressure the White House to commence the phased redeployment of U.S. troops
from Iraq in four to six months…make it clear to the Iraqis that our presence
is not open-ended and that they must take and make the necessary political
compromises to preserve Iraq as a nation.
The proposal of near-term troop
withdrawal is argued to lead to two basic results which are not mutually
exclusive. First, a troop reduction by
the US-lead coalition could encourage Iraqis to make a greater investment in
ending the violence and establishing a new government. Second, removing the US-troop presence could
cause a power vacuum that would be filled by the party with the biggest weapons
arsenal.
2. Encouraging Iraqi Investment in their
Destiny
The
most common defense of a withdrawal of troops is to encourage the Iraqi people
and their leaders to take responsibility for their own destiny. In John Murtha’s defense of withdrawal, he
stated, “I believe with a U.S.
troop redeployment, the Iraqi security forces will be incentivized to take
control.” Some believe that Iraqi leaders have failed
to take a stand in the future of their country because they rely on the
Americans for keeping order. In Murtha’s
mind, the military has completed its mission and the situation requires a
purely political solution now. As the death toll of American lives
approaches 3,000, many have begun to wonder whether democracy in Iraq
is worth the pain and suffering each additional casualty brings. However, it was recently leaked to the public
that the Bush Administration is concerned that the current Iraqi leaders under
Nouri al-Maliki do not have the requisite power or resolve to end the violence
and move the country towards peace.
3. Risking a Power Vacuum and the
Possibility of a Failed State
Despite
their stance on how the US
ended up in Iraq,
many civilian and military policy-makers and commentators warn against the
withdrawal of troops. The Bush
Administration has argued that setting timetables for withdrawal provides a
date after which the terrorists and sectarian militia may take control of the
country by force. The biggest fear is
that Iraq
will become a failed state and a terror-haven posing an even worse threat than
when Saddam was in power. Public Policy
scholar Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. describes the strategy of the insurgency as
seeking to force a premature departure by the US
from Iraq
in order to seize the state through a disciplined foreign-financed coup.
Military leaders
have generally cautioned against a drastic reduction in troops in the face of
increased violence. On November 15,
2006, General Abizaid testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee
opposing plans for a phased withdrawal. However, this contradicts General Abizaid
testimony in the Fall of 2005 which supported a withdrawal to help ease the
insurgency in Iraq. The opinion of average US soldiers on the idea of beginning a
withdrawal from Iraq
provokes mixed responses. Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Suich’s take on the prospect of withdrawal from Forward Operating
Base (FOB) Sykes was, “Take us out of that vacuum -- and it's on the edge now
-- and boom, it wo–d becom’ a free-for-all . –. a raw contention for power.
That would be the bloodiest piece of this war.” Captain Jim Modlin, also stationed at FOB
Sykes, indicated some change was needed:
Pulling out
now would be as bad or worse than going forward with no changes . . . .
Sectarian violence would be rampant, democracy would cease to exist, and the
rule of law would be decimated. It's not
'stay the course,' and it's not 'cut an’ run' ‘r other politica’ catchp’rases.‘
There are ’eople's lives here. There are
so many different dy’amics that go on here that a simple solution just isn't
possible.
It is clear that the opinions, even
amongst the military decision-makers, are split.
One
of the greatest fears expressed about a military withdrawal is the threat of
who will fill the political vacuum after the US departs. These fears played out on a small scale in
early November in the province of Diyala which borders Iran. This predominantly Shiite province was once
considered a secure area, however sectarian violence has begun to spread through
the area. Feeling pressure to begin
withdrawing, American Colonel Brian D. Jones attempted to transfer some control
of this province to the newly appointed commander of Iraq Army’s Fifth
Division, Brigadier General Shakir Hulail Hussein al-Kaabi. Al-Kaabi is a Shiite who was appointed to his
role by the government in Baghdad. After taking control of the Diyala province,
al-Kaabi brought Col. Jones a list he had received from Baghdad of individuals who needed to be
arrested. The list included every Sunni local leader
with whom the Americans had been working with to try to establish the peace. The Iraqi Fifth Division began to carry out
several operations aimed solely against the Sunni population. The actions appeared to be solely aimed at
securing the Diyala province as a Shia province rather than maintaining the
peace. In early November, American commanders
decided that any transfer of power at that point was premature and a full
transfer of power was delayed at least until spring, 2007. By the end of November, the Diyala province
has been characterized as “volatile” as military encounters there grow greater
than ever – including one fire-fight that lasted for 40 hours straight and
resulted in 72 killed insurgents along with two American casualties. A mere handful of weeks after the failed
attempt to transfer control of this province to the new Iraqi Armed Forces, US
commanders describe the new insurgents that have moved into Diyala as
“remarkably disciplined.”
ANALYSIS: Withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq is a reality that the American
people and policy-makers should be prepared for. After three years in Iraq, the
increasing violence and loss of American lives are a source for concern,
however the decision to withdraw US troops before a stable government has been
created is a decision that requires serious consideration. In the best case scenario, a near-term
withdrawal of troops would cause Iraqis to quell the violence and step up to
the podium to lead the new nation of Iraq forward while at the same time. Under a worst case scenario, the nation would
progress into a full civil war that could last for several years and result in
some, if not all, of the country becoming a haven for terrorism.
The United States’ primary (“slam dunk”) purpose for
a pre-emptive attack on Iraq
was to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction which could easily be
transferred to terrorist organizations. The
purpose stated less frequently in public was rid Iraq
of a brutal dictator creating a model democracy as an example for the entire Middle East. After
the presence of weapons of mass destruction was determined to be inaccurate,
the Bush Administration began to publicly focus on its second goal of
establishing healthy democracy. An
immediate withdrawal from Iraq
would fail at this goal and likely leaves Iraq in a broken state that is more
dangerous to international security than it was under Saddam. Some argue that the United States no longer has the possibility of
success in Iraq
and should therefore withdrawal immediately.
The story from Diyala in the previous section is a mild example sectarian
retaliation would likely engulf the nation if the US leaves without democratic
protections in place. Most policy-makers
wish they could return to the debate authorizing the use of force in Iraq with
the knowledge we have today, but unfortunately the United States must live with
the decision it made before and after entering Iraq and at the very least
establish a Iraqi stable government and a military that can protect itself.
That being said,
the United States must have
an exit strategy from Iraq to
avoid perpetual dependency on the US military as well as to require
Iraqis to take the lead in determining the future of their nation. It is necessary that the withdrawal of US
troops is a valid option for the US and a reality for the Iraqis in
order to force Iraqi participation in the future of their country. The timing for a withdrawal from Iraq could be phased or set to a timetable,
however, that timetable should coincide with progress on the ground towards a
stable Iraq
that is not susceptible to harboring and supporting terrorism. For the US to succeed at its stated goals in
Iraq, a withdrawal in the midst of sectarian and insurgent violence would leave
Iraq as a broken state – one in which the entire world would have to bear the
consequences. Withdrawal must be a
reality for the Iraqi people, but withdrawal must begin and end based on the
decisions of the US
policy-makers.
C. Increase Troop Presence
PROPOSAL: Increase
the number of Coalition troops in Iraq to stem the violence and train
the new Iraqi Armed Forces.
1. Background
Prior to the start
of the invasion into Iraq, a
major in the Marine Corp that sat on the National Security Council (NSC)
estimated that a force of 500,000 would be needed to attack and hold Iraq
in a memo given to then-NSC Director Condoleeza Rice. Around the same time, General Eric Shinseki, then-Army
Chief of Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that troop
levels required for the occupation of Iraq
would be “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” because Iraq
was a “fairly significant” piece of geography. Former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
Ambassador Paul Bremer, reportedly told an aide in Baghdad that it “wasn’t
politically possible” to get any additional troops in Iraq and anyone who felt
like they were unsafe should “go home.” Later, Bremer made waves when he reportedly
said that “The single most important change -- the one thing that would have
improved the situation -- would have been having more troops in Iraq -- the
beginning and throughout” at a private address in September, 2004. The leadership of the Department of Defense
like Paul Wolfowitz dismissed General Shinseki’s estimate as “wildly off the
mark” and eventually dismissed General Shinseki from service. Wolfowitz followed saying, “It’s hard to
conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it
would take to conduct the war itself . . . . Hard to imagine.”
From the start of
the Iraq war, Senator John
McCain has been a vocal critic of the number of troop with which the US
entered the war. Senator McCain stated in
November of 2003, “The simple truth is that we do not have sufficient forces in
Iraq
to meet our military objectives . . . . Our overall troop level in Iraq
does not reflect a careful assessment of what it takes to achieve victory.” Despite the mid-term election results in 2006,
McCain believes that an increase in troop levels still has a strong chance of
salvaging Iraq. McCain points to the weakening of the US
influence in the Middle East and to the writings of extremists like Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden as the strongest factors for sending more troops
into Iraq.
As President Bush
seeks advice on a new course in Iraq,
views on an increase in troop levels vary.
The Iraq Study Group (ISG) rejected the proposal of making a substantial
increase in troops because it was unrealistic given the current size of the
military. The ISG said that it would support a
short-term increase in troops to either stabilize Baghdad or assist in troop training. Long-term, the ISG recommended that “subject
to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat
brigades not necessary for force protection” be withdrawn by the first quarter
of 2008.
In contrast, some
in the Pentagon leadership which met with President Bush on December 13, 2006
planned to recommend an increase in troop levels by about 40,000 troops coupled
with a strategic realignment of their mission to include missions against the
militias of al-Sadr and the insurgents of Al Anbar province. Some commentators have termed this strategy
as America “doubling down”
on its bet for the future of Iraq
to use the common betting term. General Peter J. Schoomaker, current Chief of
Staff of the Army, cast doubts on plans to build up troop levels at a December
14th congressional hearing stating “The Army is incapable
of generating and sustaining the required forces to wage the global war on
terror.” It was reported that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for the US Armed Forces did not endorse calls for a troop build-up, but
rather presented the President with plans to focus on political and economic
solutions to current violence while devoting up to 15 percent of the current
combat troops in Iraq
to training the new Iraqi Armed Forces. Meanwhile, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki began a “national reconciliation” conference where he announced an
official end to Bremer’s de-Baathification of the Iraqi Armed Forces was over
and all former military officers were welcomed back into the military. Any US
change in plans for Iraq
may be subject to change after Robert Gates is sworn in as the new Secretary of
Defense on Monday, December 18, 2006.
2. Establish Greater Security for the
Iraqi People
Looking back, many
commentators believe that the failure of the US military to prevent the looting
of governmental offices, weapons dumps, and the private industries created an
environment of insecurity amongst the Iraqi people. According to Noah Feldman, a “security
umbrella” is the necessary first duty of a nationbuilder. Only after security has been restored can
meaningful nationbuilding begin. By
failing to create a secure environment, many Iraqis, accustomed to rule of the
most powerful party, turned to militias and tribal leaders for a sense of security.
The
policy-makers supporting an increase in the number of US troops on the ground
hope that a larger force would quell the violence and increase security for the
Iraqi people. According to Clausowitz’s military
theory, ensuring victory requires overwhelming force. Meanwhile US troop levels stand at
approximately 140,000. While Senator
McCain acknowledges to sustain an increased troop presence, the entire military
would have to grow, he suggests increasing troops levels to around 200,000. However, General Abizaid testified on
November 15, 2006 that under current force capacity the US military
could add up to 20,000 troops, even this modest increase could only be
sustained short term. If the increase in
troop levels is limited to a short term increase of 20,000 troops, it is
unlikely that overwhelming force Clausowitz suggests could be achieved.
3. Threat of Increased Loss of Life and
Greater Violence
Any
increase in US
troop levels brings with it a threat of increased loss of American lives. As American casualties approach 3,000 – of
which a vast majority occurred after President Bush declared an end to “major
combat operations” – the willingness of the American people to accept the
growth in casualties has severely waned.
Others argue that the growth in violence in Iraq
is directly related to the continued US
presence in Iraq
and increasing the number of troops would simply drive more to participate in
the violence. For instance, John Murtha
stated that insurgents “are united against U.S. forces and we have become a
catalyst for violence Based on the inability to implement a
significant increase in troop levels, it may be necessary to enact a change in
military strategy to prevent increased loss of life and greater violence. According to a recent Los Angeles Times / Bloomberg
poll, only 12 percent of the country supports an increase in troops in Iraq.
One
alternative military strategy proposed by Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. is the so
called “oil spot strategy”. This strategy is so named based on its
expansion of military influence from one isolated spot to the entire region
similar to oil expanding over water. Two
prerequisites to this strategy are 1.) a commitment by the US to enhance the battle
preparedness of Iraqi forces; and 2.) end the perpetual rotation of military
leaders in and out of Iraq
in order to encourage a continuity in leadership. The “oil spot strategy” requires the US military to choose a limited number of
centers of military influence similar to the Green Zone in Baghdad.
From these centers of influence, joint Iraqi/American forces would
gradually expand their sphere of security outwards over time. The inner sphere (or expanding Green Zone)
would be a secure zone where Iraqis could return to a sense of normalcy while
transacting business and politics in a secure environment. Krepinevich proposes that Iraqi units take
the lead expanding the outer ring of influence with American troops
ready-in-waiting for any penetration into the security zone. If successful, this strategy would return
expanding sections of Iraq
back to the Iraqi people while taking some of the burden off the American
troops. The strategy relies on a
successful concurrent political strategy that is successful in bringing Iraqi
tribal leaders around to support US unification initiative. The major detractors to the “oil spot
strategy” are the inability to abandon the centers of influence once it has
begun in order to fight flare-ups around the country and the lengthy commitment
this strategy requires. However, the
opportunity to return expanding regions of Iraq back to secure, normal life
while integrating Iraqi military forces into the fight for their own future is
very attractive.
ANALYSIS: An increase in the level of troops in Iraq creates
the potential for great risks as well as great rewards. For the purposes of this analysis, success
will be considered increased security for all Iraqis and stability to pursue
political objectives. The risks of an
increase in troop levels are political, economic, and most importantly in human
lives. The war in Iraq has become
largely unpopular as the conflict extends year after year without significant
progress. While the final decision to
increase troops lies with the President at the advice of his military leaders,
the political risk that even increased violence cannot quell the violence is
great. Any time troop levels are altered
– increased or decreased – it comes at significant cost as personnel and
equipment must be rotated in and out of the country. To sustain an increase in troop levels, a new
Democratic Congress would likely have to approve funds to support troop
increases both in Iraq
as well as state-side in order to accommodate the increased strain. Finally, the increased troop levels come at
grave risk to the lives of America’s
bravest men and women. Weighing the
increased risk of human life against a political victory is always a grave
decision must only be made with a grave evaluation of the likelihood of
military success.
The
reward reaped by a successful increase in troops would bear political and military
dividends. Politically, the goal in Iraq has been
to establish stable democracy. Although
it is impossible to return to the early days of the Iraqi conflict and remedy
the lack of security felt by the Iraqis, an increase in troop levels could
provide sufficient security to allow political progress and reconstruction to
resume full speed. Militarily, the goal
in Iraq
has been to toIple the BaatIist regime and eliminate the threat of insurgent
and local militias to the new regime.
The number one priority for terrorists, insurgents, and radical leaders
is to effectuate the withdrawal of US troops before a stable government has
been created leaving a security vacuum that can be filled by their own
forces. A military success at quelling
violence to a level that allows progress creating a stable government would be
a huge success in the face of a complex network of terror attacks.
Although
the initial invasion of Iraq
crushed any formal resistance, the US military has faced a formidable
task attempting to conquer the local resistance with its current force. The ability to tame the opposition in Iraq is an attractive option and would help
solidify victory in Iraq. It is unlikely that a solution purely focused
on putting more boots on the ground would succeed unless accompanied by a shift
in strategy. Specifically, two options
are to attempt to follow Krepinevich’s “oil spot” strategy or to focus the
troop increase on Iraqi troop training along with imbedded troop units that
will work directly within Iraqi units.
As Secretary Gates evaluates the plan to increase troop levels, it will
be important for civilian policy-makers to listen to the opinion of military
commanders regarding the risks and challenge the military to bring new,
innovative strategies to the Iraqi theater.
Based on the dynamic nature of the threat in Iraq, if the solution includes more
troops, it must be in an intelligent manner to move American interests towards
victory.
D. Internationalize
Nationbuilding in Iraq
PROPOSAL: Engage the
international community to either turn some control over to an organization with
experience nationbuilding or invite international partners – including Iran and Syria – to help determine the
future of the nation.
1. Background
On September 23rd,
2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing
entitled, “Iraq:
Next Steps How to Internationalize Iraq Reconstruction and Organize the U.S.
Government to Administer Reconstruction Efforts.” During this hearing, Senators from both sides
of the aisle requested testimony from public policy experts on how to engage
the international community in Iraq.
In his campaign for President, part of
Senator John Kerry’s proposed plan was the internationalization of
reconstruction in Iraq. Laying out his vision at Westminster College
in Missouri,
Kerry said, “[W]e have to truly internationalize both politically and
militarily: we cannot depend on a US-only presence.” Kerry’s plan was to appoint an “International
High Commissioner” and ask NATO to play a more dominant role training the new
Iraqi military.
2. Iraq Study Group Urges
Internationalization
One of the major
components – in fact the first 18 recommendations – of the Iraq Study Group’s
report was a suggestion to engage Iraq’s neighbors, including difficult
neighbors like Syria and Iran, to play a role in stabilizing the future of Iraq. The ISG recommends that a new diplomatic push
should focus on creating regional buy-in to stabilize Iraq, secure
its borders, and build its economy. The ISG strongly recommends that America engage its enemies like Syria and Iran in “diplomatic dialogue,
without preconditions.” The ISG also suggests that dealing with
regional conflicts like the Palestine-Israeli conflict is also key to creating
peace throughout the region.
ANALYSIS: Based on the increasingly violent situation in Iraq, it is unlikely that any international
organization would be willing to take-over administration of the
nation-building efforts in Iraq. The Bush Administration should however, seek
advisors willing to assist establishing a new government infrastructure and train
the new Iraqi Armed Forces. It will
likely be difficult to secure direct diplomatic dialogue between all of Iraq’s regional
neighbors. Engaging Iraq’s neighbors will be key so the United States or Iraq itself should consider
inviting all of the Iraqi neighbors to the table to discuss important issues
regarding security, borders, and the regional economy.
E. Dividing Iraq into Three States
PROPOSAL: Cause an end to the nation of Iraq as it is currently known and
divide it into three states or three nation-states.
1. Background
This proposal has
been publicly proposed in two different forms.
The first, proposed most thoroughly by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE),
suggests the division of Iraq
into three separate states, with a limited, unified central government. The second, argued most ardently by Peter
Galbraith, suggests the division of Iraq into three separate,
autonomous nation-states.
2. Three United Iraqi States
On May 1, 2006,
Senator Joseph Biden, in cooperation with Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of
the Council on Foreign Relations, made a proposal that would result in a
unified Iraq
with three separate states. Sen. Biden proposed the creation of three
largely autonomous states along ethno-religious lines – Kurd, Sunni, and Shia -
with a unified central government. Under
th– Biden proposal a relatively weak, central government would be responsible
for “border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues.” Biden indicates that this solution can be
done within the parameters of the new Iraqi constitution and without redrawing
the Iraqi national map.
In order to get
the Sunni population to sign on to the three-state proposal, Biden suggests a
concession guaranteeing 20 percent of the present and future Iraqi oil. This concession would bring the Sunni
population to the table because it would guarantee a cut in the known oil which
is located in the Kurdish north and Shia south.
The concession would keep the Kurds and Shia at the table by
guaranteeing that the country would remain unified maintaining its leverage to
negotiate oil sales internationally.
The United States is
required to be the power broker and support for the adoption of this
proposal. Sen. Biden proposes that the US maintain and grow the reconstruction of Iraq with
incentives to guarantee the protection of the rights of women and
minorities. The United States would also engage Iraq’s neighbors to ensure that they do not
attempt to subvert the new united states
of Iraq. Finally, the US would responsibly draw down
troops transitioning more and more power to the Iraqis forcing additional
responsibility to rest in Iraqi hands.
3. Establish Three Separate Nation-States
Peter
Galbraith unapologetically calls for the division of Iraq into three separate,
autonomous nation-states. Galbraith states
that the best argument for partitioning Iraq into three nation-states is
because “It has already happened.” Out of humility, the United States policy-makers should
defer to the Iraqi people. Galbraith believes that the civil war in Iraq
can be traced all the way back to August 29, 2003 when a suicide bomber killed
Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, a leader in the largest Iraqi Shiite party. By attempting to broker a unified Iraqi
government, the United
States would be committing to an indefinite
participation in internal Iraqi politics. And in Galbraith’s mind, “There will be no
reason to mourn Iraq’s
passing. Iraq has brought virtually nonstop
misery to the 80 percent of its people that are not Sunni Arabs and could only
be held together by force.”
4. Difficulty Dividing Iraq into Three Distinct States
There
are a number of difficulties with dividing Iraq into three distinct states or
nation-states. Not the least of which is
determining what body has the ultimate power to divide up a sovereign nation. One recognized definition of a nation-state
which has been adopted in US federal courts is an entity that has “competence,
within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with
other states, as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities
to do so.” Some suggest statehood is granted simply be
being recognized by others as constituting a state
[T]he word
"state" means an entity that has a defined territory and population,
under the control of a government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities. A state is a body politic
possessing sovereignty.
The United
States presence in Iraq as occupiers requires the
restoration of public order and safety, however, except in extreme circumstances,
it must be done within the laws in force in the country. In 1971, the United Nations claimed the right
to recognize new nation-states in its decision to recognize Namibia and place sanctions on South Africa until it left the
country. Based on its international obligations, it
would be very difficult for the United States
to mandate the partition of Iraq
into three separate nation-states.
Additionally,
there will be difficulty dividing up the large cities and holy places in Iraq like Kirkuk
and Baghdad. The northern city of Kirkuk straddles the Kurdish and Sunni
religious territories. Kirkuk
is an oil rich city occupied by Iraq’s
Kurdish, Sunni Arab, Turcoman, and Chaldo-Assyrian population. During the reign of Saddam, significant
numbers of Sunnis settled into the Kirkuk
area. Iraq’s
new constitution provides that the control of Kirkuk would be decided by a local referendum
at the end of 2007. Baghdad
provides an even more difficult
situation. Split amongst Sunni
and Shiite populations, Baghdad
has become a hotbed of sectarian violence.
Under the Iraq’s new
constitution, Baghdad
is prohibited from joining any of the regions subsequently formed. If policy-makers were to decide to divide the
country into three nation-states, splitting important cities like Kirkuk and Baghdad
will dominate and may block the creation of a three-state solution.
Finally,
all of the risks of an immediate withdrawal would also apply where Iraq were
divided into three-states. Many fear
that the creation of three states would create the risk of one or more of the
states failing and becoming a safehaven for terrorism. If, for instance, Iraq
were divided into three states, many fear that the Sunni state would attract
former Baathists and Al Qaeda operatives eager to inflict pain on the United States and regain control of Iraq and its
oil profits. A failed ethno-religious
state would create an equally debilitating situation as a failed nation of Iraq.
ANALYSIS: The three-state solution is perhaps the most
intriguing of the three proposals. This
proposal seemingly offers an opportunity to turn back the clocks to the Ottoman
Empire and allow the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and al-Basrah to
each develop their own destiny with some degree of autonomy. Sectarian violence has been a growing source
of the instability in the country. The
Biden and the Galbraith plan each propose a way forward that allows Iraq to be divided along sectarian lines that
may be a new direction for Iraq. However, splitting the nation into three states
may not be a universal problem-solver.
Establishing three
states under a common umbrella government or three separate states will not in
and of itself end the violent relationship between these religious groups. In fact, after the borders are penciled in,
it may encourage violence or antagonistic handling of any Iraqi unlucky enough
to be living in a state that does not share their religious practices. The only way to avoid violence and perhaps
genocide would be to engage in mandatory relocation of Iraqis into their
appropriate state. Forced relocation is
a possibility, but as the Israeli-Palestine conflict has evidenced, requiring
an individual to leave their home may cause significant problems itself. Urban areas housing Iraqis of different
sectarian backgrounds, like Kirkuk and Baghdad, will present
significant problems splitting the nation into three states. Mandatory relocation would also likely mark
an end to hopes of establishing a liberal democracy that harbors individual
freedoms. While a unified, heterogeneous
Iraq
must, by necessity, be accepting of diverse religious views, a homogeneous
state may adopt strict, religiously repressive rules to govern their
population.
Additionally,
splitting Iraq into three
states may compromise US
efforts to ensure the new Iraq
will not harbor or support terrorists.
Upon division, it is conceivable that insurgent and Al Qaeda fighters
could congregate in the Sunni controlled area to train and prepare for attacks
in Iraq
and beyond. Prolonged presence by the US
military in the region would be still be required to ensure that the territory
of Iraq did not become a breeding ground for terrorism. The parties currently seeking to destabilize Iraq
for political gain would likely continue to attempt to seize power at the state
level.
The risk of
continued sectarian violence and harboring of terrorism are not reasons for the
failure of the Biden or Galbraith plan.
There is a very real possibility, however, that a shift in policy
towards a three state plan would not reduce the US
involvement in Iraq,
but perhaps could extend it as three separate parallel governments are
established in a continued violent environment rather than one national system.
The Best Route to
Success in Iraq
Since
2003, the United States has
asked Iraq
to fit its complex, dynamic society into a pre-manufactured cookie-cutter
democracy. Novice Iraqi politicians have
faced demands to forge political coalitions as they simultaneously engage in 21st
century political environment. After
analysis, both here and throughout the political arena, it has become clear
that each of the proposed alternatives has the potential for benefit and
detriment for the future of Iraq. One thing that is certain as the President
seeks to chart a new way forward in Iraq
in 2007 is that the “stay the course”, open-ended commitment in Iraq
must change. The new course for US policy in Iraq likely lies in a mixture of
these five proposals. After an atypical
string of weeks in early December, 2006 where the Bush Administration invited
outside advice on options available within the fiscal, legal, and logistical
restraints currently available, the Administration officials are likely the
most informed to chart a new strategy moving forward. The Administration should not feel handcuffed
to past policy, but must define what success in Iraq
means today and embrace the policy best suited to achieve that success in Iraq.
Definition of Success: Success in Iraq
should be defined as the development of a unified, federal Iraq that is
governed by a stable democracy accepting, though not necessarily embracing, of
diverse cultural and religious differences.
Proposal: The best route to success in Iraq should empower moderate Iraqis to take
control of their own destiny while reducing violence and outside political
influence, growing the economy, and rotating the US military from harm’s way as soon
as possible.
These goals are
admittedly a tall task, but can be achieved with a combined commitment from the
Iraqi people and US political, diplomatic, and military leaders.
Empowerment
of Moderate Iraqis
The empowerment of
moderate Iraqis has both a political and military component. Politically, there are two primary
objectives: 1.) identify and promote political leadership; and 2.) encourage an
environment of compromise and national reconciliation. Since Saddam took power in 1979, membership
in the Baath Party was the only way to power in Iraq and even that power was
limited to prevent any threat to Saddam Hussein regime. In the wake of the ouster of the Baath Party,
new political parties are still timidly testing the waters of democratic
political advocacy. Iraqi political
parties must be encouraged to quickly identify local and national leadership
that is representative and holds the charismatic personality qualities that
will garner popular support. To train
Iraqis in political organization, grassroots movements, and advocacy, the full
experience (without the rhetoric) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and US national
political parties should be offered to help train emerging political leadership
and staff. As in the United States, the political leaders
chosen will not be perfect, nor will they be permanent. The United
States and its coalition, must then responsibly promote
the new Iraqi leadership to the international community as the face of Iraq while
allowing the new leadership the opportunity to learn crucial lessons about
ruling their nation.
To establish a
stable democracy, the new Iraqi leadership must be able look beyond their
personal political religious beliefs and encourage an environment of compromise
and reconciliation. Debate and compromise
are two of the most important aspects of a democracy, but are two things that
the United States can never
force on Iraq. These
qualities are best understood not as a sign of weakness, but an opportunity to
prove the merits of your position and achieve the best results for your country. In an Iraqi environment where personal
freedoms are currently guaranteed at the barrel of a gun, there are significant
barriers to political compromise. Representatives
from the legislatures of the United States Congress, British Parliament, and
other world democracies can provide advice to the Iraqi leadership. Moderate political leadership will ultimately
have to make a decision to seek compromise instead of violence. If the Iraqi leadership decides that the nation
is best served by splitting into the confederation of three states or three
separate nation-states, the United
States should honor that decision, assist in
the negotiation of the division of the country, and prepare an exit strategy
aimed at preventing the failure of any of the new states.
Moderate
leadership is also necessary in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Although progress is being made to
reconstitute the Iraqi military, the military units are generally split
according to religious differences and hand out justice accordingly. Establishing an effective Iraqi military will
require integrated military units committed to the protection of Iraq
against common enemies instead of acting according to religious motivations.
Reducing Violence
and Outside Political Influence
The US efforts to win the peace in Iraq have failed. Easing the violence in Iraq will have
the greatest impact on the lives of the Iraqi people who have faced increasing insurgent
and sectarian violence for the last three years. Ending the violence in Iraq requires
both a military and increasingly a political strategy.
Militarily, the US must change its tactics in Iraq. Currently the US military is forced to police the
streets, conduct raids on suspected safe-houses, and respond to insurgent
flare-ups. Despite the valiant efforts
of the US forces, the
violence in Iraq
continues to grow. Fighting the
insurgency has been like attacking Hydra – every time the US cuts off the
head of the insurgency in one place, another one grows in its place. To more effectively deal with the violent
situation, the US
must change its mission to focus more intently on training new Iraqi troops to
take the lead in the fight for their own future by adjusting its deployment to
increase the number of coalition troops sent to train Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi troops would have the advantage looking
and speaking like their fellow countrymen. The United
States should also use the experience of its military
leadership, active and retired, by putting emerging Iraqi military leaders
through training with America’s
best and brightest soldiers. As Iraqi
military leaders are identified, they should receive special training in
applicable international and national law that governs combat including the
personal freedoms protected under the new Iraqi constitution. The decision to embed Iraqi and US troops in
mixed units is another option to consider, however this must be a military
decision because language and chain of command barriers may complicate this
tactic.
To help end the
violence, a political solution must accompany the new military strategy. Simply placing Iraqis at the forefront will
not by itself solve the violence problem in Iraq. Iraq must engage in internal and
external diplomacy that engages dissenting views politically rather than
militarily. National reconciliation
between the sectarian groups is necessary for the survival of a unified Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has
started the process, but a genuine commitment to turning the page must be adopted.
The Iraqi politicians and religious
leaders must devote all available efforts to finding common ground on the role
of government and the end of unrestrained violence. Economic and political incentives should be
employed as leverage to make the stakes clear and entice parties to the
table. Diplomatic efforts do not end at
the borders of Iraq. Iraqi, US, and European officials must engage
in diplomatic negotiations with Iraq’s
neighbors to make clear the interests for each nation to establish a safe and
secure Iraq
for each of their best interests.
Political considerations should be taken into account when deciding
which country’s diplomats will enter negotiations and whether the negotiations
will be public or kept private.
Growing the
Economy
Iraq currently
suffers from staggeringly high unemployment.
The disrepair of internal infrastructure, failure of businesses, and the
continued internal violence has lead to significant unrest amongst the Iraqi
people. Security concerns have prevented
large scale reconstruction projects from being completed. Car bombs frequently attack lines of Iraqis
looking for work at police stations and job centers. If efforts to quell the violence are successful,
rebuilding and economic growth should become primary goals of the US-led
coalition. International commitments to
fund the rebuilding Iraq
should be pursued to continue the infrastructure building. As Iraqis return to work, the number of
Iraqis available to incite violence will diminish and the incentive to stabilize
the security situation will increase.
Rotating US
Troops Out of Harms Way
Just as the
military option is an important part of diplomatic negotiations, the option to withdraw
troops is necessary to negotiate peace.
While the “stay the course” open-ended commitment to democratizing Iraq
was meant to discourage the opposition of democracy in Iraq, it did not place a
sufficient sense of urgency on the need to establish a Iraqi leadership that
could unite the country and quell the violence.
The US military has
served valiantly in Iraq,
addressed mistakes quickly and definitively, and sacrificed brave men and
women. Combat has taken a toll on the US
military and rotating our troops out of harms way should be a constant endgame
strategy.
However politically
attractive an immediate withdrawal from Iraq
may be, US troop levels
should not be reduced until Iraq
new Armed Forces can take over security to bolster the elected leadership in Iraq. To ensure that waiting for the Iraq Armed
Forces does not turn into a continued open-ended commitment, benchmarks and
deadlines should be put into place to ensure the progress of the Iraqi
military. Benchmarks should include
total number of combat-ready Iraqis, special-trained response forces, officers
trained. Although the initial US
occupying force would have benefited from as many as 200,000 additional ground
forces, based on military estimates it is unlikely that the military could
sustain such a large increase in deployment to Iraq today. To achieve its goals of curbing violence and
reaching Iraqi military benchmarks, the US military should consider short-term
increases in the number of troops to achieve specific military goals. Additionally, to sustain current military
commitments as well as any new threats that may arise, the US military
should appropriately grow its total force strength.
As the Bush
Administration charts a new way forward for Iraq,
it is crucial that all new and alternative ideas for developing a stable
democracy in Iraq. The United
States should not hesitate to call upon America’s vast intellectual, political, and
military leadership to be directly involved in specific training of Iraqis that
will be guiding the new Iraq
forward. The US coalition should seek to empower
moderate political and military leadership that are prepared to lead the
country through compromise and reconciliation.
Violence and direct outside influence in Iraq must be curbed to allow the
Iraqi local and national government to develop.
A primary goal of both Iraq
and the United States
should be to grow the economy to put more Iraqis back to work. Finally, the US should set benchmarks that will
facilitate greater opportunity to rotate American troops out of harms way
making it clear to Iraqis that withdrawal of US troops is a reality.